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Abstract 
Interdependencies between infrastructures which enable the flow resources 
have the potential to increase the vulnerability of interconnected systems of 
supply chains to disruption via cascading mechanisms. These interactions are 
poorly understood as there are limited observations whilst the movement of 
resources can occur at many spatial scales. It is a complex problem because of 
both the number of components and the dynamic nature of the systems that 
allow these to move around. 
To analyse the disruption of resource flows within interdependent systems, this 
paper introduces a resource model that pulls together two established modelling 
methodologies: input-output modelling and network analysis. Data on supply, 
demand and flows are typically only provided at coarse spatial scales, so an 
important development was the disaggregation of regional economic input-
output data into smaller spatial units.   
The model was tested using a case study of Lerwick in the Shetland Islands. It 
was found, when flood defences were taken into account, the level of risk from 
storm surges of various magnitudes was low. The model was able to highlight 
unknown linkages and reaffirm an increase in vulnerability caused by Just-in-
time management strategies and the clustering of like industries. As part of this 
a flood risk analysis technique was presented which highlighted the potential 
impacts of floods of varying magnitudes, as well how the flood protection 
affected the levels of risk caused by these events. 
A second case study of the food distribution network in New York was also 
developed to provide validation through the recreation of the effects post 
Tropical Storm Sandy. 
The research provided a rationale for an encouragement of a move away from 
just-in-time production to take place and halt the fashion of making supply 
chains leaner. It also encouraged an increase in cooperation to take place 
between companies to understand the vulnerabilities within their own supply 
chains.  
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1 Introduction  
Cities, regions and countries can be viewed as systems which are made up of 
numerous stocks and flows such as; direct energy, materials, waste, food, water 
and transport (BFF, 2002). These resources, and our ability to move them to 
where they are needed, enable modern lifestyles, and enhance the quality of life 
and wellbeing of the communities they serve. To deliver these services requires 
numerous interdependent infrastructures, including energy generation and 
transmission, water, sanitation, telecommunications and transportation (Rinaldi 
et al., 2001). Disruption of the movement of resources or its supporting 
infrastructure therefore has inevitable economic, social and environmental 
impacts. Numerous examples from extreme events such as Hurricane Sandy 
and the Chao Praya River Basin flooding in Thailand highlight the need for more 
effective intervention and management to reduce resource disruption.  
To tackle this, a quantitative resource model has been developed that embeds 
Input-Output (I-O) (Lifset, 2009) relationships of supply and demand within a 
spatial network model. These capture the interdependencies within a city or 
region to enable understanding of how disruption to resource flows may affect 
the system. The resource model can test the impact of a spatial hazard and test 
resource and infrastructure management options to reduce the impacts of 
disruptive events. 
1.1 The challenge of understanding resource disruption 
Figure 1.1 summarises the movement of resources into and out of Greater 
London but it does not provide any detail of how these resources are consumed 
or used by individuals or industrial processes within the region. Work to date on 
resource modelling has treated cities and their infrastructure as an aspatial 
‘consumer unit’ (Figure 1.1). Typically, the impacts of extreme events on a 
regional economy have been modelled by assuming a uniform drop in 
production across sectors and not considered the spatial properties of supply, 
demand and the infrastructure that mediates these (e.g. Crawford-Brown et al., 
2013).  
The importance of this knowledge has been highlighted by recent floods, other 
natural disasters and human activities, showing the impact of infrastructure 
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disruption on supply chains and the movement of resources (such as goods, 
water, energy, materials and waste) at a range of scales. The movement of 
these resources helps ensure the health of people, their communities and 
economy. For example, during the summer and autumn of 2011, Thailand was 
severely disrupted by prolonged flooding that occurred in the Chao Praya River 
Basin. The damage was estimated to be more than US$45 billion (AonBenfield, 
2012), making it one of the most costly disasters in history.  
Similarly, the reduction in energy generation capacity that resulted from the 
nuclear accident at the Fukushima – Daishi power plant in 2011 lowered the 
production capacity of Japanese industry. This led to a decrease in the supply 
of materials and goods to downstream industries – including car assembly 
plants located as far away as the North East of England (Nanto et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 1.1: MFA of Greater London (BFF, 2002) 
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In addition, hurricanes Katrina and Sandy both impacted upon resource 
movements, in New Orleans and New York respectively. A further example is 
the blockade of six of the nine oil refineries in the UK, which took place over 
four days in September 2000. This led to a nationwide shortage of fuel; over 
3000 petrol stations were reported to have run out. This in turn led to a 
cancellation of mail delivery, shortage of food availability and other knock on 
effects.  
The number of people affected by disasters is increasing across the globe, and 
the rise in prevalence of such events poses new challenges for emergency and 
disaster planners (Nagurney et al., 2011), who will need to understand the 
problems these disasters will cause to complex supply chain networks. These 
networks underpin modern society, be it physical networks such as: 
transportation; logistical and manufacturing networks; energy; and the internet, 
or other, non-physical networks, such as; financial, social, and economic 
networks (Nagurney and Qiang, 2012).  
Research on such networks has been rejuvenated in recent years because of a 
string of catastrophic events which have highlighted a requirement to 
understand the impacts caused by these disruptions. These events have 
included: the September 11th terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York 
City; the Northeast US and Canadian blackout of 2003; Hurricane Katrina in 
2005; the I-35W Mississippi River bridge collapse in 2007; the Mediterranean 
submarine cable disruption in 2008; and the Sichuan Earthquake and Cyclone 
Nargis in China (Nagurney et al., 2011). 
Focusing on supply chain networks and their related effects after major 
disruptive events has explicitly emphasised the need to understand the risks 
posed to such systems. For example, a fire in the Phillips Semiconductor 
factory in Albuquerque caused mobile phone manufacture Ericsson to lose 
approximately US$400 million, while their competitor Nokia sourced alternative 
supplies, which mitigated the impact of this disruption (Latour, 2001). The 
responses of the two companies differed as Nokia had contingency plans in 
place, which they followed, whereas Ericsson followed no such action 
(Mukherjee, 2008). It was therefore important to develop an understanding to 
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how disruption to supply chains could lead to a failure in an interconnected 
network. 
All of the aforementioned examples show that the consequences and 
vulnerabilities caused by disruptions to supply networks are connectively 
inherent, even if at first they may seem unrelated or go unnoticed (Sheffi, 2005; 
Qiang et al., 2009). It is important that a system wide approach is used, when 
assessing supply chains, to capture the complex interactions (Nagurney and 
Qiang, 2012). This is partly because supply flows are aided by complex 
infrastructure networks that have been designed and built, as well as operated, 
with the assumption that the supply of resources will be continuous (Hodson et 
al., 2012).It is therefore important to have an understanding of these unknown 
linkages, in order to increase resilience against such events.  
As supply systems become increasingly interdependent, the potential scale of 
disruption to production, the subsequent cascading disturbance of resource 
flows and the resultant impact on society becomes increasingly challenging to 
analyse. Many resources and systems are required to enable modern living, 
and interdependencies between these resources and the infrastructure which 
supports their movement are vital. These interactions are poorly understood as 
there are limited observations.  Many approaches, such as material flow 
analysis (Figure 1.1), only provide a black box view of how resources enter a 
system and not how these are consumed. In addition, input output analysis is 
carried out an economy wide scale, when in reality the movement of resources 
can occur across many spatial scales.  
It is a complex problem due to both the number of components and the dynamic 
nature of the systems that allow them to move around. Current methods for 
appraising such interactions are based on direct economic benefits and not 
building resource security. Often the conclusion of these appraisals is that the 
leaning of supply chains can lead to a lower level of resource resilience. This is 
exacerbated by the number of apparent uncertainties and no single actor or 
agency being responsible for monitoring and maintaining the movement of 
resources.  
It therefore becomes important to understand how infrastructure networks 
mediate and modulate flows of resources around a system with a requirement 
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for a spatial modelling capability. This spacialisation of resource flows allows for 
the assessment of disruption by spatial hazards such as floods on 
interdependent supply chain networks within this research. 
1.2 Aim & Objectives 
The aim of this research is to develop a method for assessing the robustness of 
resource flows against disruption from spatial hazards. In addition, this research 
aimed to address recovery; leading to an understanding of the resilience of 
these flows following such extreme events: 
1. Understand the issues relating to disruption of supply chains and 
investigate different modelling procedures through extensive literature 
review. 
2. Develop a methodology for spatial disaggregation of resource supply and 
demand quantities and locations.  
3. Develop a quantitative, spatial, resource flow model that dynamically 
links spatially disaggregated information on supply and demand with the 
infrastructure networks that mediate their flows. 
4. Subject this model to a series of disruptive events and test alternative 
strategies to increase the resilience of urban and regional units and 
accordingly make recommendations for industry, policy makers and 
researchers. 
5. Demonstrate the use of the model to support flood risk analysis by 
providing a quantitative assessment of the indirect impacts of extreme 
events on resource disruption.  
6. Validate this resource model against an observed event. 
1.3 Overview of thesis 
Resource movements have been disrupted by flood events at a range of scales. 
These resources including water, food, materials and goods are necessities for 
the wellbeing of both individuals and communities. Yet growing infrastructural 
and supply chain interdependencies pose significant challenges to those 
responsible for the conveyance of resources, and flood risk managers aiming to 
reduce the impacts of extreme events. 
The main contribution of this research is the new methodological approach that 
draws together influences from many different fields of study, for example I-O 
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analysis, network analysis, infrastructural interdependencies, urban metabolism, 
resilience, and supply chain risk management.  These different approaches 
were utilised to provide an understanding of levels of resilience within supply 
chains and the vulnerabilities within these from hazards such as flooding. This 
is important as such events are causing more disruption and costing more 
money than in the past (O'Brien et al., 2006) and the majority of this increase 
has been seen from meteorological and hydrological events (Birkmann and von 
Teichman, 2010; Winn et al., 2011). 
The literature review of this thesis is split into two parts. Chapter 2 introduces 
the context of this research. The chapter highlights a number of previous 
examples of cascading failure due to supply chain disruption and emphasises 
the need for this research. Chapter 3 reviews methods that have been used in 
this research, as well as alternatives approaches that were considered but 
ultimately rejected during the literature review procedure.  
Chapter 4 introduces the quantitative resource model that embeds input-output 
relationships of supply and demand within a spatial network model. This 
enables the impacts of a spatial hazard, such as a flood event, to be evaluated. 
The I-O model describes the flow and sharing of resources between industrial 
sectors, capturing interdependencies between elements of the resource system. 
The elements of these systems interact with each other and with their 
environment; and are therefore suitable to analysis using network theory.  
Initially the model was tested using a case study of the Shetland Islands, 
described in Chapters 5. The analysis highlights the potential for a single flood 
event to disrupt the movement of resources in other industrial sectors away 
from the initial disturbance. Given certain conditions, disruption to some 
important sectors can rapidly lead to the collapse of the entire system. 
Resource management strategies were tested to provide a useful insight to 
flood risk managers and planners; for example locally storing supplies; or 
planning alternative delivery schedules were shown to reduce the extent of the 
initial impact, therefore slowing the propagation of disruption through the 
system. 
Chapter 5 also introduces an adapted risk analysis methodology that measures 
the vulnerability of the economy on the Shetland Island to disruption by storm 
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surge events of different magnitude. This required extension of the spatial 
disaggregation approach to provide suitably high resolution information for a 
flood risk analysis. This method provides a rational basis for assessing the risks 
of resource flow disruption and capturing some of the indirect impacts of 
extreme events. 
Chapter 6 describes a case study in New York City that focuses on the 
distribution of food following Hurricane Sandy. This case study acts as a form of 
validation as sufficient information was collated on the disruption of food 
resource movements to compare actual and modelled results. Chapter 7 then 
discuses these results while referring back to the examples from the literature 
reviews, as well as providing some discussion around the validation of the 
technique developed throughout the research.  
Finally, Chapter 8 provides the conclusions of the research. These are split into 
those relating to the method and those relevant for supply chain managers and 
academics. A just in time (JIT) resource production and movement strategy 
caused the fastest cascade through the system, and therefore the least resilient 
approach. On-site storage of stocks increased resilience to disruption, with bulk 
deliveries providing further stability, although this was dependant on the timing 
and frequency of deliveries.  
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2 Background Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction       
This research, as outlined in Chapter 1, sets out to investigate supply chain 
resilience. The following chapter presents a review of background literature, and 
a justification for the research. Included in this is a discussion of the key issues 
regarding the discourse of resilience; it’s current standing in the study of supply 
chains; and finally some detailed case studies. These case studies highlight the 
need to develop an understanding of dependencies within supply chains and 
how the disruption of these linkages leads to cascading failures. Finally, the 
advantages of the just-in-time (JIT) production system are discussed (JIT is 
defined as a resource management strategy in which products are produced or 
delivered only as required (Merriam-Webster, 2016)). 
2.2 Resilience 
An understanding of resilience is required because of a noted increase in 
catastrophes, such as flooding, which have become increasingly devastating 
(Vogel et al., 2007). This has been attributed to various reasons including 
increased urbanisation, meaning more people are affected by such events; and 
climate change potentially leading to a rise in the frequency of extreme weather 
events (Hammond et al., 2014; Hammond et al., 2015). In response to this is 
has become imperative to develop an understanding of what resilience is, as 
this can be used to provide a framework to reduce the loss caused by such 
disruptive events (Zhou et al., 2010). This will provide a greater understanding 
of why some cities are more able than others to recover after disruption (Klein 
et al., 2003). 
Resilience is the elastic ability to return to an original state or the capacity to 
quickly recover from difficulties, (OED, 2010) with its origins coming from the 
Latin word “resilio” which means to jump back (Klein et al., 2003; Manyena, 
2006). It can therefore be defined as the capacity to stabilise and recover from 
loss (Comfort, 2010; Zhou et al., 2010). Leichenko et al. (2010) define urban 
resilience as the ability of an urban system to withstand a large variety of 
shocks and stresses. Although this definition is aligned more with the concept of 
robustness, as it does not take into account “bouncing back” which is integral to 
the discourse of resilience.  
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Resilience can also be divided into different attributes. The MCEER (2006) 
suggest these different components are:  
1. Robustness; the amount of force the system can take before 
performance drops. This attribute was measured by Scott et al. (2006), 
the authors considered; network flows, link capacity and network 
topology to develop the Network Robustness Index. This index aids 
highway planning decisions. This was achieved through developing an 
understanding of individual links in a network and how disrupting to these 
affects the wider transport Network.  
2. Redundancy; the ability of a system to carry on working after damage 
has occurred. This is a very important concept in transport planning and 
takes into account the ability of a network to provide alternative routes in 
times of disaster, as well as the spare capacity of that network in normal 
conditions (Xu et al., 2015)  
3. Resourcefulness; capability of a system to self-organise after a disruption 
has occurred. MacKinnon & Derickson (2012) add to this by stating 
resourcefulness moves the focus of attention to the uneven distribution of 
resources and promotes the possibilities of community self-determination 
in response to disruptive events.   
4. Rapidity; ability of a system, through learning, to increase its capacity for 
adaption. Chen & Shinozuka (2004) provide an example of rapidity in 
practise, it is the ability of a system to provide treatment to any injured in 
the first day after the event. If rapidity is not present, the injured are left 
untreated. 
The Resilience Alliance discuss three dimensions of resilience; these are: 1) the 
amount of disturbance which can be absorbed by a system without a large 
amount of change taking place; 2) the amount a system can self-organise post 
a disruptive event; 3) the ability, through learning, of a system to grow its 
adaptive capacity (Klein et al., 2003).  
There is no consensus when defining resilience, this means no clear technique 
exists to measure the concept (Manyena, 2006). Consequently this makes it 
very difficult to calculate changes in resilience and it also hinders the capacity to 
predict how differing methods may affect resilience (Gibbs, 2009). As no 
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common indicators exist to measure resilience, the development of such 
indicators is a necessity to allow for academic debate to be applied to the real 
world (Cutter et al., 2008). An understanding of who is resilient to what and for 
how long is required (Gibbs, 2009). Although it is agreed that, for example, a 
flood resilient city is less affected by extreme flood events than a non-flood 
resilient city (Hammond et al., 2014; Hammond et al., 2015). 
When applying the idea of resilience to a network or system it is viewed as  
having qualities such as; staying power, adaptability, and a flexible approach, 
which in turn suggests a system characterised by its dynamism (Pickett et al., 
2004), although these systems are highly variable and are prone to change 
unexpectedly (Ahern, 2011). Early work on resilience within cities focussed on 
the idea of retaining equilibrium, meaning networks could bounce back to their 
original state after disruption (Pickett et al., 2004; Leichenko, 2011) with being 
‘resilient’ seen as being able to recover as quickly as possible (Parsons, 2010). 
In addition to this there is a need to have the capability to adapt and evolve post 
event; as a resilient system will recognise the risks whilst being highly adaptive 
(Opstal, 2007).  
2.1.1 Robustness 
The work carried out in this thesis has a strong focus on one of the attributes of 
resilience, that is robustness. As mentioned above the term robustness can 
become confused with that of resilience, therefore it is important to understand 
the difference between these terms. In general robustness is defined as being 
“capable of performing without failure under a wide range of conditions” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2016).  
Having robustness indicates an ability, for example, of a factory to produce its 
goods after a disruption has been caused to its production line. It is therefore a 
very desirable attribute to have in this situation. Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) 
applied this thinking to supply chains and stated that robustness is determined 
by the weakest link in a supply chain. Therefore the different aspects of a 
supply chain need to be assessed to determine the level of robustness 
apparent, and consideration must be given to the trade off between having 
robustness and the resulting lowering of effiency this will cause.  
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As this work is focusing on supply chain networks and systems robustness is 
defined as such a system's capacity to remain operational following a variety of 
disturbances, there is then an implication that an understanding is needed on 
how such a disrupted system responds to differing levels of disturbance (Mens 
et al, 2011). This resistance and ability to tolerate disruption is different to 
resilience which is the ability to recover from such disruptions (De Bruijn, 2004a 
and De Bruijn, 2004b). 
Understanding a networks robustness provides an ability to view the effects of a 
disturbance at one point of time, and therefore a way to understand “what if”. It 
allows for a focus onto one type of disturbance and/or uncertainty that may 
affect the modelled system. Finally, it permits for the testing of relevant system 
responses to disturbances, this provides insight into how different types 
measures affect the behaviour of the system. This can then lead to improved 
recovery, and therefore resilience (Mens et al, 2011).  
Throughout this research the notion of increasing the robustness, through 
increasing lag between disruption and effects, is revisited as it is believed this 
would provide stakeholders to carryout appropriate responses and therefore for 
increase the resilience of the system.  
2.3 Vulnerability and Susceptibility  
A second major criticism is the relationship between resilience and other 
concepts such as vulnerability, as this is not truly appreciated and further 
hampers the development of a universally accepted definition for resilience. 
Firstly, resilience can be viewed as an element of vulnerability, relating to how 
something or someone adapts to a hazard (Pelling and High, 2005). Conversely 
resilience can be interpreted as the opposite of vulnerability, meaning 
something which is vulnerable lacks resilience (Cutter et al., 2008).  
Manyena (2006) argues that resilience has less of a relationship to vulnerability; 
if vulnerability is defined in terms of a level of threat or exposure to a hazard. 
Vulnerability can be seen to be caused by a lack of resilience, meaning an 
increase resilience will lower vulnerability (Klein et al., 2003). These two points 
form the backbone of the risk analysis approach developed in this work, the 
vulnerability is measured in terms of the probability of an event occurring and 
increasing of resilience to this event will decrease the vulnerability.   
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Vulnerability can therefore be seen as the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to floods due to exposure to a risk whilst taking into account the 
systems with its capacity/incapacity to be resilient, i.e. it’s ability to withstand, 
recover and / or adapt to a disruptive event (Balica et al., 2009; Balica et al., 
2013). 
Susceptibility can be defined as the level to which parts of a system are 
exposed to risk (Messner and Meyer, 2006) and this influences the chance that 
these elements are harmed at times of disruption (Balica et al., 2013). The 
levels of susceptibility are effected by the characteristics of the modelled, for 
example, social context of flood damage formation (Begum et al., 2007) such as 
poverty and education (Balica et al., 2013). 
2.4 Adaptive Capacity  
This approach to learning was described in Holling’s (2001) work on panarchy, 
which is the concept that explains the evolution of complex adaptive systems. 
Within this, the main process of learning occurs during the adaptive cycle and is 
made up of three properties that allow for change: 
 The potential for change that exists within a system. 
 The amount of interconnected processes and internal control. 
 The system’s capacity to adapt to disruptive events. 
The adaptation occurs within a cycle that has a trajectory and moves from a 
long stage of slow gathering and transformation of resources to quicker periods 
in which opportunities for innovation are developed (Holling, 2001). Such 
learning is a move away from single loop learning (doing things better) towards 
double loop learning (doing things differently) (O’Brien and Hope, 2010). The 
disruptive event acts as a trigger for change and initiates a period of a period of 
rapid reorganization.  
This is related to resilience as it is highlights an approach which allows for 
reorganization and rebuilding after a disruptive event. Once this occurs it 
provides opportunities for innovation which can either help the system return to 
pre-event levels or bouncing forward to a new and more desirable state after 
recovery has been completed. 
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2.5 Supply Chains 
Manufacturing strategies have developed to meet the needs of four important 
components of consumer goods, these are to; lower cost, improve quality, 
increase usability, and deliver in a timely manner. Through globalisation and the 
improvement of transport, IT and services; supply chains have evolved into 
inter-organisational networks to meet these demands, with the management of 
costs being the main concern, this could be the cost of; ordering and holding 
inventory, transportation, production, and assembly (Wang et al., 2009). Within 
each of these actions there is an inherent risk to the supply chain, as a 
disruption could occur at any point, and if functionality is affected it could lead to 
a financial impact (Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). 
Different supply chains are concerned, therefore, with different cost savings. 
These can be categorised into three different types: mass customisation 
networks, allowing for individually tailored products; lean practise which is 
concerned with the reduction of waste in the supply chain, such as JIT 
production; and hybrid systems which attempt to do both. Modern supply chains 
can also be aided by e-commerce and virtual enterprises (Wang et al., 2009). 
Consequently there is a need to manage supply chains efficiently and 
effectively to allow them to adapt if disruption occurs (Thun and Hoenig, 2011).  
2.5.1 Supply chain disruption 
Many corporations throughout the world strive to build a competitive advantage 
and increase their market share, which can be done through the implementation 
of various initiatives, such as outsourcing manufacturing and developing 
product variety (Tang, 2006). This has led to the extending of supply chain 
networks on an increasingly global scale. In addition, many firms have 
attempted to make their supply chains more lean (Tang and Nurmaya Musa, 
2011) by operating them with lower levels of inventory, and less human and 
capital investment (Knemeyer et al., 2009). In a stable environment, these 
endeavours are extremely effective, but because of the factors discussed 
above, such as uncertain economic conditions, varying consumer demands, 
and natural and manmade hazards, supply chains have become less stable 
more at risk of disruption (Tang, 2006).  
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There are two main types of disruption which can affect a supply chain, these 
are: issues caused by problems with the coordination of supply and demand; 
and risks caused by events which interrupt normal activity (Kleindorfer and 
Saad, 2005). To help lessen the effects of a disruption, supply chains should 
incorporate both financial and operational mitigation strategies, as well as have 
contingencies in place to replace effected suppliers or re-route supply lines 
(Tomlin, 2006). As supply chains get longer and delivery times shorter it 
becomes imperative to develop ways to understand the effect of such events on 
supply chains (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). The removal of redundancy from 
the systems have made supply chains less able to reconfigure during disruptive 
events (Knemeyer et al., 2009). 
In order to lessen the impact of disruption to a supply chain, these supply 
chains need to be understood, and within this an understanding of pinch points 
in the network is necessary (Christopher and Peck, 2004). It is also important to 
understand how density and complexity of supply chains, and the importance of 
various suppliers within those supply chains effect vulnerability (Craighead et 
al., 2007).  
For example, the supply base should be widened to mitigate the risk of a 
disruption at one production facility cascading through the system (Christopher 
and Peck, 2004). A move towards multiple suppliers can mitigate the effect of a 
disruption. An example is Nokia’s multisource strategy, which lessened the 
effects of disruption to the supply of semiconductors, which were necessary for 
their products (Tomlin, 2006). All of these things can be aided by collaboration 
and the building of redundancy into systems (Christopher and Peck, 2004). 
2.5.2 Supply chain resilience 
Wang et al. (2009) define resilience for a supply chain as: 
“… a system with an objective to survive and maintain function even during the 
course of disruptions, provided with a capability to predict and assess the 
damage of possible disruptions, and enhanced by the strong awareness of its 
ever-changing environment and knowledge of the past events, thereby utilising 
resilient strategies for defence against the disruptions.” 
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Once again this definition comes short of what is truly meant by resilience, as it 
does not take into account the ability of a system to recover from shock and 
therefore is only a measure of the robustness of a system.  
In terms of resilience, globalised supply chains can be both a hindrance and an 
aid in times of disaster. If the majority of a supply chain is found outside of the 
affected area it can be utilised to replace missing parts and help regain 
production quicker than if all suppliers were in the affected region (Todo et al., 
2014). However, if one element of the supply chain cannot be sourced from 
outside of the disrupted area, then the shock can be felt throughout the supply 
chain network (Romero, 2012) showing an inability to function during the course 
of a disruption. 
Companies are, in general, aware of what makes their supply chain vulnerable, 
although supply chain managers at times fail to implement supply chain risk 
management. This, coupled with an underestimation of the risks, increases the 
likelihood of a disruption cascading through a supply chain (Thun and Hoenig, 
2011).  In order to reduce the chance of this occurring, supply chains must be 
designed in a way which incorporates effective and efficient responses to 
disruption, as well as a readiness to implement mitigation strategies 
(Ponomarov and Holcomb, 2009). 
2.6 Working definitions; robustness and resilience 
The different discourses which have informed this study all approach resilience 
in different ways, as outlined above. At times there seems to be a confusion 
between the concept of robustness and resilience. For simplicity this research 
will use the following definition of robustness 
“Strength, or the ability of elements, systems, and other units of analysis to 
withstand a given level of stress or demand without suffering degradation or 
loss of function” (MCEER, 2006). 
This definition is the bases of the model developed, which measures how long, 
and to what extent, the modelled system can still function after a disruptive 
event. The model has also been developed to add some elements to recovery 
to it. This therefore pushes it towards a being a full measure of a systems ability 
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to withstand, and bounce back from shock. For the purpose of this study the 
Cabinet Office’s (2014) definition of resilience is used, which is:  
“The ability of assets and networks to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and recover 
from disruption.” 
2.7 Supply chain disruption examples across different scales  
In this section, four detailed case studies dealing with supply chain disruption 
are introduced. These disruptions occurred across different scales: Sections 
2.4.1 and 2.4.2 deal with the disruption to worldwide supply chains; 2.4.3 looks 
at a National level disruption; and 2.4.5 looks at a city scale.  
2.7.1 Great East Japan Earthquake, 2011 
On 11th March2011, the Pacific Coast of Tohoku experienced a catastrophic 
earthquake that uniquely had strong ground motion over large areas and led to 
a severe Tsunami which caused damage along 670km of Tohoku’s Pacific 
Coastline. The magnitude of the earthquake measured 9.0, and caused a 
500km long by 200km wide rupture of the fault zone (Matsuo, 2015). As Japan 
lies on three seismically active belts it has witnessed many such earthquakes, 
but this caused a tsunami that resulted in damage to the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant and a wider cascade of disruption than ever observed 
before (Ghadge et al., 2011) 
The earthquake and tsunami were of unparalleled size and were exacerbated 
by human and political mistakes; the most damaged prefectures were Iwate, 
Miyagi and Fukushima, leading to national effects (Maya-Ambía, 2012; 
Krausmann and Cruz, 2013). There were also worldwide consequences, as 
Japan at this time was the world’s third largest economy and was vital in the 
supply chains of many multinational industries, such as; computers, electronics, 
and car assembly (Lohr, 2011). 
The earthquake, known as both the Great East Japan and Tokoku earthquake, 
and the resulting Tsunami killed over 1600 people (Krausmann and Cruz, 
2013). It caused over US$200 Billion of damage, with roads, bridges, and 
railways being washed away. In addition, many fishing villages and thousands 
of boats were destroyed (MunichRe, 2012). Life in Tokyo also experienced a 
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fundamental shock (Ueno, 2013). On top of these disruptions fifteen nuclear 
reactors were disrupted, including Fukushima Daiichi (Matsuo, 2015). 
These disruptions caused unprecedented and extensive damage to supply 
chains. For example the manufacture of components for digital displays, 
electronic components, and hard disks was affected (Matsuo, 2015) and with 
Japan being a leading producer of flash memory, global companies such as 
Apple felt the supply shortages (Lohr, 2011). These disruptions were caused by 
numerous factors, but the leading factor was the disruption to electricity 
production (Ueno, 2013). The resulting evacuations, coupled with uncertainties 
in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster compounded problems 
caused by the initial disruption. The power grid had a peak shortfall of nearly a 
third and could only provide 75% of normal supply at other times. As the east 
and west of Japan have different grids the problem was made worse (Nanto et 
al., 2011). 
This disruption was felt by many large Japanese corporations, who reacted in 
varying ways. Toyota, Honda and Nissan all halted production in some, if not 
all, of their Japanese plants. Within the electronics and semiconductor 
manufacturing sector, Sony closed ten facilities, Texas Instruments, Panasonic, 
Sanyo and Fujifilm all had to lower output, and Panasonic and Cannon reported 
injuries to staff. Disruption was also reported in steel and ship building 
industries (Ghadge et al., 2011). 
These national effects also led to global disruption. For example, over a third of 
Japanese imports to the USA in 2010 were cars and car parts. Toyota had 
assembly plants which were damaged by the earthquake, whilst other plants 
were disrupted by the power outages, leading to a reduction in supply. This led 
to some US based car assembly plants curtailing operations because the 
required parts from Japan could not be acquired.  
Ford was depended on Japanese manufactured electronic components and 
therefore had to slow production because of disruption to supply. Similar 
problems were noticed by General Motors, Nissan and Peugeot-Citroen who 
had to reduce production at US and European assembly plants as they could 
not get the required semi-conductors from a Hitachi factory based north of 
Tokyo (Nanto et al., 2011). On top of this, car assembly and export capacity 
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was reduced by 39% in Guangdong-China and 48.5% in Thailand because of 
the restricted supply of automotive parts (Fujita and Hamaguchi, 2012) 
The basic problem was a lack of components within a large number of 
interconnected industries (Matsuo, 2015).This was made worse by shipping 
lines reducing the number of vessels sailing to and from Japan because of 
radiation fears: Hapag-Lloyd halted service to Tokyo, instead unloading in 
Osaka and shipping goods across land, increasing both time and cost. Extra 
safety checks in ports receiving goods from Japan also slowed the supply 
process (Bradsher, 2011) 
The interconnected nature of the most affected industries meant a disruption in 
North Eastern Japan led to supply chain problems throughout the world. The 
initial disruption was made worse by rolling blackouts in Tokyo leading to a 
lowering in output of many sectors, as well as a disruption to commuters who 
struggled to get to and from their places of work as train services were 
suspended (Ueno, 2013). On top of this, cargo transportation to and from Japan 
was reduced, making it more difficult for products, such as semiconductors, to 
reach their intended market.  
2.7.2 Chao Phraya River flood in Central Thailand, 2011  
In the latter part of 2011 and early 2012, Thailand suffered the country’s worst 
floods for 70 years (Chongvilaivan, 2012). These floods not only had a profound 
impact on human life (Smith, 2013) but also disrupted the country’s 
manufacturing capacity (Abe and Ye, 2013). It was the most disruptive flood 
and the fifth largest natural disaster in terms of economic loss since 1950 
(Smith, 2013). The estimated losses were around US$45 Billion, with an 
insurance loss of almost US$15 Billion (Abe and Ye, 2013; Smith, 2013) 
Poor urban planning coupled with deforestation, no systems of floodwater 
management and substandard flood mitigation master plans all attributed to the 
devastation caused by the floods (Abe and Ye, 2013). The flooding event began 
at the end of July when Hurricane Nock-ten made landfall in Thailand. The 
floods resulted in 65 of Thailand’s 77 provinces including Bangkok, the capital 
city, to be declared flood disaster zones in October 2011 (Zevenbergen et al., 
2013). The flooding caused over 800 deaths and affected a further 13.6 million 
people (Komori et al., 2012; Zevenbergen et al., 2013). 
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With pressures to reduce costs, firms and suppliers in Thailand tend to cluster 
in a small number of industrial locations. In addition, a JIT approach to 
production increased the vulnerability of the complex global supply chains 
(Chongvilaivan, 2012; Komori et al., 2012). Seven industrial estates in 
Ayutthaya and Pathum Thani provinces were severely affected by the flooding; 
this resulted in huge manufacturing production losses of almost one third, 
between October 2011 and January 2012 (Abe and Ye, 2013) this equated to 
over 1000 factories being inundated across central Thailand (Fuller, 2011). 
In addition to the direct losses caused by the damage of facilities, a large 
number of firms were indirectly affected, including nine Japanese car 
manufactures. In the 1980s, Thailand became a hub for these firms (Fuller, 
2011; Kohpaiboon and Jongwanich, 2013). Two of the biggest examples of this 
were the Nissan and Toyota plants in Thailand, which were unaffected by flood 
water, but were both forced to suspend operations due to an inability to source 
all of the required parts from their suppliers,  who were directly impacted by the 
floods (Abe and Ye, 2013).  In summary, these disruptions to the supply chains 
of important parts and components required for the manufacturing process 
within Thailand compelled other connected industries in areas unaffected by the 
floods, in both Thailand and the rest of the world, to halt their production lines 
(Chongvilaivan, 2012). 
Toyota was by far the worst affected, as the indirect disruption caused the 
slowing of production in factories as far afield as Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
USA, Canada, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Africa and Vietnam. Honda also 
slowed production at factories across the globe (Fuller, 2011), from the 
Philippines to Swindon in the United Kingdom (Chongvilaivan, 2012), as its 
Thailand plant was out of action for nearly six months (Haraguchi and Lall, 
2014) 
In addition to the disruption within the car manufacturing industry, many other 
sectors were affected. This was highlighted by a survey of Japanese companies 
which investigated the impact they felt from the floods in Thailand. Of the 
companies surveyed, 78% stated they were directly or indirectly affected. In 
response to the disruption to supply-chains, nearly two thirds of directly affected 
manufacturers, especially those who manufactured electronic components, had 
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to temporarily relocate their operations to other Asian countries (Abe and Ye, 
2013). What was less well documented was the effect on local business, and it 
was estimated 10,000 – 15,000 SMEs felt some effect of the flooding 
throughout Thailand (Surminski, 2013). 
Supply chain disruptions also had a major impact on another production sector: 
severe shortage of hard disk drives caused prices to spike and the production of 
computing equipment to be restricted throughout the world. PC manufactures 
did not have enough stockpiled components to wait out the flood, and this was 
exacerbated by the clustering of like industries with the ambition of forming lean 
JIT supply chains (Romero, 2012). As Thailand is the world’s second-largest 
producer of hard disk drives, the lowering of output caused by the flooding 
caused some resellers and wholesalers to defensively purchase this 
component. This led to further increases in the prices of hard disk drives to 
almost double the pre-disaster levels (Abe and Ye, 2013). 
2.7.3 United Kingdom fuel protests, 2000 
In September 2000, a protest over fuel costs broke out on a national scale in 
the United Kingdom. The protest was led by a network of British farmers and 
road hauliers who began an intense movement of direct action to protest at high 
levels of fuel duty. They followed a similar model to a campaign carried out by 
farmers, hauliers and fishermen in France, which had led to a lowering of such 
duty by the French government. The British protesters began by blockading the 
petrol refinery in Stanlow, Cheshire, and within only a few days created a fuel 
crisis that paralysed the country, bringing fuel distribution to a virtual standstill 
(Doherty et al., 2003). 
In the eighteen months from January 1999 to June 2000, fuel prices increased 
by more than 40%. At this time, approximately 75% of the cost of a litre of petrol 
or diesel was tax and duties. The level of taxation on fuel in in Britain was the 
highest in Europe, with a steep increase in the price of crude oil adding to the 
problem (PSEPC, 2005).  
The protest was began by a relatively small number of protestors, made up of 
around 150 – 200 farmers and hauliers from North Wales. Disgruntlement was 
particularly high among farmers of livestock who were still suffering the effects 
of the BSE crisis. This coupled with falling livestock and milk prices forced 
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action against the fuel duty increases. The duty on fuel for agricultural 
machinery and tractors, red diesel, was comparatively low against commercial 
diesel, but the net price paid had gone up by 9 pence a litre since May 2000 
(Doherty et al., 2003).  
On Thursday September 7th the price of crude oil rose above US$35 a barrel, a 
ten year high; this meant a litre a fuel was to rise by 2p per litre compounding 
the anger felt by consumers who were already paying the highest petrol prices 
in the world. Direct action was taken and the first oil refinery was blockaded. 
The following day over 100 trucks staged a "go-slow" protest on the A1 and 
blockaded the Texaco oil refinery in Pembroke (BBC, 2000a; Korowicz, 2012).  
At this point in the protest it was noted that the oil refineries colluded with 
protesters to cut the country's fuel supply by instructing their drivers not to leave 
the refineries. This approach was tactical, as it attempted to prevent any future 
increases in fuel duty (Doherty et al., 2003).  It was also noted that some drivers 
did not wish to cross the unofficial picket lines set up (PSEPC, 2005). Further 
refinery blockades and protests continued for an extra five days (BBC, 2000a). 
The disruption of fuel had profound effects across many sectors in both direct 
and indirect ways. For example, the transport sector was directly impacted by 
the "go-slow" demonstrations, which caused temporary traffic delays. In 
addition, striking truck and taxi drivers compounded the disruption (PSEPC, 
2005). The indirect effects were more severe. The transportation sector has a 
reliance on petrol and diesel, and both public and private systems were 
interrupted by a lack of fuel. Nearly 30% of private motorists, which is equal to 
about 23% of the adult population, were forced to stop driving because they 
were unable to purchase fuel (Travis, 2000). This in turn increased the pressure 
on public transport due to overcrowding, which was worsened by a reduction in 
bus services because of limited fuel supplies (Guardian, 2000a). 
The day to day functionality of the NHS was also affected by the fuel crisis: 
ambulance services were disrupted by a lack of fuel; hospitals in the West 
Midlands were short of food; some hospitals were unable to remove hazardous 
waste from their sites; and Royal Hull Hospital had run out of stitches for 
operations (BBC, 2000b). In addition to this, some hospitals had to cancel 
operations and move to emergency only care (PSEPC, 2005).  
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A further four sectors also noticed disruption. The first of these was food 
distribution, caused by both a lack of fuel and panic buying by consumers 
(PSEPC, 2005). Banks were unable to refill cash machines; and the royal mail 
had to limit service and cancel next day deliveries altogether (Guardian, 2000b).  
The final group which noticed an affect was industrial sectors; including 
disruptions in the transportation of staff and consumers, meaning people could 
not get to work, or have the ability to purchase a product. This was made worse 
by a JIT approach to production and the interconnected nature of supply chains. 
It was felt most of all in the defence, car assembly and steel sectors (PSEPC, 
2005).  
2.7.4 Hurricane Sandy, 2012  
On the 30th October 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit ground in New York City on a 
city wide scale, causing a 5.1 metre storm surge, the highest since 1851, to 
engulf the financial district of Lower Manhattan (Chan et al., 2014). This event 
led to the death of more than 40 people across New York City with the total 
number of deaths for the North East of the United States reaching 132 (BBC, 
2012). 
There was also major infrastructure damaged during the storm: the runways of 
two major airports, John F Kennedy and Newark, were flooded, and the New 
York Stock Exchange was closed for two days (Chan et al., 2014). In addition, 
bridges and tunnels connecting Manhattan to the rest of New York were closed, 
leading to a disruption to the subway system (NYC, 2013).  
Sandy affected a very large area, including more than 12 states in New England 
and the Mid-Atlantic region, with strong winds being reported along it’s 1,500km 
path(CCTV, 2012). New York City’s storm warning system was activated nearly 
2 days before Hurricane Sandy arrived, leading to the closure of financial 
markets and the issuing of a warning to local residents to stock up on food and 
water and protect their property with sand bags, or move to a safer area if 
possible (BBC, 2012). These measures undoubtedly saved lives (Chan et al., 
2014).  
In addition to the damage to financial and transportation infrastructure, 
widespread and prolonged blackouts occurred in the wake of the disaster. In the 
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majority of the areas affected by the Hurricane the power supply was 
successfully restored after multiple blackouts, but a week after the storm a large 
number of customers were still affected by the extended power outage; for 
example in New Jersey over 150,000 customers and New York in the region of 
175,000 customers (WRN, 2012). In total, approximately 90% of Long Island 
was without power and it took from 30 hours to 18 days to fully restore 
connectivity (Fthenakis, 2013) 
These blackouts caused further problems because of the interdependencies 
inherent in modern supply chains and the dependency on critical infrastructures, 
which meant that the interruption to electricity supply caused cascading 
problems throughout other infrastructure systems (WRN, 2012). There were 
high direct losses caused by Hurricane Sandy to residential and industrial 
buildings, as well as the electrical supply network. Subsequent supply problems 
with gas, and business interruption (particularly in transport-dependent industry 
sectors) led to a large number of indirect losses. 
One such example of these indirect losses and disruptions was felt by the food 
distribution sector in New York City. Initially there were also very heavy direct 
losses: the storm surge itself destroyed the produce of 80 retailers in Coney 
Island and Brighton Beach, and nearly all retailers in Rockaways & Broad 
Chanel lost all produce.  
As this sector depends heavily on the transportation network for delivery and 
distribution of goods, the lack of fuel available in the city, as well as the closure 
of roads and bridges, meant that supplies could not make it to their intended 
destinations. This, therefore, led to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) setting up hot food distribution sites throughout Manhattan. 
Food shortages were worsened as perishable food was lost, as the blackouts 
meant refrigerators could not be used, although in some cases diesel fuel was 
syphoned from vehicles to power generators (NYC, 2013). 
Other impacts were felt on the city’s healthcare system: services were disrupted 
across New York due to the closure of six hospitals and the evacuation of 
almost 2000 patients. Sandy caused outages across the telecommunication 
services, either through a loss of power or a damaging of infrastructure, which 
took up to 11 days to repair. The supply of drinking water was largely unaffected 
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although in areas with power outages pumping stations could not operate, 
meaning people on the upper floors of high-rise buildings were without running 
water (NYC, 2013). 
Wastewater treatment throughout the city was affected greatly by the loss of 
power: ten out of 14 treatment plants released partially treated or raw sewage 
into local waterways, and 42 out of 96 pumping stations required to keep the 
sewer system moving were temporarily out of service because of either direct 
damage or a loss of power. Finally, in addition to the closure of bridges, 
disruption to road traffic, subway, rail and ferry services occurred either directly 
because of damage caused by the storm surge, or indirectly due to a loss of 
power. This stranded commuters, meaning people could not get to their place of 
work (NYC, 2013).  
2.7.5 Other Examples 
In 2003, a large electricity blackout in the north eastern states of the USA and 
some areas of South Eastern Canada exposed vulnerabilities within the electric 
power-grid system. As most aspects of the economy are highly dependent on 
electric power, the power-grid outage had far-reaching effects, which impaired 
the ability of critical infrastructures to operate. 50 million people were affected 
by the blackout which led to commuters being stranded, perishable food going 
to waste, and water pumping stations going out of action. It also had an effect 
on other aspects of the transport system, with the panic buying of fuel 
increasing congestion. The cost of the blackout was estimated at around US$10 
Billion (Anderson et al., 2007).  
Very soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 at the World Trade 
Center in New York, disruptions to the flow of vital supplies were noticed by 
manufactures. One such example of this was Ford, who had to shut down 
production on many of their assembly lines, as trucks bringing supplies from 
Mexico and Canada were held up at the respective borders. In a matter of hours 
after the event, Toyota had to stop production in Indiana as they were awaiting 
components supplied by air from Germany. This problem was caused because 
the two manufactures operated a JIT production system with very little slack in 
their supply chains to respond to disruptive events (Sheffi, 2001). 
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In 2005, the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina kick-started an 
overwhelming succession of failures in the critical infrastructure of the City of 
New Orleans and other parts of Louisiana (Leavitt and Kiefer, 2006). These 
interdependencies let to an estimated US$107 billion of direct losses. When 
indirect losses caused by the interdependencies within the region were taken 
into account this rose to almost US$150 billion (Hallegatte, 2008). Examples of 
such disruption occurred in the oil pipelines and telecommunication systems, 
which failed because of a loss of power. In addition, contamination of New 
Orleans water distribution system and inoperable communication and data-
gathering equipment during the response phase caused further issues (Santella 
et al., 2009). 
2.7.6 Summary of case studies 
From the different case studies we learn four key things: 
 Firstly, cascading failures caused by interconnecting supply chains can 
occur at any scale.  
 Secondly, The JIT production system was highlighted as a contributing 
factor in all of the case studies 
 Thirdly, clustering of like industries within the supply chain can lead to 
greater disruption if these areas are affected 
 Finally, such disruptions can lead to unexpected indirect effects which 
need to be understood. 
2.8 Just in time production system 
In the above examples JIT was highlighted as a contributing factor to the 
severity of all of the cascading failures meaning it is important to understand 
what this system is and when it was developed. 
The approach, which was developed in Japan after the Second World War, 
came about for three principle reasons: a lack of space, as it was realised the 
majority of a factory was used up as storage space; the improvement of the 
quality of production, meaning  fewer rejected goods or scrapped batches; and 
the development of the “Toyota Production System” (Wheatley, 1992).  
JIT is an integrated approach which strives to seek manufacturing excellence 
with the goal of producing a product at a minimum cost (Schniederjans, 1993). It 
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therefore aims to reduce Shigeo Shingo’s seven wastes, which are found in; 
transportation; inventory, motion, waiting, over-processing, over-production, and 
defect (Sandras, 1989). 
The key benefits of JIT, as discussed by Malakooti (2013) are:  
 Reduction in setup time which allows the company to vastly decrease, or 
even eliminate, the amount of inventory required to change from one 
product to another. 
 Simplification of inventory flow and the management of this by reducing 
delays. 
 It allows companies to train employees on different parts of production 
allowing them to move workers to where they are required. 
 The scheduling of production is synchronized with demand, therefore if 
there is zero demand the product is not made.  
 Increased emphasis on relationships with suppliers. 
 Supply arrives when it is needed meaning the optimal amount of 
inventory is on site. 
 Reduces storage space needed. 
 Reduces the chance of inventory breaking or going out-of-date. 
JIT pushes for constant improvement and a leaning of the production system at 
all points to achieve the minimal cost, and therefore increases the profits 
achievable by the company. Throughout these benefits only one hints at the 
possibility of problems arising, namely supplier relationship that needs to be 
strong to avoid any issues occurring, which could slow production.  
The most commonly cited example of a JIT approach is the Toyota Production 
System, which is based on the following 14 principles (Jeffrey, 2004):  
1. Have a long term philosophy on which management decisions are based 
2. The production should be a continuous flow which allows problems to be 
spotted early. 
3. To avoid overproduction, utilise a pull system - supplies are replenished 
only when used 
4. Smooth production removing fluctuations in performance  
5. Inbuilt quality control to get it right first time  
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6. Make processes and tasks standardised, allowing for continuous 
improvement and employee engagement. 
7. Make sure problems are not hidden by using visual controls  
8. Technology must be thoroughly tested, reliable, and fit for purpose.  
9. Ingrain the philosophy within all staff and develop leaders to teach 
others.  
10. Encourage excellence in people and teams. 
11. Respectfully challenge partners and suppliers to improve; providing help 
when required. 
12. Managers should take initiative to understand any situations. 
13. Consider all decisions and agree slowly by consensus, implement these 
decisions rapidly. 
14. Learn through persistent reflection and continuous improvement. 
These principles form the foundation of their JIT production system and are in 
place to allow all involved to understand and follow these ideals (Jeffrey, 2004). 
Although this system has suffered because of its leanness when supply chains 
have been disrupted. This was noted in the aftermath of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Chao Phraya River flood in Central Thailand: in both cases 
Toyota had to reduce production because they were unable to source the 
relevant supplies.  
2.9 Summary 
Within this Chapter, the background information that identified the need and 
context of this work has been outlined, building on the justification in Chapter 1. 
Firstly, issues surrounding the discourse of resilience were discussed: work 
within this field is hampered by the lack of a common definition.  
The removal of robustness from systems makes them more susceptible to 
disruption from catastrophic events. These can be combated by the introduction 
of mitigation strategies and contingencies in supply, such as the sourcing of 
parts from multiple suppliers in different locations. 
A number of examples explore the need to understand supply chain linkages to 
allow cities and infrastructure systems to become more resilient to disruptive 
events. In all case studies in section 2.7 the JIT production system was seen as 
a contributing factor to the vulnerability of industrial networks. This, therefore, 
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highlighted the need to understand how moving away from this production 
system would increase resilience. Throughout Chapter 3 alternative methods 
are discussed to allow for the development of a method that combats some of 
these issues. 
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3 Methodological Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents a review of the literature that informed the methodological 
choices for this research. It begins by focusing on infrastructure research, 
before looking into the various concepts that can be used to model resource 
flows along these infrastructure networks. The following methodological 
approaches were selected for detailed discussion; Input Output (I-O) analysis, 
network analysis, material flow analysis, and risk analysis.  
3.2 Infrastructure 
The method developed as part of this research models the flow of goods within 
a chosen infrastructure network, for example transport or electricity distribution.  
It is, therefore, helpful to have an understanding of what infrastructure is, what 
the different types of infrastructure are, and what the different forms of can take 
place. This knowledge informed how the infrastructure was represented within 
the model, as well as the types of disruption that formed the basis of tested 
scenarios.  
 The term infrastructure is defined by the OED (2010) as: 
“The basic physical and organisational structures and facilities (e.g. building, 
roads, and power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise” 
Rinaldi et al. (2001) provide various examples of different infrastructure found 
within a city including: banking and finance, educational system, electric power, 
emergency services, food and agriculture, government services, the health care 
industry, natural gas, petroleum, telecommunications, transportation, water 
supply, various commodities such as iron and steel, and finished goods. 
3.2.1 Critical infrastructure 
Energy, transport, water, waste, and information and communications 
technology are vital to human well-being and provide necessary services that 
allow society to function (Otto et al., 2014). The interconnected nature of these 
infrastructures makes them highly vulnerable to disruption, as problems may 
stem from one or more of their dependant elements. For example, a water main 
break  could cause a minor disruption, but this in turn could cause a sink hole to 
develop, resulting in a street closure and consequently a much larger disruption. 
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The disruptions could develop further if, for example, the sinkhole caused water 
and natural gas pipelines to fail, leading to fires, which could not be tackled 
successfully due to a drop in water pressure and supply. This could in turn lead 
to consciences far exceeding expectations from the initial water main break 
(Little, 2002).  
What is classified as critical infrastructure varies but generally includes: banking 
and finance, energy, food, health, telecommunications, transport, and water 
(Ridley, 2011), plus activities such as defence, and the chemical and hazardous 
materials sector (Min et al., 2007). These are ever changing, complex systems 
that are highly interdependent, through the widespread use of information and 
communication technologies and  as well as through physical links (Eusgeld et 
al., 2009a). In the United Kingdom the CPNI (2009), when discussing UK 
Critical National Infrastructure, stated:  
“…there are certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise 
of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of 
essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to 
loss of life.” 
These different infrastructures also become reliant on one another through 
various interdependencies within their processes and therefore can be a viewed 
as a system of systems (Eusgeld et al., 2009b). This relatively new concept 
strives to describe the integration of numerous independent systems that work 
together to satisfy a universal goal and within predefined parameters (Karcanias 
and Hessami, 2011). These form highly complex systems which are adaptive in 
behaviour and incorporate feedback loops within the system (Eusgeld et al., 
2011). As these interdependencies between the different system components 
increase, the vulnerability of the system also increases (Balducelli et al., 2007) 
(Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1: Critical infrastructure and their interdependencies (Rinaldi et al., 2001) 
3.2.2 Types of disruption 
It is important to understand how these infrastructures are connected and what 
effect a disruption within one or more of these sectors would have on the rest of 
the system (Zio and Sansavini, 2011). There are various types of disturbance 
that could cause disruption of supply chains within the urban system; a number 
of these are listed by Conrad et al. (2006):  
 Energy blackouts due to insufficient generation, transmission 
bottlenecks, or equipment failure; 
 Telecommunications disruption caused by fire, wind, water, or sabotage; 
 Water supply contamination caused by toxic materials; 
 Banking and finance liquidity problems, resulting from a disruption to 
electronic payments;  
 Emergency services failing to keep up when a disaster overwhelms 
response capacity; 
 Day to day disruption of operations within government services; and 
 Production of food if food supply becomes contaminated 
3.3 Input-output analysis 
Leontief (1970) introduced the technique as an approach that both describes 
and explains the output of a chosen sector of an economy. This is related to the 
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associated intensities of activities in other sectors within the same economy. I-O 
modelling can be used to represent interdependencies between elements of a 
system (Lifset, 2009), as critical industries share significant resources with the 
flow of goods and information constantly taking place between these different 
sectors (Pant et al., 2011). The levels of outputs and interdependencies, both 
desirable and undesirable, can be analysed and described as part of a network 
(Leontief, 1970) which is fundamental to the research carried out as part of this 
thesis. 
The basic input output relationship is defined by, where C is consumption and 
demand, De.  
x = Cx + De    (3.1) 
The level of demand is equal to: 
De = (1 – A)x   (3.2) 
For I-O, the equation must be solved for x, where 1 is equal to the identity 
matrix (I), giving: 
x = (I - C)-1De   (3.3) 
The I-O model portrays relationships between industries within an economy. It 
therefore depicts how an output from one sector may become an input to 
another. The approach highlights the level of dependency each industrial sector 
has with every other industrial sector. It also shows how a sector can be both a 
supplier of outputs to another sector, whilst also being a consumer of inputs 
from others (Ten Raa, 2009). The demand for outputs from one sector can be 
influenced by the sectors it supplies. For example, if the demand for 
construction rose then the demand for outputs from various parts of the 
manufacturing industry, as a supplier to construction, is also likely to go up. 
These inter-industry linkages can be used to investigate the knock-on effects 
caused by changes in demand (The Scottish Government, 2015). 
I-O accounting is an established technique and it is utilised by national 
governments to depict their economy. ESA (2010) published the Supply, use 
and Input-output tables methodology. This provided guidelines for the 
development of national supply and use tables, as well as the Symmetric Input-
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Output table. This table can either be produced product by product, or industry 
by industry. These tables highlight: industrial interdependencies, movements of 
goods and services within an economy, and imports and exports from the 
economy.  
The interest in this technique for this research stemmed from the need to 
predict the adverse effects on a network caused by a disruptive event within an 
interdependent system, as well as the need to evaluate potential techniques to 
lower the impacts caused by such events (Pant et al., 2011). To do this, such 
models must show the interdependencies between human activities and 
ecosystem services, in addition to interactions between them both (Cordier et 
al., 2011). This provides the ability to predict future scenarios, whilst optimising 
the system to deal with them (Liang and Zhang, 2011). In addition, this 
highlights and addresses issues with high levels of uncertainty, and provides a 
holistic approach that takes into account both core and support services within 
the modelling process (Cordier et al., 2011). 
A major benefit of I-O tables is that they provide an insight into the whole 
economy through the flow of trade, which ultimately links each sector to all 
others (Leontief, 1986). I-O tables take an economy level perspective in order to 
analyse the economy through disaggregating the total output of economic 
activities by industry (Giljum and Hubacek, 2009). These tables are made up of 
various components, that were described fully within Chapter 4. In short, the 
three main elements of an I-O table are:  
 The expenditure by a sector in each of the other sectors in the local 
economy, which is shown in the columns;  
 The revenue received by that sector from each of the other sectors, 
which is shown along the rows; 
 The imports, including all expenditures made outside of the local 
economy; and 
 The exports that include all revenue generated from outside of the local 
economy. 
A second advantage of I-O is that it is an adaptive approach, which can be used 
in conjunction with other concepts. For example, an environmental I-O analysis 
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carried out by Moll and Acosta (2008) highlighted ten groups of products with 
both high levels of emissions and wastes, as well as a requirement for a large 
amount of resources. For these groups, in line with European Union Policy on 
using natural resources sustainably, various ways to reduce the environmental 
impacts throughout their lifespan to decouple environmental impacts from 
resource use were identified. To do this, the environmental I-O analysis was 
combined with NEMA tables (national accounts matrix, including environmental 
accounts). 
A second variation of the approach was to develop an ecological-economic I-O 
model. Cordier et al. (2011) applied this technique to a case study of the Seine 
estuary, which allowed for an estimation of the impacts of the restoration of 50% 
of fish nurseries that were destroyed between 1834 and 2004. The model took 
into account the interdependency between the ecosystem service (fish 
resources) and the life supporting service (nursery habitat) as well as 
incorporating its impact on human actions. The study also applied principles 
related to Post-Normal Science, namely addressing uncertainties and 
establishing holistic properties. 
One of the most famous variations of I-O modelling was developed by 
Hallegatte (2008) to assess the economic cost of Hurricane Katrina to New 
Orleans and the surrounding region. It employed regional I-O tables and 
calculated both direct and indirect losses caused by the disaster. It also 
incorporated some of the recovery phase, although the author states that it did 
not model the weeks directly after the disaster very successfully. The model 
only takes into account interactions within the region studied; it also assumes a 
steady economy and not how the disaster changed economic activity. Similar 
assumptions were made within the model described in this thesis.  
In addition to the aforementioned benefits, I-O has further advantages; first of all 
it is a long established technique that is well understood and widely used. On 
top of this, the way that the tables are set out leads to an ability to model 
scenarios, which is important for this research. I-O provides the ability to see 
the results of these scenarios on a sector by sector basis; this is also 
fundamental to the developed method (Clarke, 2010).  
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Certain criticisms exist of the use of I-O modelling. One of these is that they lack 
flexibility, as there is no option within I-O models for a producer to find an 
alternative supplier if there is a disruption to their usual source of 
supply(Hallegatte, 2008). As I-O data and models track the interactions at an 
economy wide level (Leontief, 1970; Leontief, 1986; Hallegatte, 2012), they do 
not necessarily take into account a spatial or geographical element of where 
these interactions actually take place. This is due to the level of aggregation. As 
the studies are at economy wide levels it becomes impossible to carry out any 
spatial analysis of the data. Further disadvantages of this approach are that is 
assumes various constants; for example, it assumes linkages between 
industries remain the same, and it also assumes that there are no supply 
constraints (Clarke, 2010).  This spatial disaggregation problem is highlighted 
by Fernandez-Vazquez, et al. (2014) as a frequent problem; as data which is 
cross classified to include industry and region does not readily exist. This is, 
therefore, a reoccurring criticism of aggregated I-O tables .  
The approach developed as part of this research therefore sets out to address 
these issues, as well as hold on to the benefits of I-O analysis. The I-O 
relationships are utilised throughout to depict the supply and demand linkages 
between different aspects of the economy, and therefore are the backbone of 
the model developed within this thesis. They provided the raw data that 
informed the linkages inherent within the resource model, as well as information 
regarding which sectors were apparent in the modelled economy.  
3.4 Network Analysis 
A second approach for mapping infrastructure interdependencies is network 
analysis. The basis of this comes from graph theory. A graph (Figure 3.2) is an 
object which includes two elements, the first of these are nodes and the second 
are edges that connect the nodes (Dolan and Aldous, 1993; Wilson, 1996; 
Rinaldi et al., 2001; Chen, 2003; Salles and Marino, 2012). A graph is an 
ordered pair consisting of a set of nodes, also known as vertices, and a set of 
edges; with an edge being related to two nodes (Jungnickel and Schade, 2008). 
This makes it a perfect tool to model supply chain links between different sites 
of production.  
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3.4.1 Graphs 
Within a graph the edges can be either undirected, or directed. In an undirected 
graph, the edges have no orientation. Within a directed graph, on the other 
hand, the edges connecting the nodes have a direction associated with them 
(Figure 3.2). A multigraph allows multiple edges to connect the same pair of 
nodes, as well as loops linking one node to itself (Diestel, 2000; Bang-Jensen 
and Gutin, 2007; Jungnickel and Schade, 2008). In this research the network 
was modelled using multigraphs, as more than one route can link the different 
nodes, and self-loops were also required as certain industries required an input 
from that industry to operate; for example a power station could not function 
without electricity.  
 
Figure 3.2: Digraph and its underlying graph (Balakrishnan and Ranganathan, 2012) 
A subgraph (Figure 3.3) is a subsection of a graph in which all nodes are 
connected to each other (Jungnickel and Schade, 2008). Related to this a 
connected component of a graph is a subgraph in which the nodes are 
connected to each other by edges, but are not connected to any other nodes in 
the graph (Chen, 2003). 
 
Figure 3.3: Graph and subgraph (Jungnickel and Schade, 2008)  
A graph becomes a network when these elements are assigned numerical 
values (Dolan and Aldous, 1993; Diestel, 2000). These numerical values can 
take the form of weightings applied to edges and nodes. An example of this 
could be the time taken to travel along an edge. A node can have both an in-
degree and an out-degree showing the number of edges connecting to and from 
the node. In turn, the degree of the node is the number of edges connected to 
that node, the higher the degree the more influential the node (Newman, 2004).  
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3.4.2 Metrics 
Connectivity can be measured in various ways and is a technique for assessing 
the robustness of a network (Diestel, 2000). One way of measuring connectivity 
is through the clustering property. This uses the assumption that if node A is 
connected to node B, which in turn is connected to C, it is more than likely that 
A is also connected to C (Newman, 2004; Vasudev, 2006; Dueñas-Osorio et al., 
2007). The more clustered a network (measured by the clustering coefficient), 
the more vulnerable it is to cascading failures (Huang et al., 2013). A second 
measure of connectivity is to calculate the shortest paths; this is done by 
calculating the mean shortest path lengths connecting each node in turn to all 
others in the network (Dueñas-Osorio et al., 2007).  
The degree centrality is the number of paths less than or equal to k that 
emanate from a node: this is a good measure of the likelihood of a disruption 
shifting from one node to another (Kang et al, 2011). It is normalised by the 
maximum centrality (total number of nodes minus one) (D'Errico et al., 2009; 
König and Battiston, 2009) and the higher the degree centrality the more likely it 
is for an event to spread from this node (Salles and Marino, 2012). This, 
therefore, could be used as a measure of the resilience inherent within 
infrastructure networks. Within this study the degree centrality was utilised to 
identify a potential zone to be disrupted in one of the modelled scenarios.  
The degree centrality is (Networkx, 2012):  
for node n = degree of n / N – 1   (3.4) 
Nodes which have a greater number of links to other nodes can be considered 
to be in an advantaged position. This is because they have numerous ties, and 
therefore alternative means to satisfy their requirements, making them less 
dependent on other individual nodes. This greater number of links means they 
could have access to a greater number of the resources found in the network as 
a whole (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). However, this does not necessarily 
increase the robustness, or the resilience, of a network. If, for example, the 
highly connected node represented the sole power station within a modelled 
economy, and this power station failed for some reason, the high degree 
centrality would be detrimental to the robustness of the rest of the network 
(Salles and Marino, 2012).  
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The degree centrality has, because of this relationship, been used to measure 
of the robustness of networks. For example, Pinnaka et al. (2015) used this 
metric to model the robustness of critical infrastructure networks. The authors 
utilised the degree centrality to highlight the important nodes within their 
modelled network; an approach which was utilised within this thesis to select 
the most important geographic area for a targeted attack (Section 5.8.3). A 
similar approach was employed by Stergiopoulos et al. (2015), with the authors 
stating that nodes with the highest degree centrality values display the highest 
levels of risk, if disrupted, to the reminder of the network. 
3.4.3 Types of network 
Most real-world networks come under the umbrella of complex networks, which 
is a large set of interconnected nodes (Lü and Chen, 2005). These networks are 
everywhere, and can be divided into subcategories: social, information, 
technological and biological (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Models of complex networks 
allow for a representation of interdependencies inherent in the network 
topology; although they are unable to simulate more complicated interactions 
between nodes (Nan et al., 2013). Complex systems are usually made up of 
nodes that interact strongly with one another in a nonlinear fashion and the 
nodes are connected in a complicated web of exchanges that may be largely 
unknown (Amaral and Ottino, 2004). Various examples of complex networks 
exist; these include the Internet and electric power grids (Lü and Chen, 2005).  
An approach to modelling network interactions is to utilise random networks. 
This allows for an investigation into how network properties change when 
varying both their size and topology, although due to their simplified nature they 
are not accurate representations of real-world networks (Albert and Barabási, 
2002; Newman, 2004).  
A second approach, slightly closer to real-world networks, is to use small world 
networks. These are networks which are based on the assumption that 
geographic proximity of nodes leads to them having effect on the other nodes 
connected to them, meaning that nodes which are located closer to one anther 
have a greater effect on each other than if they were further apart (Newman, 
2004).  
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3.4.4 Infrastructure networks  
This research is interested in interdependencies within complex interdependent 
networks that are highly connected (Rinaldi et al., 2001) and therefore very 
susceptible to disruption. Rinaldi et al. (2001) describe four different types of 
interdependency: physical, in which two entities are dependent on the physical 
output of the other; cyber, a dependency based on the transfer of information; 
geographic, when different elements are in close spatial proximity; and logical, a 
dependence that is not physical, cyber or geographical. Disruption to any of 
these different types of interdependence can lead to a cascading of failures 
throughout the network. 
Rinaldi et al. (2001), follow this up by looking at dependencies which exist to 
electrical power, giving the example of the power crisis in California (Figure 
3.4). As most industries require power, this strong example shows the effects of 
disruption to interdependent networks; this is highlighted by the disruption to the 
power network causing cascading failures through many other industries, either 
directly (first order effects) or indirectly (second and third-order effects).  
 
Figure 3.4: Direct & indirect failures caused by the California power crisis in (Rinaldi et al., 2001) 
This idea of being able to analyse not only direct, but also indirect, effects of 
disruption is fundamental to this research. However, it has been addressed 
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slightly differently to allow for the ability to model reserve stock and different 
delivery patters (Chapter 4). 
In addition to the above, Pizzol et al. (2013) used network/graph theory to asses 
a Danish Water Management system, in order to apply theoretic discussion to 
the real world: this work concluded that network/graph theory was a valuable 
tool for assessing sustainable use of resources. It is commonplace throughout 
network analysis for infrastructure systems, such as water systems, to be 
modelled in such a way. The nodes are typically pumping stations, water towers 
and electricity substations; and the edges are generally the pipes (Holden et al., 
2013). For the purposes of this research, this practice was not followed; instead 
the links between nodes represented the infrastructure between different sights 
of production, for example, the roads that allowed supplies to move from one 
site of production to another.  
Recent research into infrastructure networks by Pant et al. (2016) has split the 
type of nodes into three categories. The first of these are the source node, 
which represent where resources are generated. Next are the intermediate 
nodes which transmit from the source nodes to other nodes. Finally there are 
the sink nodes, which receive supplies either from the intermediate nodes, or 
directly from the source nodes. There are some similarities between the work of 
Pant et al. (2016) and the work carried out in this thesis, the first being that a 
node can represent both a produce of a resource (source) and a user of a 
resource (sink). A second similarity is that Pant et al. (2016) also use edges to 
represent a physical piece of infrastructure which links the node, for example a 
road or electricity cable. The authors trialled their methodology on a case study 
of Great Britain’s rail network and found it provided a valuable analysis tool for 
highlighting which interdependencies potentially have large impacts on the rail 
network. 
Within Chapter 4, both transportation networks and electrical distribution are 
studied. Both of these types of network have recently had network theory 
applied to them, to allow for analysis to take place (Dunn et al., 2014). 
Examples of these include:   
 Transportation Systems 
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o Airline networks have been analysed on national scales in China 
(Wang et al., 2011), India (Bagler, 2008), and Australia (Han et al., 
2008), as well as European wide (Wilkinson et al., 2012) and the 
whole world (Guimera et al, 2005).  
o Subway networks have also gained attention, for example, by 
Latora and Marchiori (2002) who focussed on Boston’s subway 
network. Lee et al. (2008) looked at the Seoul subway network, 
and the terrorist attacks on the London Underground were the 
focus of work by Jordan (2008). 
o In addition, and more relevant to this work, road networks have 
also been addressed using network analysis, for example, by 
Taylor et al. (2006) in Australia and Weber (2016) in the USA 
 
 Electrical distribution systems, which are regarded as some of the most 
complex human-constructed networks (Costa et al., 2007).  
o Example studies have been carried out on both the North 
American (Albert et al, 2004, and Kinney et al., 2005) and 
European (Sole et al., 2008) distribution networks, as well as in 
the UK (Pakka et al., 2016). 
3.4.5 Summary 
As highlighted above, graph and network theory provide tools to aid 
investigation into the resilience of supply chain networks. Aspects of the above 
discussion were, therefore, utilised within the developed resource model. It was 
important to use such tools to identify key components of a network, to allow for 
decision makers to implement policies to increase resilience (Nagurney and 
Qiang, 2012) and therefore understand the vulnerabilities within networks 
(Eleuterio et al., 2013). This research has built upon the basic application of 
these methods by using degree centrality to inform which nodes have the most 
connections, leading to these nodes being targeted for disruption within the 
developed network model. This allowed for an analysis into how disruption to 
these important nodes leads to a cascade of disruption through the modelled 
system (Chapter 5). 
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3.5 Urban metabolism 
Figure 3.5 provides information on the urban metabolism of Brussels, i.e. what 
the city consumes and the wastes it produces, taken from Duvigneaud and 
Denayeyer-De Smet's (1977) investigation into urban ecosystems in Belgium. It 
shows the same basic understanding, but once again no knowledge of how 
supplies move around the system. It was important within the research for this 
thesis to develop a method of spatially modelling the flow of resources in order 
to investigate the effects of disruption to these flows caused by spatial hazards 
such as flooding. 
 
  Figure 3.5: The Urban metabolism of Brussels 
Studies of the metabolism of an urban area are increasingly conducted (Liang 
and Zhang, 2012) as they provide a host of benefits. These include giving a 
holistic view of all inputs, stores, and outputs for an urban area (Kennedy et al., 
2011). The approach allows for recommendations to be made that create a 
more efficient use of materials within a city (Brunner, 2007) 
A second benefit of these studies is that they provide a method to understand a 
city’s metabolism, as most of the products consumed in cities come from other 
areas. A city can, therefore, be described as an attractor of consumable goods. 
The knowledge of such flows allows for an understanding of urban functions to 
be developed, as well as an understanding of what impacts such patterns of 
consumption can have on a larger scale (Barles, 2009), whilst trying to change 
the linear metabolism of cities to a more cyclic function. This could lead to 
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waste from one process being an input for another, with stocks maintained and 
reused to reduce the amount of primary inputs into the system (Brunner, 2007). 
The metabolism of a city is seen as an interconnected set of flows which are 
dependent on materials, energy and information inputted from external sources 
(Gandy, 2004). 
Certain issues with the urban metabolism approach do exist, as opposing 
disciplines use slightly different methodologies and modes to analyse the 
different stocks and flows which are part of urban activity (Pauleit and Duhme, 
2000), The analysis of fluxes and functions within an urban area make it easier 
to define the different components of urban metabolism (Zhang et al., 2010), 
allowing for standardisation to occur through concepts such as energy analysis 
(Pulselli et al., 2009). 
Although not directly utilised within this work, the study of urban metabolism 
offers an alternative data source that can provide the necessary inputs for the 
developed model. This is done through the use of material flow analysis (MFA) 
data, which can be displayed in a similar way to I-O tables (Lifset, 2009). 
Utilising MFA data highlights the direct flows of materials in a more bottom-up 
approach, rather than focusing on the economic links between different sectors 
as in I-O tables, which makes these more top-down.  
3.5.1 Material flow analysis 
To increase the resilience of a system, an understanding of how the system 
consumes resources is required. In addition, the quantification of material flows 
and the documentation of industrial processes which make modern society 
function is required (Hong et al., 2011). To help gain this understanding, 
material flow analysis (MFA) is useful; it is a technique used to measure urban 
metabolism usually at a national or economy wide level (Eurostat, 2002; OECD, 
2008a) but it can also be applied at lower levels (Barles, 2009).  
MFA provides a holistic view of how resources are managed, with the goal of 
minimising wastes and inefficiencies within the supply chain (Browne et al., 
2011). It also can focus on a subject whilst allowing for wide-ranging secondary 
analysis and the development of summary indicators (Eurostat, 2002). MFA is 
based around a mass balance approach which states that inputs are equal to 
accumulation of materials in the system plus the outputs from it, (Hinterberger 
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et al., 2003; Browne et al., 2011) meaning that matter cannot be created or 
destroyed (Sheerin, 2002). 
 
Figure 3.6: Mass balanced approach adapted from methods outlined by Eurostat (Barles, 2009) 
Figure 3.6 shows an example approach for a MFA, adapted from the approach 
set out by Eurostat (2001). Similarly to the Brussels (section 3.5) and London 
(section 1.1) examples, it uses a black box approach to depicting the 
consumption, meaning that the complex interactions between sites or 
production are not depicted.  
On a basic level, raw materials are extracted from nature, and are the inputs to 
the system; these are then transformed into products, and finally the outputs re-
enter the natural system as waste or emissions (Hinterberger et al., 2003; 
Weisz et al., 2006). However, the current linear model of production, 
consumption, waste output seen in cities is unsustainable and does not fit with 
the patterns shown in natural ecosystems (Huang and Hsu, 2003).  
Direct inputs to an economy include resource extraction from within the area 
being studied and imports from a separate system. The outputs are landfill 
waste, emissions into air and water, and exports into the system (Sheerin, 
2002). This being the case, an MFA is affected by varying qualities of data 
relating to imported products, which can therefore affect the accuracy and 
validity of the study (Sheerin, 2002; Hong et al., 2011). Another concept that 
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MFA takes into account is hidden flows; this is unused extraction which does 
not directly enter the economic system (Kovanda and Hak, 2007).  
Many examples of MFAs are apparent in the literature ranging in both scope 
and scale. Huang and Hsu (2003) use MFA, coupled with ecological energetic 
analyses, to investigate the sustainability of urban construction in Taipei. 
Similarly, Müller (2006) focuses on housing in the Netherlands with the aim of 
introducing stock dynamics as an approach to predict resource demand and 
waste generation; urban lifestyles and population being the driving force behind 
this.  
MFA studies can focus on the production of a single product, such as paper. 
The approach models compositions of raw materials inputs and outputs 
associated with the lifecycle with this product (Hong et al., 2011). MFAs have 
been applied to larger scales, be it a city or region level, in which the focus is to 
have a holistic view of the metabolism of the chosen area, such as Limerick 
(Browne et al., 2011), York (Barrett et al., 2002) and London (BFF, 2002). 
However, at these lower levels most data is generally disaggregated from 
national statistics, as in many cases the data does not exist (Browne et al., 
2011). MFAs are also utilised at an economy wide level, with OECD (2008b) 
and Eurostat (2001) providing detailed guidance on how this should be carried 
out. MFA can also be used as a comparison tool when looking at material 
consumption (Weisz et al., 2006) or material flow through major cities (Decker 
et al., 2000).  
MFA is a useful tool for gaining in-depth knowledge of the metabolism of a 
system, be it the system for the manufacture of a single product, the system by 
which material flows in and out of a research area or a whole economic system. 
It takes into account all inputs, including hidden flows, outputs and 
consumption, and can be used to provide summary indicators as a way of 
describing the metabolism of the system. 
3.6 Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is a formal scientific process for determining the risk of a hazard 
event to a system (Bahr, 2000; McLauchlin et al., 2004). The process itself is 
highly subjective and represents the incorporation of science with significant 
psychological, social, cultural, and political factors (Slovic, 1999).  
46 
 
Risk analysis is a forecasting technique that identifies hazards which may affect 
a system, carries out a risk assessment determines the significance of the risk, 
and communicates the risk information to stakeholders (Cohrssen and Covello, 
1999), by stating the probability and the expected impact of a hazard (Lee and 
Pradhan, 2006). The identification of hazards should never be considered to be 
finished, and should be an on-going process (Redmill and Consultancy, 2001; 
Redmill, 2002). The events highlighted throughout Chapter 2 emphasise the 
need for effective risk management. 
3.6.1 Hazard and Risk 
For the purposes of the following discussion, the terms ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ are 
defined here. A hazard is something that poses a level of threat to life, health, 
property, or the environment (Thomas, 2012). Hazards can be either natural, 
such as an earthquake or a hurricane, or man-made, such as a nuclear disaster 
(Wolshon and Murray-Tuite, 2013). A hazard is, therefore, something which 
either exists or not, whereas a risk is the probability of such a hazard doing 
harm (Hodges, 2009). 
A risk is a potential danger (Arnoldi, 2013). Risk, R,  must, therefore, include an 
element of loss, A, which may be multiple in nature. Risk should also take into 
account how significant a loss might be (larger losses imply a greater risk) and 
the likelihood, p, of disruption occurring from that event, d. The level of 
uncertainty dictates how a decision maker responds (Yates, 1992), therefore:  
R = (p)A(p)d     (3.4) 
Zsidisin (2003) defines supply risk as: 
“…the probability of an incident associated with inbound supply from individual 
supplier failures or the supply market occurring, in which its outcomes result in 
the inability of the purchasing firm to meet customer demand or cause threats to 
customer life and safety.” 
3.6.2 Basic Risk Analysis Approaches 
Standard risk analysis approaches can fall into two basic types: quantitative or 
probabilistic, and pseudo-quantitative. Quantitative approaches attempt to 
explain the consequences of a hazard in monetary units, time, or potential lives 
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lost, and seek to understand what could happen, how likely this is and what 
would the consequences be if it were to happen (Kaplan and Garrick, 1981). 
While pseudo-quantitative approaches may also assign numbers, these 
numbers are not necessarily linked to values relating to cost and/or loss of life. 
An example of this type of approach is a risk matrix that classifies the likelihood 
and consequences of a risk in separate categories (Markowski and Mannan, 
2008). 
3.6.3 Vulnerability assessment 
In terms of risk assessment, vulnerability is the combination of possible 
consequences, and uncertainties associated with a given hazard, making risk a 
combination of both vulnerability and the hazard (Aven, 2007). This definition 
provided the basis for the flood risk analysis technique developed as part of this 
thesis; with the risk value being the sum of vulnerabilities for each of the 
modelled flood magnitudes. The consequences of a natural hazard are 
generally measured in terms of damage or losses, either as monetary value, or 
some other metric, such as evaluations based on social values (Fuchs et al., 
2007).  
A fundamental aspect of the proposed method within this thesis is the 
assessment of vulnerabilities. Vulnerability assessment can be defined as the 
methodical inspection of a system to identify those elements or related 
mechanisms that may be susceptible to a hazard (Rao and Thakur, 2007). Such 
an assessment should take into account the intensity of hazards and provide 
information based on the different magnitudes (Deck et al., 2009). A supply 
chain vulnerability assessment requires a different set of methods and statistics 
and may be performed separately from standard approaches (Nowakowski and 
Valis, 2013). 
3.6.4 Flood Risk Analysis 
Flood risk analysis provides flood managers with an improved understanding of 
vulnerabilities to flooding and the most effective means of assigning resources 
to improve performance (Dawson et al., 2005) and is a requirement for flood 
risk management (Hall et al., 2005).  
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Within the literature, many approaches to flood risk analysis are proposed. One 
such method was introduced by Dawson et al. (2005). It describes a risk-based 
sampling technique that removed the need to produce accurate estimates of 
flood depth and damage, in order to reduce the computing power required to 
estimate flood risk. The model also had the potential to examine how a system 
may respond to future external disruptions. For this method, flood risk, “the 
product of the probability of flooding and the consequential damage”, and 
economic risk, “an expected annual damage, EAD”, are discussed.  
Dawson et al. (2005), estimated the probability of distribution flood depths at 
different dyke locations on a flood plain. As part of this, two types of flood were 
modelled, overflow and dyke breach. At sites with complex topography, a 
hydrodynamic model was required. This model simulated floodplain inundation 
and provided estimates of flood depths. A fragility component was also included 
to make reference to a dyke’s ability to resist damage within the calculations 
(Figure 3.7 shows a schematic of the methods used).  
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Figure 3.7: Overview of risk-based sampling methodology (Dawson et al., 2005) 
On a larger scale, Hall et al. (2005) propose a national flood risk assessment 
model that made use of location, level of protection and condition of flood 
defences in England and Wales. In addition to this, a dataset with the size of 
floodplains, topography, population, and asset values was included in the 
analysis. The analysis predicted that a 20-fold increase in funding for flood risk 
management would be required by 2080 to mitigate the expected increase in 
flood risk. Figure 3.8 provides an overview of the methodology used in this 
study.   
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Figure 3.8: Overview of the national flood risk assessment methodology (Hall et al., 2005) 
The two examples presented above utilise the vulnerability caused by different 
depths of flooding and calculate risk based on the probability of these flood 
events occurring (albeit including other information). This basic approach forms 
the backbone of the flood risk analysis metric, which is produced by the model 
developed in this research. 
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A similar approach in term of an integration of hydrologic and socio-economic 
factors was proposed by Yoon et al. (2014). The research assessed watershed-
based flood hazards and vulnerability in the Han River Basin, Korea. The 
authors found that despite a small sample size and a difficulty sourcing data, 
they were able to provide a quantitative description of the Han River flood risk, 
which gave stakeholders and decision-makers a combined approach of risk 
assessment and management. Figure 3.9 shows the conceptual framework 
employed for this study. 
 
Figure 3.9: Conceptual Framework and Hierarchy for the Flood Risk Index in the Han River Basin, 
Korea (including weighting factors) Yoon et al. (2014) 
A further flood risk method was developed by Hallegatte et al. (2011), which 
analysed the risk to Copenhagen from storm surges based on predicted sea 
level rises. The model incorporated I-O analysis to take into account the direct 
and indirect losses when infrastructure was disrupted. The model identified that 
the risk of such a hazard occurring would increase, calling for a comprehensive 
strategy of adaptation and mitigation to manage the effects of climate change to 
be developed.  
3.6.5 Supply chain risk analysis 
The main emphasis of supply chain risk analysis is to identify future 
uncertainties, in order to allow for the practical management of risk-related 
issues (Norrman and Jansson, 2004). This is usually achieved through a use of 
multiple qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative methods (Cagliano et al., 
2012). Supply chain risk analysis is an imperative method to enhance the 
security of supply chain networks (Toivonen et al., 2009). However, there is no 
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conceptual framework in place which ties together research into this area 
(Manuj and Mentzer, 2008).  
To combat this criticism, Blackhurst et al. (2008) when focusing on the 
automotive industry, developed a framework of risk factors based upon a multi-
criteria scoring process. It calculated vehicle part and supplier risk indices with 
the aim of developing risk assessment and monitoring systems. It was 
developed in conjunction with the stakeholders from the automotive industry to 
provide an easy to use system to understand and control their supply base.  
A methodology for the identification of supply chain risk was proposed by 
Neiger et al. (2009). It was developed from the incorporation of pre-existing goal 
modelling and process modelling techniques. It was extended to include a more 
multi-disciplinary definition of risk that was flexible enough to include the 
variations caused by the supply chain structure being modelled. The model was 
able to keep the strengths of the amalgamated approaches to risk analysis, 
while identifying and representing risks holistically, and also depicting the 
connections between issues of risk and the goals and activities of business. 
Risk analysis is an essential tool for maintaining the functionality of supply 
chains when disrupted by hazards such as flooding. It provides an ability to 
identify hazards, highlight vulnerabilities, assess how significant the level of risk 
is, as well as provide an opportunity to adapt the system to reduce these risks. 
Risk analysis also provides the opportunity to understand interdependencies 
within complex supply chains. This is important as underestimating the 
interdependencies in such networks can cause stakeholders to underestimate 
the overall risk (Jonkman and Dawson, 2012).  
 
3.7 Spatial data disaggregation 
To combat a criticism of I-O modelling, a technique for the disaggregation of 
data has been proposed. This was required because the data was at an 
economy wide level, therefore without a spatial element. Data disaggregation 
allowed this data to be output at smaller geographic levels. Hallegatte (2008) 
disaggregates US wide economic I-O data to state level by disaggregating the 
Gross State Product per industry for Louisiana, post Hurricane Katrina. This, 
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therefore, produced a proportional value for: output, value added, employee 
compensation, and intermediate consumption. A similar approach to data 
disaggregation was used for a risk analysis of Copenhagen (Hallegatte, 
2012).These investigations by Hallegatte (2008, 2012) were the inspiration for 
the technique used during this research.  
A data disaggregation approach was also utilised in order to compile 
employment forecasts for South East Queensland, Australia. It was carried out 
by Li et al. (2009) as part of a geographically weighted regression analysis. A 
disaggregated approach was essential, as aggregated data can hide the 
distribution of economic activities, due to the internal entities of the spatial units 
being represented as a homologous black box ). The approach was also 
applied to an urban model, which tested planning scenarios in Queensland 
(Stimson et al., 2012). This technique combined census data and journey to 
work data, in order to allow the original statistics to be output at a smaller 
geographic level.  
3.8 Summary 
In Chapter 2 the background literature was reviewed in order to provide the 
platform required to carry out the methodological literature review in Chapter 3. 
This chapter set out to identify appropriate techniques for the development of a 
resource model that can measure supply chain resilience. From this review, 
certain aspects from three different mythological approaches were incorporated 
to form the proposed model.  
The first of these was the utilisation of I-O tables to inform the supply chain links 
between different sectors; this was chosen as it contained all of the supply and 
demand information in one place, allowing for it to be adapted for spatial 
analysis, while depicting a real world network. This was applied in conjunction 
with a newly developed technique for the disaggregation of economy wide data 
to ward level as part of the proof of concept case study. 
Secondly, elements from network analysis were added to the model to assess 
the infrastructure networks which allow stocks and flows to move around supply 
chain networks. Metrics were chosen because of their simplicity to model within 
Python, as well as their relevance to the modelling of supply chains.  
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The final addition to the model was a risk assessment based upon the 
vulnerability to flood events of different magnitudes. The steps followed to do 
this are set out in the following chapter. This additional metric provides a tool to 
compare relative risks between different case studies, as well as highlight a real 
world application of the developed model. 
In Chapter 4 the understanding of the methods is further developed through the 
presentation of an example case study. 
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4 Methods 
The method developed to model disruption of resource flows is described within 
this chapter. The approach combines thinking about infrastructure 
interdependencies with elements of spatial network analysis and is underpinned 
by input-output (I-O) relationships. The I-O interactions implicitly reveal any 
interdependencies between different human activities and provide a tool for 
trialling future approaches as well as allowing for system optimisation (Liang 
and Zhang, 2012).  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the use of I-O allows for the pinpointing of issues 
caused by supply chain interdependencies, and their disruption. I-O analysis 
permits a more holistic approach that takes into account all levels of interactions 
within the system that has been modelled (Cordier et al., 2011), including levels 
of consumption which occur within an interdependent network (Resurreccion 
and Santos, 2012).  
The I-O relationship describes the input requirements for each site of production 
from each of the other industrial sectors in the modelled system to yield one unit 
of its output (Leontief, 1970), thus highlighting  the interdependencies that exist 
between these elements of the same system (Lifset, 2009).The movement of 
resources around a system is mediated by the infrastructure networks, such as 
transport, energy, water and waste. As these system elements interact with 
their environment and one another, they can be analysed using network theory 
(Amaral and Ottino, 2004).  
This chapter describes the key components, algorithms and assumptions of the 
developed resource model. A synthetic case study is used to illustrate and 
explain how the model works and has been implemented.  A glossary of all of 
the notation used in this chapter, and throughout the thesis, can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
4.1 Overview of the model 
The resource networks modelled are viewed here as a system comprising of 
numerous stocks and flows. As outlined within Chapter 3 of this thesis, the 
current understanding of such network interactions treats networks and their 
infrastructure as a ‘consumer unit’, but does not account for the other influences 
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on resource consumption. The major issue was to understand how 
infrastructures as well as their interdependencies mediate the flow of resources 
around, into and out of networks, with infrastructure providing choices and 
options for resilient (or not) behaviour, and to understand the effects of 
disruption to resource flows and how this may impact on the rest of a system. 
This provides the basis for investigating ways to increase resilience and 
develop adaption options.  
The model is made up of three key components that are shown in Figure 4.1: 
1. The model domain is divided into a number of zones, Z, of analysis. 
Each zone places resource demands, De, on other zones, provides a 
resource supply, S, and holds an onsite stock, O. 
2. A network model describes the infrastructure links, IL, between each 
zone. 
3. A hazard model that can perturb the demand, supply or onsite stocks in 
zones and/or their flows along the infrastructure links according to the 
magnitude, L, of the hazard event. 
 
Zone 5 is highlighted and within this zone there are two sites of production. For 
the highlighted site to output its necessary level of supply, inputs are required 
from various sectors. If the first supplier site does not have any of its products 
available, the demanding site requests supply form an alternative supplier. If it 
is unable to source the supply the level of production is affected. This then in 
turn disrupts upstream industries that require its product, which may then affect 
the industries they supply and so on. One site of production may produce 
enough supply to fulfil multiple demands, both inside and outside of the zone it 
is in.  
The model assumes that the network being modelled is a closed system and 
therefore does not model the imports and exports from the system, focusing on 
the local interactions as depicted within the local economy section of I-O tables. 
The relationship is made more complex as the links between the different sites 
are made by various infrastructures, which is the second layer of the model. In 
the infrastructures modelled were the transport and electricity network. To 
receive product from a site there must be a transport link which connects the 
57 
 
demanding and supplying sites. If a link was removed due to disruption, certain 
zones may become disconnected, meaning that sites of production may not be 
able to receive supply. The current model assumes that resources move along 
only a single infrastructure network, building on work by Fu et al. (2013) and 
Dunn et al. (2013), although in some scenarios the network modelled is 
transport and in others it is energy networks. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Schematic of the key components of the resource model 
The scenario parameters and to some extent the flood magnitude was user 
defined and allowed for the initialisation of the different scenarios utilised within 
this research. The model overviewed in this section allowed for the impacts of a 
spatial hazard on the movement of resources to be investigated in an efficient 
manner. On top of this it enabled the exploration of scenarios and interventions 
to aid the understanding of network dynamics. The model allowed for the 
development and design of effective and adaptive supply chain networks to 
lower the effects of disruption and therefore increase the resilience of these 
networks. 
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Figure 4.2 summarises how the model runs through one iteration, depicting the 
actions which occur either every day, only on a day in which delivery is 
received, or when the recovery period has begun depending on which scenario 
was modelled.  
 
Figure 4.2: A single iteration (day) within the model 
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Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the different aspects depicted in 
Figure 4.2 will be elaborated upon, providing a chronological run through of the 
developed model. 
4.2 Setup of the model 
Within this section, the data required for the model, as well as how it is 
formatted, is outlined. On top of this, the set up phase of the model, and the 
different parameters are also described. 
4.2.1 Input-output tables 
I-O analysis requires three basic components(Zamora, 2010): 
1) A transactions table, showing the monetary flow of goods and 
services; 
2) A direct requirements table, showing inputs purchased from all other 
sector to produce its output; 
3) The total requirements table (direct and indirect requirements), from 
which multipliers are derived. 
These industries make up the columns and rows of the initial transaction table 
(Table 4.1) 
Table 4.1: Basic layout of an I-O table for the example case study 
  Intermediate sector, by industry 
  a B C D e f 
Intermediate 
sector, by 
industry 
a       
 b       
 c       
 d       
 e       
 f       
 
Accounting data is added to the table (Table 4.2), going down the columns, 
highlighting how much one industry spends when purchasing products from 
another to produce its own products over a stated period of time. 
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Table 4.2: Example accounting data 
   Intermediate sector, by industry 
  a b C d e f 
Intermediate 
sector, by 
industry 
a 50 500 500 750 500 0 
 b 100 0 0 50 0 0 
 c 100 0 100 250 100 0 
 d 1000 0 500 300 100 100 
 e 500 250 500 750 50 250 
 f 1000 250 250 500 150 50 
 
Other aspects are also included within the transaction table. These are the final 
demands (the purchases by final consumers) and the final payments for inputs 
not within the intermediate sectors. As the matrix is an integration of revenue 
and expenditure accounts there should be a balance between the input totals 
and output totals, as the total outlay is equal to the total output. 
The full input-output table is shown on the following page and contains the final 
demand sectors and primary supply sectors, and provides a statement of 
accounts for the sectors involved in the example case study (Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3: Example of a full I-O table 
 
 
 Final Demand Sectors 
Households Government Exports Capital Final 
Demand 
Total (d) 
Total 
Gross 
Output 
  Intermediate sector, by industry        
  A b c D e f        
Intermediate 
sector, by 
industry 
a 50 500 500 750 500 0  1000 550 250 150 1950 4250 
b 100 0 0 50 0 0  750 500 350 600 2200 2350 
c 100 0 100 250 100 0  500 750 1000 100 2350 2900 
d 1000 0 500 300 100 100  750 100 100 1000 1950 3950 
e 500 250 500 750 50 250  50 100 50 50 250 2550 
f 1000 250 250 500 150 50  100 50 50 50 250 2450 
Intermediate demand (T)  Final demand (Y) 
Primary Supply 
Sectors 
              
Households  500 300 400 400 500 500        
Government  200 100 100 200 250 700        
Imports  700 650 350 250 100 50        
Capital  100 300 200 500 800 800        
Total  4250 2350 2900 3950 2550 2450        
Value added        
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Following the completion of the input-output tables, the next step was to create the 
consumption matrix, C, based on the intermediate demands of the local economy. 
The output of each sector is listed within a production vector, with a final demand 
vector listing the values of the goods and services demanded from the productive 
sectors by the open sector: these are the intermediate demands as the sectors 
attempt to produce enough goods to meet the final demand vector. 
To calculate C, each input per column (sector) is divided by the Total Gross Output 
for that sector. So, for example, the below vector shows the demands required for 
sector a. This sector’s Total Gross Output is 4250: 
|
|
50
100
100
1000
500
1000
|
|
 
Therefore the following calculations take place (4dp): 
50 / 4250 = 0.0118 
100 / 4250 = 0.0235 
100 / 4250 = 0.0235 
1000 / 4250 = 0.2353 
500 / 4250 = 0.1176 
1000 / 4250 = 0.2353 
The same process is then repeated for all columns, using the specific Total Gross 
Output for each sector, giving the following results: 
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𝐶 =
(
  
 
0.0118 0.2128 0.1724 0.1899 0.1961 0
0.0235 0 0 0.0127 0 0
0.0235 0 0.0345 0.0632 0.0392 0
0.2353 0 0.1724 0.0759 0.0392 0.0408
0.1176 0.1064 0.1724 0.1899 0.0196 0.1020
0.2353 0.1064 0.0862 0.1266 0.0588 0.0204)
  
 
 
Data can then be ascribed to a system, creating a network resource flow model 
showing the inter-infrastructure flows, as well as providing the raw data for the I-O 
model used to describe the resource interdependencies (Liang and Zhang, 2011). 
The above example has 13 sites of production from the six sectors. These sites of 
productions are shared between the 10 different zones, and was achieved because 
of the spatial disaggregation outlined in Section 4.2.2. This allowed for multiple sites 
of production per sector to exist, as well as allowing more than one industrial sector 
to have sites of production in each zone.  
4.2.2 Spatial disaggregation of data 
The spatially disaggregating of data provides a spatial element to the analysis, 
allowing for spatial hazards, such as flooding, to be modelled. To do this, the total 
demands, de, and outputs, Op, for each industrial sector are proportionally divided 
between each zone based on the percentage of employees, e, for the site of 
production in that zone, z; E is the total number of employees in an industrial sector, j 
(equation 4.1).  
𝑂𝑝𝑧
𝑗 = 𝑂𝑝𝑗 𝑥 
𝑒𝑧
𝐸
     (4.1) 
For example, Sector A has two sites of production; one in Zone 1 and another in 
Zone 2. They have equal numbers of employees and produce 50% each of the total 
output for this sector. The entirety of Sector A requires the following inputs to 
produce one unit of its product: 
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|
|
0.0118
0.0235
0.0235
0.2353
0.1176
0.2353
|
|
 
These consumption inputs are then multiplied by the proportion of production found 
in Zone 1 and Zone 2 (0.5) to give the required inputs as: 
|
|
0.0059
0.0118
0.0118
0.1176
0.0588
0.1176
|
|
 
The demand placed on each other sector by Sector A remains the same but is now 
split between the two sites. This was then repeated for all other sites of production in 
each of the zones (Table 4.4). As with industrial supply and demand this makes the 
assumption, in the light of no higher resolution information, of uniform demand and 
productivity per capita.  
Table 4.4: Adapted consumption matrix, including sector and zone e.g. a, Zone 1 
a 
Zone1 
a 
Zone2 
b 
Zone4 
b 
Zone5 
c 
Zone3 
c 
Zone5 
c 
Zone6 
d 
Zone5 
d 
Zone7 
e 
Zone8 
f 
Zone8 
f 
Zone9 
f 
Zone10 
0.0059 0.0059 0.1419 0.0709 0.0862 0.0431 0.0431 0.0949 0.0949 0.1961 0 0 0 
0.0118 0.0118 0 0 0 0 0 0.0063 0.0063 0 0 0 0 
0.0118 0.0118 0 0 0.0172 0.0086 0.0086 0.0316 0.0316 0.0392 0 0 0 
0.1176 0.1176 0 0 0.0862 0.0431 0.0431 0.0380 0.0380 0.0392 0.0102 0.0102 0.0204 
0.0588 0.0588 0.0710 0.0354 0.0862 0.0431 0.0431 0.0949 0.0949 0.0196 0.0255 0.0255 0.051 
0.1176 0.1176 0.0710 0.0354 0.0216 0.0108 0.0108 0.0633 0.0633 0.0588 0.0051 0.0051 0.0102 
 
The final step of this process was to link the data with geographical data based on 
zone codes shown in Figure 4.1. The sources of and sizes of datasets are different 
for each case study, although the fundamental preparation remains the same for all. 
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This allows for the data to be analysed within the model, which is detailed further in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
4.2.3 Infrastructure networks 
Before the model parameters are set, the infrastructure network is rebuilt within the 
model. The infrastructure is a separate layer which links the zones and, therefore, 
sites of production, to one another. In the example case study the infrastructure 
being modelled is the transport network (Figure 4.1). The infrastructural links are 
highly important to the model as they dictate where a demanding site of production 
can receive its required supply from.  
The infrastructure network was rebuilt within the NetworkX module of Python. When 
NetworkX reads infrastructure networks, such as a road network, from an ESRI 
shapefile, they tend to treat all junctions as a node and all links between these 
junctions as edges. As this resource model is simulating interactions between zones, 
this level of detail is not required and so a simplified network was constructed. This 
was done, in the example of a road network, by counting all of the roads that linked 
one zone to another and adding this number of edges to the simplified network.  
A multigraph is required, as multiple edges between the same nodes may be 
required, as well as self-loops. The graph is undirected, to enable resources to flow 
both ways (although flow is sometimes zero). Other types of infrastructure, such as 
the electricity network, only allow the flow to follow one direction and are therefore a 
multidigraph.  
4.2.4 Model parameters  
To set up the different simulations within the model, certain options are available at 
the start of the model which can be changed to adapt to the scenario being modelled. 
These are (with the type of input required in brackets):  
 Length of disruption, tl, (number of days).  
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 Level of disruption, L (value from 0 to 1, for example 0.6 would mean 60% of 
original output is still produced).  
 Infrastructure failure, IF, (Yes or No).  
 The zone which was disrupted, z, (name of zone).  
 Rationing of supply Ps, (Yes or No). 
 Amount of reserve stock in days, tr, (0 if not modelled).  
 Delivery frequency, tn. (number of days) 
 Recovery modelled, Rv (Yes or No).  
 Injection of resources, I, (Yes or No). 
4.3 A standard day in the model (no disruption) 
For a standard day in the model, with no disruption, the following parameters are set: 
 tl, = 0 
 L = 1 
 IF = No 
 z = na  
 Ps = No 
 tr, = 0  
 tn = 1 
 Rv = No  
 I = No 
This means that there are no disrupted sites of production, the model is delivering 
stock every day, and each site of production has no reserve.  
4.3.1 Pre-daily iterations 
At this point of the model, before the daily iterations begin, each site of production, i, 
has some supply, S, which is a factor of time, t. This supply is the sum of all the 
demands from the K number of sites that require this input; with k equalling site of 
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production placing the demand (taken from the disaggregated I-O table, with daily 
usage, U, being equal to demand) De on i.  
Si(t) =∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1    (4.2)  
In addition, each site of production has a value termed original supply, Os: 
Osi(t) = Si(t)    (4.3) 
The reserve level, Re, at site of production i for demands j at the start of a day is 
calculated as: 
Re
ij 
= 𝐷𝑒𝑗 (tr)    (4.4) 
The model also has an assumption that a delivery has taken place and, therefore, the 
non-disrupted sites of production, i, have enough onsite stock, O, of demands, j, to 
keep production at 100% until the next delivery date. For example, if deliveries are 
made every day, this value will be zero plus the amount of reserve, Re, for j. 
Whereas, if the deliveries are made every 3 days, this value will be 2 times (td-1) the 
original demand, De, meaning that on the day of delivery the onsite stock will equal 
zero plus the amount of reserve, Re, for j 
Oij = Dej(td-1) + Rej   (4.5) 
Finally, supply, S, is recalculated for any disrupted sites of production, i, in the 
disrupted zone, z: 
Siz(t) = OsizL    (4.6) 
4.3.2 Daily iteration 
Once this information is in the model, it then checks to determine whether rationing, 
Ps, is being modeled. On a standard day, rationing is not being modelled and so Psj 
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= 1, and the demands, De, at each site of production k, for each demand type j are 
calculated as: 
Dekj= PsjDekj    (4.7) 
The next step in the model is the delivery, with the supply, S, at site of production, i, 
of product j, being reduced by the amount demanded, De, by site of production k: 
Sij = Sij – Dekj    (4.8) 
j is then added to the onsite stock, O, at site of production k:  
Okj =  Okj + Dekj    (4.9) 
This demand is then met, and Dekj = 0.00. The model then calculates the minimum 
proportion, p̂ of demands, j, received onsite, O, at site of production k based on the 
usage, U, per day:  
p̂k= min(
𝑂𝑘𝑗
Ukj
)     (4.10) 
The model assumes that all different inputs to a site are a limiting factor on 
production. For example, if one site requires four inputs; receives 100% of three, but 
0% of the fourth then zero production would take place at that site. This is similar to 
Liebig's law which states that the  maximum possible output is not dictated by the 
total amount of available resources, but by availability of the scarcest resource, which 
is, therefore, a limiting factor (Danger, et al., 2008).  
This is then used to calculate the supply, S, available for the next delivery, based on 
the original supply, Os, value for k:   
After the delivery, the onsite stock, O, of j is then used up in such a way as to make 
sure j does not run out before the time of the next delivery tn. Therefore, usage, U is 
recalculated at site of production k as: 
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U
kj
 = 
𝑂𝑘𝑗
𝑡𝑛
    (4.11) 
And onsite stock, O becomes: 
   Okj = Okj - Ukj      (4.12) 
Finally, De and U are reset to their original value before the iteration begins again. 
Throughout this process the model does loops to check if a path exists between a 
site providing a service and/or commodity, and another site which demands this 
input. If there is a path connecting the two, then the demand can be met, assuming 
sufficient supply is available. If there is no path, or there is insufficient supply, the 
model loops through and checks the next site of production which may potentially 
satisfy the demand. 
4.4 Disruption of output 
The first type of disruption simulated within the model is disruption to output in all 
sites of production, S, in a particular zone, z. This means that the initial values for 
these sites of production are changed during the initial set up phase. 
The formula for supply and demand, De, at site i becomes, with L being the level of 
disruption: 
     Szi = Oszi x L    (4.13) 
     De = Uzi x L    (4.14) 
The model also assumes onsite stock for these sites is, Ozi = 0.00. 
4.4.1 Just-in-time (JIT) 
Just-in-time (JIT) production means that inputs were required every day, treating the 
deliveries as a constant flow of goods or services at each time step (day). Therefore, 
in normal circumstances, the sum of supply, S, at each site, i, is equal to sum of all 
demands, De, made on that site.  
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     ∑ 𝑆𝑖 = 
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑  
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑒𝑖      (4.15) 
Once the supply, demand, and onsite stock are set, the model then runs through the 
same process as in Section 4.3.2, until it gets to the delivery. At this point there is an 
‘if’ statement which checks if 100% of demand is met. If it can be, it follows the 
process set out above. If It cannot be, the supply, S = 0.00 and the demand, and 
onsite stock are: 
Dekj = Dekj - Sik    (4.16) 
Okj = Okj + Sik    (4.17) 
The model then continues to follow the process set out in 4.3.2, and as there is a 
shortfall in supply, this affects the rest of the calculations and, therefore, the output of 
individual sites of production which require a supply from one of the disrupted sites. 
This then in turn, in following iterations, means that more sites become disrupted, 
and they cannot supply the sites which demand their product and so on.  
4.4.2 Modified Just-in-Time 
In the model’s basic state, it assumes that all sites work on a JIT supply basis. This 
strategy moves away from this by adding a level of reserve, Re, which was calculated 
by demand, De, for i, multiplied by the number of days the reserve would last for, tr. 
The reserve can be accessed when normal supplies are interrupted. The model 
assumes that there is space on site for the storage of reserve. Reserve levels in 
terms of a service  is assumed to mean that this input can be  forgone for a few days, 
before it affects the output at the site of production.  
     ∑ 𝑅𝑒𝑖 = 
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑒𝑖  𝑥 𝑡𝑟      (4.18) 
A second way of modifying JIT was through the rationing of supply. When this is 
simulated, instead of using Ps = 1.00, Ps is calculated for the levels of supply, S, for 
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each type of demand, j. Ps is the sum of all of this supply from all sites of production 
J, over the non-disrupted values, Os:  
Psj =
∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑂𝑠𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
    (4.19) 
Changing this value means that demand is reduced, based on the proportion of 
available supply from one sector.  For example, if sector A usually has two sites 
producing 50 units of a product each, and one of these sites were to be disrupted by 
50% and could only produce 25 units, then the total output for the sector would be 
reduced to 75%. The rationing value then affects the demand values derived from 
equation 4.7, meaning that each demanding site of production would only be able to 
receive 75% of their usual demands. 
The rationing is important as it attempts to stop certain supplies running out. This is 
done because one assumption programmed into the model is that if a supply runs 
out, and reserve has been depleted, then all sites requiring this supply halt 
production.  
4.4.3 Bulk deliveries 
The second resource management strategy simulated within the model introduces 
batch deliveries. For example, a site may receive enough of its demands, De, of 
product, j, to last three days every third day. This assumes that all deliveries by all 
suppliers happen at the same time and with the same frequency between deliveries, 
td, for all of the sites of production. Sj is equal to the total amount of j available in the 
economy. 
∑ 𝑆𝑗 = 
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝐷𝑒𝑗𝑥 𝑡𝑑     (4.20) 
This has a major effect on the daily iteration outlined in Section 4.3.2. Prior to the 
delivery phase there is a check carried out to see if time, t = td. If these two times are 
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equal, the normal path is followed. If they are not equal, the model jumps straight to 
the utilising of available stock.    
4.4.4 Recovery  
To develop the model from a measure of robustness, a simple recovery element was 
added. At the start of each daily iteration, a check is carried out to see if time, t = tl, 
with tl being the modelled length of disruption. If this isn’t the case, then the daily 
iteration carries on. If they are equal, then the recovery loop is followed. The first 
aspect of this recovery loop allows the sites of production, which were originally 
disrupted, to have the potential to output at 100% again (if stock is available). 
Secondly, any surplus reserve, Re, of j which may be available in the system is 
utilised to boost available supply, S, in that sector. 
Sj= Sj + Rej    (4.21) 
A further development of the recovery model was the injection of supply into the 
system, to cover any shortfall. This development assumes that firstly, the amount of 
resource required is distributed evenly between the sites which produce that supply, 
and secondly, that there is enough resource to cover whatever shortfall there may be 
between original demand levels and the amount of supply currently available: 
Si = Osi    (4.22) 
When modelling recovery, it was assumed that all disruption to either the sites of 
production within a zone, or to an infrastructure network, ended at the same time, 
meaning that all sites attempted to return to pre-disruption levels of production 
simultaneously.  
4.5 Disruption of infrastructure 
The second type of disruption simulated within the model is the disruption of an 
infrastructure network. This was carried out in the initial set up phase of the model, 
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by removing various edges which linked one zone to another. This in turn could 
potentially lead to failure cascading more quickly through the system.    
4.5.1 Recovery 
As mentioned above, disruption to infrastructure affects the way the recovery model 
works. Once the model reaches the recovery phase, all of the removed edges are re-
added. This then allows the whole infrastructure network to act as one, meaning that 
resources can move freely around the system once again. 
A development of the recovery model was to withhold the use of reserve until the 
disruption has ended, this is because once a a sub-network is formed the model 
assumes the sites of production in this network will stop producing, and therefore 
their reserve will remain unused. This final strategy was used during infrastructural 
failure scenarios to investigate how the timing of using reserve stock affected 
recovery after disruption. Within this scenario, as reserve was available, onsite stock 
was not utilised as an extra source of supply.  
4.6 Metrics   
This study is not seeking to evaluate indirect economic impacts (Hallegatte, 2008), so 
simple metrics were used to aid understanding of the interdependencies and the 
processes of disruption, as well as compare the effectiveness of alternative resource 
management strategies:  
1. The number of days after the initial disruptive event before a site of production 
is disrupted 
2. The proportion of ward of production output, p̂ (op), as a percentage of 
baseline (normal) levels (b) per individual site of production 
3. The mean production output as a proportion of baseline, Op, as a percentage 
for the whole study period for the whole of the Shetland Islands. Calculated 
as:  
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𝑂𝑝 =  
∑𝑝̂ (𝑜𝑝̂)
∑𝑝̂ (𝑜𝑝̂)
 𝑥 100     (4.23) 
The latter two metrics are often used as a proxy to measure the resilience of 
networked systems (Salles and Marino, 2012).  
The following metric of resilience, which was used within this study, was more 
complex and focused on the structure of the network: 
4. The centrality was measured to illustrate the robustness of the network 
(Yazdani et al., 2011), as well as where the critical nodes to the network lie 
and how this changes as the failures pass through the system. 
 
4.6.1 Risk Analysis  
The risk analysis approach was developed to provide a metric that can easily be 
compared between different parts of a case study, as well as allowing for comparison 
to take place between different networks. 
Flood risk data was plotted for the selected zone. This data highlighted areas at risk 
of flooding and the probabilities of different storm surge levels. The flood depth data 
was then mapped. The simplified map shows the areas affected by different depths 
of flooding caused by the different magnitudes of events for the separate probability 
levels. 
A vulnerability, V, analysis was carried out by quantifying the impact of floods of 
differing magnitudes in the area of interest. The following steps were done to 
calculate V: 
1. The first step in the vulnerability analysis was to set the parameters of the 
model. For this example, no reserve stock was available and deliveries were 
made every day. Finally, it was assumed that the different sites of production 
worked together and shared resources proportionally by initial demand. 
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2. For each mapped probability level, the percentage of industrial area inundated 
was calculated. 
3. The model was then run until the disruption stabilised (Figure 4.3). The 
number of days this took and the levels of output were recorded. 
4. Once the reduction in resource stocks, production capacity, and network 
transportation capacity was quantified, the model was re-run to explore how 
far the disruption proliferates and was repeated for a full range of flood levels 
to produce a vulnerability curve.  
5. The vulnerability curve was plotted showing the level of disruption caused by 
the modelled magnitude. 
6. The steps above are summarised using the equation below, which was used 
to calculate the vulnerability, defined as the proportion of resource flows 
remaining at equilibrium. This is a worst case measure, as recovery from the 
disruption may have started by this point: 
 
     𝑉 =
∑ 𝐷𝑒𝑖(𝑡=𝑡𝑒)+𝑆𝑖(𝑡=𝑡𝑒)
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑆𝑖(𝑡=𝑡𝑜)+ 𝑆𝑖(𝑡=𝑡𝑜)
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (4.24) 
The equilibrium time is the number of days after the initial disruption that the 
level of disruption stabilises – the lowest point on Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3: An indicative model output, showing the percentage of total resource flows (compared to 
normal operating conditions) across the system after a disruptive event. 
The overall risk of the modelled zone is the area underneath the line on the 
vulnerability graph. This was calculated by finding the sum of the disruption level for 
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each of the modelled flooding events, multiplied by the likelihood of that flood event 
taking place. Dawson and Hall (2006) stated, R, is a function of probability, p, and 
impact, D. Here the impact is measured in terms of disruption to usual output of the 
modelled economy. Water depth, w, is assumed to be the dominant driver of 
disruption: 
     𝑅 =  ∫ 𝜌(𝑤)𝐷(𝑤)      (4.25) 
4.7 Sensitivity testing  
One approach to validation was to recreate real world events, and a second was 
through sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis was utilised in order to gain an 
understanding of how the model was performing, highlight any issues and validate 
the model. Sensitivity analysis was used to determine how the model reacted to the 
changing of certain key parameters (Starkey, 1992), such as the amount of reserve 
and time between deliveries that is required to make sure the model operates as 
expected.  
4.7.1 Sensitivity testing during the development of the model  
The following two figures are from the early stage of the model, and show the testing 
of different levels of reserve (Figure 4.4) and the different lengths of time between 
deliveries (Figure 4.5). The data used was an unmodified version of the Shetland 
Island Input Output tables, i.e. there is no spatial disaggregation of data for different 
wards. The upper group of results shows an industry that was not very connected 
(marine engineering - ME), and the second shows a highly important sector 
(distribution - D). The industries disrupted were done so at 100%, meaning that no 
input was received from either, in the respective model runs. This was done in order 
to facilitate the interpretation of the results, as it constrains the behaviour of the 
model, so that the only variables are the changes in reserve levels and the lengths of 
delivery time.  
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Figure 4.4 shows the effect that changing reserve levels has on the percentage of 
normal output within the modelled economy. The results of this are quite straight 
forward and can be summed up by stating that the more reserve available on site, 
the longer the lag between the disruption and the effects of that event are felt. The 
more reserve in the system, the more robustness is evident, as the levels of 
redundancy are increased. 
 
 Figure 4.4: Reserve set at 0 days, 1 day, and 3 days  
Figure 4.4 keeps reserve levels at either 0 or 3 days, and shows the effect that 
varying the length of time has on the percentage of normal output. Once again it 
should be stressed that the more stock delivered to a site at a time (i.e. within a 
single, bulk delivery), the more resilience is noted. However, it is worth mentioning 
here that the model assumes a delivery was received just before the disruption took 
place. If a delivery was due the day after the disruption, the levels of resilience and 
the lag between disruption and effect will be shorter, as the site of production will not 
have the available stock to cover any disruption to delivery.  
The additional resilience created by increasing the sizes of deliveries provides 
potential ‘breathing room’ for local authorities, flood risk managers and other 
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stakeholders. It allows them more time to identify alternative mechanisms for 
ensuring the continued supply of critical resources, as well as repairing facilities and 
infrastructure. However, although results are similarly sensitive to change, increasing 
reserve is the more robust option, as this is not dependant on when the last delivery 
took place.  
 
Figure 4.5: Deliveries every five days and ten days 
The information gained from these simulations, and the simulations carried out in 
Chapter 5, provided an initial insight into what actions and changes would increase 
the level of resilience in such systems. It also provided the basis of the development 
of the different scenarios set up as part of the main case studies, and the design of 
the experiments carried out, as it became important to understand how changing the 
sensitivities at the same time, along with other parameters, would affect more 
complex, spatially disaggregated datasets.  
The final insight that these tests provided was the difference in results caused by the 
relative importance of certain industries. In the basic economy which was modelled, 
the distribution sector had indirect connections to all of the other sectors, which 
therefore led to an entire failure of the system. This showed how “important” sectors 
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could have wide ranging affects, but also provided the need to spatially disaggregate 
the data, as distribution is not a single input based in one location. It therefore 
became important to understand how having many inputs would alter these results. 
4.8 Summary 
This Chapter introduced a new resource flow model to analyse the disruption of 
resource movements during extreme events. The design of the model was influenced 
by the literature review in Chapter 3, and combines network analysis and I-O analysis 
to disaggregate regional resource supplies and demands, and attribute the 
associated movements of resources to infrastructure networks. The model can be 
used to assess and improve supply chain resilience to two types of disruption that 
result from extreme events: reduction of output, and removal of infrastructure which 
links different sites of demand and production. To test different resilience strategies, 
the model was designed to allow the analysis of a number of different resource and 
infrastructure management strategies. Those strategies that create a lag between 
disruption and effect provide a longer window for businesses, communities and 
emergency responders to implement some form of corrective action.  
To facilitate the introduction of the model, a ‘proof of concep’ case study was used. 
The following chapters introduce more detailed results, and provide analysis in the 
demonstration of the model in the Shetland Islands and New York City.  
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5 Case study: Shetland Islands 
 
Figure 5.1: Map of the Shetland Islands showing CAS Wards used during the analysis; ferry terminals, 
regional airports (not intra Island), oil terminal and power station. Insert shows Lerwick. 
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5.1 Introduction to the case study      
This case study of the Shetland Islands was developed to test and demonstrate the 
methods and concepts outlined in Chapter 4. It investigates infrastructural 
interdependencies within an interconnected system by exploring the networks that 
deliver the required stocks and flows around the Shetland Islands. The case study 
focuses on how disruption to these stocks and flows might affect the whole system 
as a result of the interdependencies between sites.   The study then aims to identify 
ways of building resilience to disruptive events by taking advantage of the lag 
between the occurrence of a disruption and the time when a reduction in supply 
becomes apparent. This was carried out through the testing of different policy 
adaptations within the quantitative urban resource model to examine how changes to 
the system affect overall resilience 
The Shetland Islands are the most northerly local authority in the UK, with a 
population of around 22,000 people in 2009 (SIC, 2009). The islands comprise 16 
inhabited islands, in a chain of over 100, with a combined area of 1,450km2 (SIC, 
2013). The most southerly point of the Shetland mainland is approximately 160km 
from the closest point on mainland Scotland (SIC, 2012). The relative isolation of the 
islands limits the number of external resource interactions; the internal economic 
flows have been well documented over a number of years, and the co-location of 
many industries reduces the internal spatial complexity of flows on the island.  This 
data is based solely on intra-region industrial interactions, therefore imports and 
exports to or from the islands are not taken into account. 
Within the Shetlands there are 22 wards (Figure 5.1), which are used as the output 
level for this analysis. The characteristics of these 22 wards vary greatly across the 
islands. The largest urban area of the Shetlands is the capital, Lerwick. It has a 
population of 7000 people and another 4000 thousand live within 10 miles. This area 
covers nine of the 22 wards. 
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As part of the data preparation for this study, any site of production with output less 
than one per cent of the total for that industry was removed, to simplify the adapted 
input-output (I-O) table. This meant that Sound, which is mainly residential, has no 
modelled sites of production. In contrast, important wards modelled include: Delting 
East and Lunnasting which is home to Sullom Voe Oil Refinery; and Dunrossness 
where the main airport on the Island is located.  
A number of simulations were tested, the first set of these analysed a disruption to 
each ward individually.  Production in each ward was disrupted by fifteen per cent 
and the model was run in each of the following basic states (Section 5.3): 
1. A non-managed approach in which supply was taken on a first-come, first-
served basis.  
2. Rationing, in which the available supply was shared out between each of the 
demanding sites as a percentage of that sites original supply 
3. Recovery was added to the model with simulations once more done for both 
the non-managed and managed approaches 
4. Recovery with injection of supply was added to the model, with simulations 
done again for both the non-managed and managed approaches 
For each of these scenarios the following resource management strategies were also 
tested for four approaches outlined above, and explained in Section 4.6: 
 JIT production (JIT): every day each site of production received a delivery of 
all resources required in order to produce one day’s worth of goods. This was 
chosen as it is assumed to be the least robust strategy and, therefore, a worst 
case scenario. 
 JIT production with some reserve (JIT/Re): enough reserve stock to cover one 
day’s worth of production was added to each site, meaning that the site then 
had the resources for two days of production. This modification of JIT was 
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tested as a means to increase the lag between the disrupted event and the 
impact on production.  
 Batch deliveries (B): every three days, each site received enough stock to last 
for three days of production. This allowed for a testing of different delivery 
strategies to take place. 
 Batch deliveries with some reserve (B/Re): enough reserve stock to cover one 
day’s worth of production was added to each site. This modification of batch 
deliveries to was tested as a means of increasing the lag between the 
disrupted event and the impact on production. 
 
On top of these resource management strategies, recovery strategies were also 
tested. These utilised available stock in the system to help return production to pre-
disruption totals, or injected new supply into the system to make sure this occurred. 
In total, 12 scenarios (not including injection of supply) took place per disrupted ward, 
these were: 
 Batch (B), batch with recovery (B/Rv), batch with reserve (B/Re), and batch 
with recovery and reserve (B/Re/Rv); 
 Just-in-time (JIT), just-in-time with recovery (JIT/Rv), just-in-time with reserve 
(JIT/Re), and just-in-time with recovery and reserve (JIT/Re/Rv); and 
 Rationing of batch with reserve (PS/B/Re), rationing of batch with recovery 
and reserve (PS/B/Re/Rv), rationing of JIT with reserve (PS/JIT/Re), and 
rationing of JIT with recovery and reserve (PS/JIT/Re/Rv). 
This was done to allow for a comparison to the resilience of each of the wards during 
the different scenarios. In Section 5.4, a detailed analysis of the results of the least 
resilient wards is carried out; this also includes a comparison with a highly robust / 
resilient ward. In Section 5.5, a detailed risk analysis is outlined, using the costal 
wards of Lerwick.  
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The second type of disruption modelled was caused by infrastructure failure (Section 
5.6); to do this, certain infrastructure links were removed. The first links to be 
removed were all of the ferry links, and secondly a failure in the electricity network 
was modelled. Finally, roads that were highlighted as pinch-points during the semi-
structured interviews were blocked. Again, for each of these scenarios the four basic 
simulations outlined above were modelled, as well as simulations that withhold using 
reserve (WR) until recovery has begun.  
The next set of scenarios investigated the effects of combination events; both output 
in a ward and infrastructure were disrupted (Section 5.6.5). The first two of these 
investigated a road closure and reduced output in that ward, and finally, disruption to 
all of the coastal wards in Lerwick took place, with the addition of ferries from Lewick 
being unable to sail.  
The case study itself is split up into different scenarios (Table 5.1), in which each has 
a hazard which leads to a modelled type of disruption. This disruption comprises 
either a lowering of production in the effected ward, failure of infrastructure, or a 
combination event (causing both a lowering of production and infrastructure failure in 
one ward). Each scenario is then split up into different simulations in which one or 
more resource management strategies is employed to allow for analysis to take 
place.   
To aid understanding of the different simulations carried out within the different types 
of scenario, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and the resource management strategies are used, 
to provide a unique identifier for each simulation. For example, SI01HB_JIT (SI = 
Shetland Islands) would be a simulation from the unmanaged basic scenario (01), 
with disruption occurring in Harbour and Bressay (HB) and JIT resource management 
being used.  
Table 5.1: Different scenarios tested within this Shetland Islands (SI) case study 
Code Scenario Hazard Disruption mechanism Section 
85 
 
 
 
 
 
01 Basic / unmanaged Disrupted output Lowered Production 5.4-6 
02 Injection of supply Disrupted output Lowered Production 5.5 
03 Risk Analysis Storm surge Lowered Production 5.7 
04 Ferry disruption Storm Infrastructure failure 5.8.1 
05 Blackout Disrupted output Infrastructure failure 5.8.2 
06 Road Closures Flood Infrastructure failure 5.8.3 
07 Road Closures Flood Combination event 5.8.4 
08 Lerwick Storm surge Combination event 5.8.5 
 
Table 5.2: Wards analysed in detail with two letter code used for generating the unique ID. In the 
infrastructure failure scenarios where disruption occurs on links between wards NF or RB is used. 
Ward Code Ward Code 
Clickimin  CL North Central NC 
Cunningsburgh & Sandwick CS North NO 
Delting East & Lunnasting  DL Sansting, Aithsting and Weisdale SA 
Dunrossness  DN Sandwick, Levenwick & Bigton SB 
Delting West DW Scalloway SW 
Harbour and Bressay  HB No Ferries NF 
Lerwick LW Road Blockage RB 
 
5.2 Data Requirements  
The case study required data from multiple sources, to allow for a clear analysis of 
the relationships between components of an interdependent network. The different 
data sources were manipulated to allow common fields to be related to one another. 
For example, common industrial sectors are required for the I-O tables and Business 
Register and Employment Survey (BRES) Data, and it is necessary that Ward codes 
are linked between the geographic data and the disaggregated I-O table. 1997 – 
2007 CAS Wards were used to match the data format used by the Shetland Island 
Council in their publications.  
The I-O table was sourced from “An Analysis of the Shetland Economy based on 
Regional Accounts for 2010-11”. The report was commissioned by Shetland Council 
in 2011 to presents findings from an economic analysis of the Island’s economy. The 
data was presented in I-O tables, and allowed for the inclusion of detailed information 
on the industrial sectors of the economy (Dyer et al., 2013). These I-O tables provide 
an all-inclusive illustration of the goods and services which flow within a the economy 
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per year, providing a detailed picture of industrial interdependencies as well as the 
links between producers and consumers (Scotland.gov, 2013).  
The second data requirement was the BRES, which are annual employment statistics 
available on a ward level, which detail the locations of e employees’ workplaces 
(NomisWeb, 2014).  
In order to gain an insight into the actual current state of resilience planning on the 
Shetland Islands, face-to-face interviews with members of the resilience team within 
the Shetland Island Council were carried out. This provided useful information on 
vulnerabilities and the types of disruptive events which can occur, and also gave a 
general feeling of what life is like on the Islands. The interviews followed an 
unstructured pattern, allowing for respondents to add further detail when required 
(Grix, 2010). The approach also allowed for the interview to remain more informal, 
aiding the quality of discussion. 
The interview respondents were chosen as they were identified as the people who 
would most likely be able to provide significant information in aid of this research 
(Creswell, 2009). As the respondents were experts within the Council, they were able 
to provide an understanding of why the Council carried out the I-O study, and also 
highlight vulnerabilities within the transport network. 
Information was gaining during these interviews that ultimately led to the 
development of certain scenarios within this work. For example, it was stated that 
during large storms the ferry services lining the different Islands cannot run; and 
pinch points in the road network were also highlighted. In addition, it was noted that 
flooding was not a significant problem for most of the wards but at times coastal 
flooding could cause problems.  
Finally, “The Shetland Island Council Strategic Flood Risk Assessment” provided the 
data required to map the areas at risk of flooding on the islands. The report was 
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carried out as part of the Shetland Local Development Plan (LDP). The LDP aims to 
assist in both the preservation of the built and natural environments, as well as 
support economic growth and provide information to aid the planning process (SIC, 
2013). 
5.3 Disaggregating of data 
Using the approach outlined in section 4.3.2, the I-O data was spatially 
disaggregated to be used within the resource model. This enables the physical 
connections between supply and demand to be better represented within the model. 
Spatial downscaling is also essential to understand the impact of spatially variable 
events such as flooding.  
The first step of the process was to acquire the BRES data from NomisWeb. The 
data was supplied as a CSV file with a column for each if the wards within the study 
area. Each row showed the number of employees in each sector within that ward. 
The next step was to use the percentage, which is the raw count normalised 
according to the total number of employees per sector across the whole economy, E, 
from the BRES data es, to calculate the total output per sector per ward. To do this, 
the proportion of employees, e, was used as a proxy for estimating the proportion of 
supply, S, and demand, De, from each industrial sector, j, in each of the zone, z: 
𝑆𝑧,𝑗 = (
𝑒𝑠
𝐸
)𝐷𝑒𝑗  ;  𝐷𝑒𝑠,𝑗 = (
𝑒𝑠
𝐸
) 𝑆𝑗   (5.1) 
This, therefore, means that the total inputs and outputs for each industry is 
proportionally divided between each ward based on the percentage of employees 
from a specific sector found in each ward. This is then repeated for all other wards. 
The demand placed on each other sector by another sector remains the same but is 
now split between the sites of production which represent that industrial sector, as 
described in Section 4.4.2.  
88 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Initial Results  
Within this section, the results of the initial scenario set out in Section 5.1 are 
presented. In each simulation the output of a single ward is reduced by 15%. The 
simulations are then run again, but for a different ward. This continued until all wards 
had individually been disrupted.   
5.4.1 Results by simulation  
Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of production for all of the wards during each of the 
basic simulations of the model (based on 85% production for all sites in the disrupted 
ward). The first thing to note is the obvious grouping of simulations of the same type, 
for example, the four box plots for JIT simulations show a much lower level of output 
on average for the entire economy than the simulations using batch deliveries (B).  
When the addition of rationing (PS) of available resources is added to the JIT 
simulations there is improvement in some of the simulations, but the median value is 
still very similar to the initial JIT simulations, meaning that in some cases the 
simulation performs well but in others it does not. This is shown by the very long 
length of box (depicting a high interquartile range). This result is an indicator of the 
importance of the ward in terms of both the total levels of production and also the 
output of individual sites of production then a large proportion of the overall output 
from the Shetland Islands is removed and therefore the system is unable to withstand 
this shock and therefore rationing does not make a large difference in the results.  
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Figure 5.2: Box and whisker plot showing the percentage output for . The box represents the first and 
fourth quartile, whiskers 2nd and 98th percentile and the crosses are outlying results. 
When focusing on the B simulations, the four box plots are considerably higher (35%) 
than those of the initial four JIT simulations. A greater level of recovery was also 
noted in the simulations in which it was modelled (returning to almost 100% 
production). When PS is added to B, the level of production throughout the month 
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long simulations is only a fraction under 100%, showing much higher levels of 
resilience than in the basic simulations.  
This is highlighted further in Table 5.3, which shows the first day in which effects are 
noticed outside of the disrupted ward for the basic simulations of the model (without 
recovery and injection of supply). It clearly shows that the addition of reserve to all 
simulations increases the lag, with bulk deliveries also slowing the effects.  
Table 5.3: Number of days between disruption and initial effects on production, and the mean production 
output of the Shetlands for the whole study period 
 
Mean day first effects felt after 
disruption 
Mean output of whole of the 
Shetlands (%) 
B 4 45.29 
B/Re 5 56.40 
JIT 2 10.91 
JIT/Re 3 19.36 
PS/B 25 97.59 
PS/B/Re 28 99.11 
PS/JIT 9 34.17 
PS/JIT/Re 22 83.8 
 
Finally, if rationing of resources is encouraged, only small disruptions are observed 
throughout the whole island, and only within three out of the four simulations. This is 
shown by the high mean output, which indicates much greater levels of resilience. 
The modification of JIT to include either a reserve stock, rationing of supply, or both, 
makes a scenario much more robust to disruption then when just following a pure JIT 
model. 
The longer the lag between initial disruption and the effects outside of the disrupted 
ward, the higher the levels of resilience. A longer lag also allows for corrective 
actions, such as the sourcing of supply from outside of the local economy, to take 
place (see Section 5.3.2).  
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5.4.2 Recovery  
One clear result which can be seen in Figure 5.2 is the recovery model in most 
cases, apart from JIT simulations leads to a bounce back towards the original output 
levels by the end of the modelled period. This can be seen most clearly in the batch 
delivery scenarios. In the scenarios which are just measuring robustness (i.e. no 
recovery is modelled), median values for output are slightly above 50%, whereas 
when recovery is included these results show an overall output for the study period at 
around 98%, i.e. overall only 2% of resource movement is lost. This therefore shows 
a very high level of resilience when these scenarios are modelled. High levels of 
resilience are also noted in the Batch with Rationing runs that include a recovery 
component.  Similarly, when the JIT with rationing strategy includes rationing or 
reserve components, the resilience to disruption is extremely high, with around 99% 
of all resource flow occurring for all of the simulations carried out using these criteria.  
5.4.3 Injection of supply from outside of the local economy    
 
Figure 5.3 is the mean percentage of supply which needs to be injected into model 
run to bring production back to 100% per run type. These follow a similar pattern to 
the mean production box plots. The least resilient simulations were JIT this was 
because these simulations exhausted resources quickly. In most of rationing 
simulations the amount injected was lower, in some cases, less than 1% of supply, 
as resources were not exhausted in these simulations. PS/JIT with exhibits a large 
spread across the wards; as discussed in 5.4.1 this is a function of both the 
connectivity and volume of resources produced by the sectors in each ward. This 
modification of JIT does show vast improvement to robustness in some cases, 
making it a viable option to increase robustness. 
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Figure 5.3: Box and whisker plot showing the percentage of supply required to return production to 100%. 
The box represents the first and fourth quartile, whiskers 2nd and 98th percentile and the crosses are 
outlying results.  
5.5 Results by ward 
By way of example, the following simulations have been highlighted to show how 
results can be viewed by ward. Figures 5.4-5.7 highlight these basic differences in 
performance for the Sandsting, Aithsting and Weisdale ward. The first set of four 
maps (Figure 5.4) focus on SI01SA_JIT. These simulations show a low level of 
resilience, with disruption cascading through the system quickly (production dropped 
to zero by day 5). Within this example, the 14 different sectors had their supply 
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disrupted at the start of the scenario, as they had sites of production in the disrupted 
ward. 
 
Figure 5.4: Percentage of production by ward for JIT simulation after the Sandsting, Aithsting and 
Weisdale ward was disrupted (SI01SA_JIT) 
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A move from JIT production (SI01SA_B) increased the resilience levels and added a 
lag between disruption and the cascading of this through the system (Figure 5.5). In 
this simulation, the lag between the initial disruptive event and this disruption causing 
all sites of production to cease activity has been lengthened by 19 days because of 
the change to the resource delivery strategy. 
T he key difference between the results shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 is the speed in 
which the disruption cascades through the system. In 5.4 it takes five days for output 
in all wards to drop below 20% of normal, whereas in 5.5 it takes 24 days. This 
increase in lag between the initial disruption and the production levels being 
impacted is caused by the additional robustness within the system resulting from the 
move away from JIT.  
To add further resilience, a small amount of reserve stock (SI01SA_B/Re) was 
included as part of an additional simulation (Figure 5.6). In the depicted example 
there was enough reserve to last one day of production if delivery of that input 
ceased all together. There was a clear difference in performance between the results 
shown in Figure 5.5 and 5.6. The addition of reserve increased robustness and 
provided an extra three days of breathing room before the system collapsed 
completely.  
Within the bulk deliveries approach, once supply has been received the model 
calculates how much can be produced per day until the next delivery, without running 
out of any of the required inputs for that sector. This means that the received delivery 
was divided by the number of days between deliveries (in this case, three days).  
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Figure 5.5: Percentage of production by ward for bulk delivery simulation after the Sandsting, Aithsting 
and Weisdale ward was disrupted (SI01SA_B)  
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Figure 5.6: Percentage of production by ward for bulk delivery with reserve simulation after the 
Sandsting, Aithsting and Weisdale ward was disrupted (SI01SA_B/Re) 
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Figure 5.7 shows the simulations which incorporate rationing of resources within the 
Sandsting, Aithsting and Weisdale ward. If supply was limited to 85% then the site 
requiring this input could only request 85% of their usual inputs. Rationing was also 
introduced as an attempt to lower the chance of a supply running out. This was run in 
conjunction with bulk delivery, and reserve. This simulation approach consistently 
performed the best and increased the amount of time it took for disruption to cascade 
through the system, and therefore increasing resilience.  
  
Figure 5.7: Percentage of production by ward for rationing with bulk delivery with reserve simulation after 
the Sandsting, Aithsting and Weisdale ward was disrupted (SI01SA_PS/B/Re) 
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5.6 Least resilient wards  
The simulations for disruption within various wards across the Shetlands have shown 
lower levels of resilience than others, as represented by their lower mean output. 
These results are shown in Table 5.4. The wards in question are; North Central, 
Harbour and Bressay, North, Delting West, Delting East and Lunnasting, Scalloway, 
Walls, Sandness and Clousta, Sandwick, Levenwick and Bigton, and Dunrossness. 
In comparison a ward with higher levels of resilience, Clickimin (Lerwick), is also 
discussed. 
Table 5.4: Lag between disruption and initial effects and mean production output for the whole modelled 
month across the Shetland Islands 
 
Percentage 
of sectors 
present in 
ward 
Mean output of 
whole of the 
Shetlands (%) 
Number of 
simulations 
leading to total 
collapse 
Number of 
simulations 
which stabilise 
above 80% 
output 
Clickimin 34 85.29 4 8 
Delting East 
& Lunnasting 
53 53.99 8 3 
Delting West 59 38.34 9 3 
Dunrossness 53 41.51 9 3 
Harbour & 
Bressay 
78 43.28 9 3 
North 69 41.63 9 3 
North Central 56 42.49 9 3 
Sandwick, 
Levenwick & 
Bigton 
44 47.68 8 4 
Scalloway 65 55.43 7 5 
Walls, 
Sandness & 
Clousta 
56 52.78 7 4 
 
5.7 Resilience in Lerwick     
The results for disruption for twelve simulations in Clickimin (SI01CL), located in 
Lerwick are shown in Figure 5.8. As a first observation, only simulations with a JIT 
approach lead to the failure of the entire network (Table 5.4) with batch deliveries 
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stabilising production to 80%. A basic improvement in overall output is also noticed 
within the JIT and batch delivery simulations, when there is the addition of reserve 
stock. Output does not reach its lowest level for a further 11 days, by which time 
enough reserve stock for one day of production is held on site. This, therefore, 
provides a lag before disruption is felt to allow for corrective action to take place, 
increasing adaptive capacity and, therefore, resilience. 
 
Figure 5.8: Scenario results for disruption to Clickimin (SI01CL) 
In comparison to this, Figures 5.9-5.11 show much lower levels of resilience for 
wards North Central (SI01NC) (mean output of 42%), Harbour and Bressay (SI01HB) 
(mean output of 43%), and North (SI01NO) (42%). Within these results, poor 
performance can partly be explained by the modelling assumption that one resource 
is a limiting factor on production (Section 4.2). The results reinforced what was noted 
during flooding in Thailand, when the reduction in hard drive production led to a fall in 
PC and laptop manufacturing output around the world (Chongvilaivan, 2012) i.e., for 
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this case study if one site required four inputs, received 100% of three, but 0% of the 
fourth, then zero production would have taken place at that site.  
In all four of Figures 5.9-5.11 the results show that modifying JIT by combining either 
reserve stock, recovery and/or rationing of available supply leads to much greater 
robustness and resilience throughout the whole economy. The number of days 
between disruption and a major drop in production increases from 1 day up to 10-12 
days. This would, therefore, provide stakeholders with time to source other suppliers 
and implement any plans they may have to keep production as high as possible. 
 
Figure 5.9: Scenario results for North Central (SI01NC) 
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Figure 5.10: Scenario results for disruption to Harbour and Bressay (SIO1HB) 
 
Figure 5.11: Scenario results for disruption to North (SI01NO) 
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The number of days between initial disruption and production dropping off is much 
longer in Clickimin, taking at least 14 days with the worst performing simulation (JIT) 
and with only four simulations leading to failure of the network, whereas in North 
Central, Harbour and Bressay, and North JIT simulations fail after 3-4 days and in all 
three of these cases 9 of the simulations cause a total failure. This implies a greater 
level of robustness when disruption takes place within Clickimin. The lower levels of 
robustness in North Central, Harbour and Bressay, and North is the high number of 
industries located in these wards are highly connected to other industries throughout 
Shetland, as well as these wards having a number of sites of production located 
within them that produce high a percentage of the total output for their sector. 
80% of the Marine Engineering sector is found within the ward of North Central: 
disruption to this sector had a knock on effect on other important sectors throughout 
the island, namely port and harbour activities, sea transportation, fishing, and oil 
supply (Table 5.5). Once these connected sectors are disrupted they cannot produce 
at the same levels, leading to further failure throughout the system. For example, 
once port and harbour services are disrupted highly connected sectors like retail and 
wholesale start to see their operations affected. This causes a rapid cascade of 
failure through the whole system.  
Table 5.5: Interconnections between industries within the Shetland Islands and number of sites of 
production per industry 
 Number of wards  Sectors directly 
supplied 
Number of inputs 
required 
Agriculture 4 10 21 
Fish Catching 6 4 17 
Aquaculture 12 6 18 
Oil Terminal 1 1 17 
Mining & Quarrying 3 7 12 
Fish processing 5 13 16 
Other food & drink processing 9 17 18 
Marine engineering 4 6 16 
Textiles & crafts 7 11 16 
Other manufacturing 9 24 11 
Electricity, gas & water supply 6 30 16 
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Construction 11 30 20 
Wholesale 6 17 11 
Retail 8 21 11 
Accommodation 12 20 17 
Catering 11 21 19 
Ports and Harbours 8 11 4 
Transportation, sea 6 19 15 
Transportation, land 10 26 8 
Transportation, air 2 26 18 
Oil Supply Services 1 4 19 
Communication & supply 16 21 15 
Financial Services 2 24 4 
IT/computer related & real 
estate 
10 23 17 
Technical, Professional, other 
business services 
15 28 9 
Public administration 15 18 15 
School Education 17 0 15 
College Education 4 1 10 
Health 7 3 16 
Social work 13 5 9 
Other community services 16 24 16 
 
The reasons for high vulnerability within Harbour and Bressay (Figure 5.11) were 
similar to that of North Central a large and diverse range of sectors, including several 
important sectors (Financial Services, IT/computer related and real estate services 
and technical, professional, other business services) (Table 5.4). This means that 
when disruption occurs within this ward, all of  these sectors (and, therefore, the 
majority of sectors within the whole Shetland economy) are affected, even before 
connections are taken into account. Consequently, this began to affect some of, what 
were expected to be, the more resilient simulations.  
Within North, similar to Harbour and Bressay, there are a large number of different 
sectors represented, in this case 22. Four of these produce more than 50% of the 
output for that sector; wholesale, other manufacturing, land transportation and 
construction (Table 5.5).  
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5.7.1 Other wards with low resilience  
Disruption to Delting West (SI01DW); Delting East and Lunnasting (SI01DL); 
Scalloway (SI01SW); Walls, Sandness and Clousta (SI01WC); Sandwick, Levenwick 
and Bigton (SI01SB); and Dunrossness (SI01DN) led to lower levels of resilience. 
These results are shown in Table 5.5, which highlights the sectors which have the 
most connections to other sectors; he greater the number of connections, the lower 
the level of resilience. It also shows how many sites there are within each industry 
across the Islands; the greater the number of sites, the higher the level of resilience 
in output for that sector. This is countered if the majority of output is actually found in 
one area, as described in some of the examples below.  
Delting West is a sparsely populated ward at the North of the Main Island. Within this 
ward is Scatsta Airport, which is the main hub for commercial air travel to and from 
the island. It also provides the majority of support for North Sea Oil operations 
associated with the Island. In total there are around 19 different sectors represented 
in the ward, albeit most of their outputs equate to less than 10% of the output for their 
own sector. Of the 32 sectors which make up the modelled economy, 26 of them 
require some sort of input from air travel at some point, highlighting the importance of 
this ward and why, when disrupted, its resilience is lower than that of most of the 
other wards on the Island. 
Delting East and Lunnasting is home to the North Sea Oil terminal on the Shetland 
Islands. If disruption occurs to production at the oil terminal electricity generation can 
be affected, as the Shetlands are not on the national grid. If electricity production 
reduces, all other sectors on the Island will be disrupted, which lowering resilience 
within the ward. The ward is also home to 20% of the Island’s aquaculture. A 
lowering in supply of farmed fish firstly affects the fish processing industry but also 
the supply of food to catering and accommodation sectors as well as households on 
the Islands. The other eleven represented industries in this ward contribute less than 
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10% to their respective sectors, so are less likely to cause cascading failures 
throughout the system.  
The regional accounts of Shetland show an input into the electricity production sector 
from fish processing: this relationship was therefore reflected in the model. 20% of 
the fish processing industry is located within Scalloway and, consequently, disruption 
to this industry can cascade through to electricity production.  
As outlined above, disruption to electricity production has the potential to disrupt all 
other sectors on the island. Fish products have various industrial uses, one of which 
is the production of industrial lubricant, although it is unknown if such lubricant is 
used within electricity production in the Shetlands. Conversely the expenditure on 
processed fish products from the local economy could easily be for the purchasing of 
food to be sold / consumed in the staff canteen. If this were the case, it is unlikely 
that such disruption to electricity production would actually take place. 
More than 50% of the agriculture which takes place on the Shetlands occurs in Walls, 
Sandness and Clousta. A reduction in supply here has effects on food and drink 
processing, textiles and accommodation, schools, as well as health care and 
households. A limit in the supply of food could have more profound effects than those 
highlighted in this model and would realistically lead to a swift intervention from 
outside of the island chain. This would be similar to the response of FEMA in the 
aftermath of hurricane Sandy, in which they set up hot food distribution centres 
throughout Manhattan (NYC, 2013). 
 
The predominate industry in Sandwick, Levenwick and Bigton, which is found in the 
southern areas of the main island, is food and drink processing (excluding fish 
processing). As more than 30% of this industry is found in this ward, it’s disruption 
has a large effect on food supplies modelled, with the same issues arising to those 
outlined when discussing Walls, Sandness and Clousta. 
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Dunrossness is the southernmost ward on the mainland and also incorporates Fair 
Island. Within this ward the other main passenger airport of the Islands is located. 
Although 13 sectors are apparent in Dunrossness, all of these sectors aside from one 
employ less than 10% of the total for that sector. This one sector is Ports and 
Harbours; 25% of the employment in this sector within the Islands being in this ward. 
Disruption to this sector leads to disruption in many other sectors, such as: oil supply 
services, fishing, aquaculture, wholesale and retail. Although, the model assumed 
that each site of production within a sector all had the same links with other sectors. 
This is not entirely the case. The majority of these services would take place at the 
port, within the oil terminal itself and not on the smaller harbours servicing the 
different islands.  
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5.8 Infrastructure failures & combination events 
 
 Figure 5.12: Locations of disrupted Infrastructure  
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5.8.1 Disruption to all ferry services 
The first failure focused on the ferries being disrupted due to bad weather; the 
locations of the ferry routes affected are shown in Figure 5.12. Figure 5.13 shows the 
mean production for the different simulations ran. There was a similar basic pattern in 
the results: SI04NF_JIT was least robust, SI04NF_B next and finally the greatest 
rubust with the addition of a rationing of resources was SI04NF_PS/B.  
Within these simulations, the idea of withholding reserve until infrastructure returned 
to normal was tested. If a site of production cannot get one of its required inputs it 
ceases production, even if reserve is available. Once the infrastructure returns to 
normal output returns to 100%, even if a node ceased production due to lack of 
stock, it could return to 100% output because the level of reserve was set as enough 
stock for one day of production.  SI04NF_JIT/RE/WR (and other JIT simulations) 
returns output to pre-disruption levels. For the bulk deliveries simulation there is not 
enough reserve to last until the next delivery, and so there is initial recovery before 
production drops off. 
The results show that the withholding of reserve provides production sites with the 
ability to increase production back to pre-event levels: this vastly increases the 
resilience of the economy to these modelled scenarios. When an infrastructural link is 
removed it causes different sub economies; the larger economy can carry on but this 
is not the same with the disconnected part. So once the supply of one input is 
reduced, it would be more sensible for production to cease until the supply lines are 
reconnected. 
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Figure 5.13: Scenario results for disruption to ferries linking different wards 
 
5.8.2 Centrality to inform next scenario 
To help inform the case study the centrality of the different wards was measured 
based on the road (and electricity distribution – it was assumed the electricity 
network followed the road layout) network (Figure 5.14). The higher the value the 
more central that node is to the network. Harbour and Bressay had the joint highest 
centrality, leading it to be chosen for the simulation of a blackout, which involved 
removing all of the edges (representing electricity distribution) linking this ward to 
other wards, as it is a good measure of the likelihood of a disruption shifting from one 
ward to another.  
The centrality for Harbour and Bressay became zero, as it was no longer connected 
to other wards. This in turn reduced the centrality value in all of the wards which were 
initially connected to Harbour and Bressay as they had lost this connection. In total, 
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the connections to six different wards were removed. Although the subgraphs 
created contained one (Harbour and Bressay) and 21 nodes (the rest of the wards) 
respectively, meaning the blackout itself would not travel further than the effected 
ward. In summary, all of the disruption to output that occurred was due to the 
lowering of production in Harbour and Bressay (Section 5.6.3). This was not the case 
in the other infrastructure failure scenarios. The removal of the wards created 
subgraphs which contained more than the disrupted ward. The sites of production in 
these wards, therefore, stopped producing because they could not receive all of the 
required inputs, increasing the size of the initial disruption (Sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5). 
 
Figure 5.14: Centrality of each of the wards in the Shetland Islands before disruption to infrastructure 
network (certain ward names shortened to fit on the chart) 
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5.8.3 Electricity outage 
The following scenario (SI05HB) was based on a blackout occurring in ward Harbour 
and Bressay. Location of electricity cables is not mapped but through the semi-
structured interviews it was noted that in most parts of Shetland the network follows 
the roads, and electricity generators for back up are more prevalent than on the 
mainland. Therefore, for the purpose of the model this was assumed to be the case. 
As part of this scenario, zero production took place in Harbour and Bressay.  
The results shown in Figure 5.15 once again highlight the importance of when to 
utilise reserve stock. For the simulations which utilised JIT as one of the resource 
management strategies, withholding the reserve stock until the disruption ended led 
to a return to pre-disruption production levels within a day of the electircty supply 
returning to normal. In all other cases this did not happen; for example, in the cases 
of SI05HB_PS/B/Re/Rv and SI05HB_PS/B/Re/Rv/WR a new equilibrium was found. 
In these cases batch delivery lowered resilience, as the sites of production used up 
stock for longer before ceasing production; whereas SI05HB_PS/JIT/Re/Rv/WR 
stopped production straight away and was able to return to 100% output after the 
event.  
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Figure 5.15: Scenario results for a blackout within Harbour and Bressay 
The withholding of reserve vastly improved resilience and is most clearly seen with 
SI05HB_PS/JIT/Re/Rv/WR, which returned to full output. The network was unable to 
recover at all when reserve was used up before the disruption ended,  As is shown in 
the case of SI05HB_PS/JIT/Re/Rv. 
Harbour and Bressay, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is a highly connected ward 
that is home to many important, highly connected industries. In addition, such an 
outage has an effect on other infrastructure; in this case the road network would be 
disrupted as traffic signals would be out of action. 
5.8.4 Road blockages  
The following three scenarios all focused on a disruption to the road network. This 
was carried out by a targeted removing of edges from the network. The removed 
edges were chosen as they were highlighted as “pinch points” during the two 
interviews. The term “pinch point” was used by one of the respondents to describe a 
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section of road that, if disrupted, would split the island’s road network into two 
separate parts.  
The first of these disruptions was made by blocking the road that linked Upper 
Sound, Gulberwick and Quarff to Cunningsburgh and Sandwick (SI06RB). These 
wards are located on the main island to the south west of Lerwick. The results for this 
disruption show a similar outcome to those discussed above (Figure 5.16). That is, 
the simulations which withheld the use of reserve until after the disruption had ended 
were able to return to 100% output, with other simulations showing some initial 
recovery before production falls away. 
 
Figure 5.16: Scenario results for disruption to road between Upper Sound, Gulberwick and Quarff, and 
Cunningsburgh and Sandwick 
The removal of the edge (road link) from the network produced two subgraphs, the 
first of which had 19 wards and the second had three. The smaller of the subgraphs 
included the three most southern wards: Cunningsburgh and Sandwick; Sandwick, 
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Levenwick and Bigton; and Dunrossness. Production in this subgraph dropped to 
almost zero in most of the simulations, as there is no connection to all of the desired 
inputs for the sites of production in these wards, therefore causing production at most 
sites to cease.  
The final two scenarios for road blockages followed the same pattern, although the 
smaller subgraph was given one ward less for each scenario, as the removed edge 
was essentially just further south along the same road.  
5.8.5 Combination events 
Two combination events (CE) were also ran. The first of these combination events 
was based around a transport network “pinch point” between wards Northmavine, 
Muckle Roe and Busta, and Delting West (SE07RB). As part of this scenario it was 
also assumed that production in this ward dropped to 85%, in combination with the 
disruption to infrastructure. 
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Figure 5.17: Scenario results for disruption during Northmavine, Muckle Roe and Busta, and Delting West 
CE 
This disruption caused two sub graphs to develop within the transport network. This 
meant that sites of production within Northmavine, Muckle Roe and Busta were 
unable to receive what they required, which dropped production in this ward to zero 
(Figure 5.17). 
When the results from this modelled CE were compared to the basic results for 
disruption in Delting West (SE01DW) (Figure 5.18), a clear difference in output for 
the whole modelled economy was noticed, with the results for the SE07RB (a) 
dropping off quicker and having a lower overall output than those in SE01DW (b).  
The disruption to the road network in combination with the lower levels of production 
did, as expected, lead to a slight lowering of the resilience of the whole network. The 
mean output for the whole of the Shetlands for SE07RB and initial runs was 42%, 
compared to 59% when only output was lowered. This was caused by, as mentioned 
above, the sites in Northmavine, Muckle Roe and Busta stopping production, but also 
production in other wards was indirectly affected, as those same sites do not   fell 
throughout the network. While this caused some initial recovery in some simulations, 
the recovery was not sustained   in all but one case  (SE07RB_PS/B/Re/Rv), as 
some supplies ran out due to the temporarily creation of two sub-networks. 
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Figure 5.18: Comparison between combination event (CE) and standard run results for Delting West 
The second of the combination events was based upon the Lerwick Risk Analysis 
discussed below (Figure 5.19). The scenario was based upon a one-in-200-year 
storm surge, which caused disruption to production in the four modelled wards. On 
top of this it was assumed that such an event could damage the harbour facilities, 
meaning that disruptions to the ferries leaving Lerwick were also factored into the 
scenario (SE08LE). The majority of the Island’s economic activity takes place within 
the four disrupted wards, and the flood event modelled lowered output within these 
wards to 65%; therefore, having significant impacts on Shetland as a whole.  
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Within these four wards, just over 25% of the sites of production included within the 
model were located, only five of which were not initially disrupted. In many cases 
these sites are the largest producers in their individual sectors. All of these things 
combined make the observed resilience for all simulations, including the rationing, 
very low, implying an increased vulnerability to the modelled hazard. Once again, the 
withholding of reserve on SE08LE_JIT/Re/Rv/WR allowed for full recovery to occur. 
 
Figure 5.19: Scenario results for disruption during Lerwick Combined Event 
5.9 Lerwick: Risk Analysis 
A risk analysis can be used to provide a rational basis for comparing different 
locations, hazardous events, and management strategies. Lerwick, the capital city of 
the Shetlands, is the case study location and the only town on the archipelago. As 
part of this risk analysis, four costal wards were assessed, first individually and then 
combined together in one larger assessment. These wards are shown in Figure 5.20 
and comprised Clickimin (SI03CL), North Central (SI03NC), Harbour and Bressay 
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(SI03HB), and North (SI03N0) (The wards have more than one area shown on the 
map as they are fragmented slightly within Lerwick). 
As part of the risk analysis of Lerwick, not all of the wards shown on the map were 
involved. Wards Upper Sound, Gulberwick and Quarff, and South Central have no 
coast line and sit too high above sea level to be at risk of being flooded at any of the 
modelled depths. Wards Sound and Breiwick were not included in the analysis as 
they contain no industrial sites, and very few properties were at risk to any of the 
mapped flood depths. 
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Figure 5.20: Lerwick study area 
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5.9.1 Vulnerability analysis     
The first step in the risk analysis was to ascertain the vulnerability to the hazard 
being investigated, in this case a storm surge. The depths for different magnitude of 
flood are shown in Table 5.6, which was taken from the Shetland Island Strategic 
Flood Risk Assessment (SIC, 2013). The flood depth was measured in metres above 
ordnance datum (mAOD). 
Table 5.6: Flood probability and lowest mean output during risk analysis simulations for the whole of the 
Shetland Islands post disruption and the probability for flooding at stated depth to take place 
Probability 1 0.1 0.05 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.0001 
Flood depth  1.59 1.69 1.79 1.87 1.89 1.99 2.09 
Clickimin  
SI03CL_a-f 
99.33 99.16 99.16 99.16 99.16 99.16 99.16 
North Central 
SI03NC_a-f 
14.33 14.33 14.32 14.32 14.30 14.30 14.29 
Harbour and Bressay 
SI03HB_a-f 
37.17 37.17 34.90 34.90 20.36 18.16 15.72 
North  
SI03NO_a-f 
33.25 29.58 27.82 21.28 21.28 21.28 18.15 
 
Table 5.6 also shows the results of the vulnerability analysis. As mentioned above, 
Clickimin is mostly a residential ward and, therefore, the range of disruption caused 
by the different flood depths to output is negligible: from 0.67% (SI03CL_a) for a one-
in-one-year event, to an 0.84% (SI03CL_f) reduction in normal output for all other 
flood events.  
North Central ward is shown as the most vulnerable: the low depths of flooding have 
the potential to cause substantial disruption. For a one-in-one-year event, production 
for the whole island was predicted to drop to 14.32% (SI03NC_a). This ward is very 
important in terms of economic output as it has, amongst others: 79% of the marine 
engineering; 46% of Public administration - Local/Central; 32% of IT/computer 
related and real estate services; and 20% of Financial Services. All of these sectors 
are highly connected, meaning that disruption cascades quickly from them to those 
that they supply with products or services. 
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Harbour and Bressay is another very important ward for the economy of the Shetland 
Islands, as 32 out of 39 sectors modelled have some level of output within this ward. 
For a one-in-one-year flood, the level of production throughout the whole of Shetland 
drops by 62% (SI03HB_a).  
The pattern of disruption in North for the different magnitudes of flood is very similar 
to that of North Central: 67% (SI03NC_a) production loss in the whole of Shetland for 
a one-in-one-year flood; 78% for a one-in-200-year event (SI03NC_c); and 81% for 
the highest magnitude flood mapped (SI03NC_f). 
5.9.2 Risk analysis      
Flood risk is a function of probability and impact, as outlined in Section 4.6.1. Here 
the impact is measured in terms of resource disruption, and water level is assumed to 
be the dominant driver. Figure 5.21 shows the plotted vulnerability for the four wards 
at each depth of modelled flood. As the probability of a flood event decreases left to 
right on the graph. For example, the probability of a 1.59m flood is 1 (a 1-in-1 year 
flood), as such an event is expected every year, so vulnerability is high, whereas the 
probability of a 2.09m flood is 0.0001 (a 1-in-10,000 year flood) so the vulnerability is 
low.  
122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.21: Vulnerability of production in the Shetland Islands coastal by flooding of different depths in 
the coastal wards of Lerwick 
The R value for each of the wards is the area divided by the sum of the risk values 
calculated for each of the flood depths (probability of the event multiplied by the 
vulnerability).  
Table 5.7: Level of risk, R, to overall output to the Shetland Islands after flooding in each of the wards, 
with and without flood defences. 
 R R after factoring in flood defences 
Clickimin 0.81 0.01 
North Central 99.30 0.78 
Harbour and Bressay 73.02 0.65 
North 78.12 0.71 
As expected, Clickimin’s level of risk (Table 5.7) to the coastal flooding hazards 
modelled is very low (0.808). Flood defences in Clickimin are capable of protecting 
against floods of a magnitude of up to a one-in-200-year event (1.87mAOD), and 
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when these are taken into account the risk posed by any flood in this ward is 
approximately zero.  
The three remaining wards all follow a similar pattern, a relatively high risk posed by 
the relatively low magnitude events (less than one in 200 years - 1.87mAOD) and a 
much lower risk thereafter.  
As flood defences are in place in Lerwick, assuming they are well maintained and fit 
for purpose, the level of risk posed in this area to coastal flooding is negligible. This 
affirms with information gathered during the semi-structured interviews in which one 
respondent stated “flooding isn’t a big issue on the Shetlands”. 
5.10 Summary 
It is imperative to recognise and maintain the flow of vital food, materials, water and 
other resources to ensure community resilience, before, during and after any 
disruptive event. This case study presented a proof of concept, results, and insights 
from the developed resource model. It couples spatially disaggregated information on 
consumption and demand for resources, within a network model. This enabled an 
understanding to be developed of how disruption to the output in one ward cascades 
through the system to affect other sites of production.  
The sectors with a higher number of interdependencies have a far greater and more 
rapid cascading disruption of the wider network. This is because losing a more 
connected sector accelerates cascading effect and makes it more significant overall, 
as well as more connected sectors are more likely to be impacted. A JIT approach to 
resource production and movement caused the fastest cascade through the system. 
On-site storage of stocks increased resilience to disruption, with bulk deliveries 
providing further stability in both cases. This stability was increased further by 
introducing a rationing response during a disruption where wards could only request 
a proportion of their requirements based upon the level of available stock. This 
increased robustness is shown to provide potential ‘breathing room’ for the 
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identification of alternative mechanisms for safeguarding the continued supply of 
resources, as well as repairing disrupted elements.  Even for the JIT resource 
management strategy which, on its own, is the least resilient, the incorporation of 
rationing, with batch delivery and reserve can significantly improve its overall 
resilience by as much as 90% for JIT and 50% for batch deliveries.  
The infrastructure failure scenarios were chosen because of either a likelihood of 
them occurring (ferries not being able to run), a pinch point in the transport network, 
or to simulate a disruption within an economically crucial ward (electricity blackout). 
The main conclusion to take from these events is that the utilising of reserve stock is 
crucial for recovery when the assumption of a closed economy is taken into account.  
During the simulations in which reserve was withheld until after the disruption, 
recovery was more likely to return to pre-event levels than if it were used straight 
away. If a power cut was to occur, it would be reasonable to assume that in some 
cases the level of demand would also reduce as production would cease until power 
returns. In these cases, the need to use reserve straight away will be reduced and 
could therefore aid recovery. This was the most resilient response to infrastructure 
failures and combination events. 
The model was then adapted to quantify the risk to resource disruption across the 
Shetland Islands as a result of flooding in one location. The non-linearity of the 
disruption function highlights the need to capture interdependencies in such a way. 
This was because what seem to be relatively small disruptions within one ward can 
lead to much larger affects throughout the whole of the Shetlands.  
The level of risk found within the case study, especially when the flood defences 
were taken into account, was very low. This conclusion is reinforced by information 
gathered within the unstructured interviews. Both respondents suggested that the 
impact of flooding within these locations was generally insubstantial, because of the 
rock armour flood protection as well as the topography of the land. The elevation 
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above sea level rises quickly as you move inland, meaning that even a one-in 
>10,000-year flood event would not lead to many more buildings being engulfed 
compared to the more common flood magnitudes.  However, the case study has 
demonstrated the feasibility of incorporating resource disruption into existing flood 
risk assessment approaches. 
As the model case study was based on a closed system, it takes away the 
opportunity for the sites of production within the Shetlands to source products from 
other places, which would have an effect on the level of resilience within the 
modelled network.  
A second limitation of the case study comes from the level of data available. 
Although the disaggregation method provides data to a ward level, if finer grain data 
were available then the results would be more accurate. The model assumed that 
there is only one site of production per industry per ward, and all of the different sites 
from a sector have similar productivity levels. Both of these assumptions are 
inaccurate, but without the required data they had to be made.  
The final limitation based on assumptions relates to the delivery of goods. The model 
treats all products and services the same, meaning that they were delivered 
uniformly. This was done because data showing how often certain products and 
services are required by each individual site of production does not exist. 
 
  
126 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Case Study: New York City – Hurricane Sandy 
This chapter introduces a second case study, this time to analyse the model against 
the disruption to resource movements in New York City caused by Hurricane Sandy. 
The major effects of Hurricane Sandy are outlined in Section 2.4.4. The case study 
does not model all sectors of NYC economy, unlike in the previous chapter, but 
instead focuses on some of those reported in detail in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy. The focus of the case study is food distribution, which was a well-publicised 
impact.  Factors discussed, therefore, include fuel, wholesale, retail and households.  
This study addresses two shortcomings of the method introduced so far, by providing 
an opportunity for validation against an event, and demonstrating the transferability of 
the model to other contexts and geographies. Building on the insights from the 
Shetland Island case study, recommendations are made for increasing the resilience 
of NYC to similar extreme events.  
Figure 6.1 provides a timeline of key events which took place in the lead up Sandy 
impacting on New York City, its impacts, and the relevant aspects of recovery which 
took place.  
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Figure 6.1: Sandy Timeline of events in New York City (Diaz, 2012; Drye, 2012; FEMA, 2014)   
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6.1 Methods 
The case study focuses on five sectors within New York City’s economy; all other 
aspects of the model were implemented in the same way as in Chapter 5. The 
sectors modelled were distribution, oil, wholesale, retail, and households. This was 
done to enable a validation against reported data, which was not available for all 
sectors. A simplified I-O table (Table 6.1) was developed around the proportion of 
demand for each of the sites. For example, there are 71 community districts in NYC. 
A broad assumption was made that one retail outlet provides 100% of food to the 
households in that district.  
Table 6.1: Overall I-0 Relationships for NYC Area
 
In this example, the oil industry required inputs from distribution, and in turn provided 
an input to the distribution sector. Distribution was then required to move produce 
from the wholesale food markets to the retail outlets. Finally, the retail outlets 
provided an input into the households. This is a highly simplified view of the 
interactions between the sectors; the oil industry and distribution industry were 
represented by one site of production for the sector, and the wholesale industry had 
five sites. 
The model resolution is ‘community district’ (i.e. used as the equivalent to the ‘output 
level’ in Chapter 5), of which there are 71 across five boroughs in New York City 
(Figure 6.2). Each of these, therefore, has a column for household and retail in the I-
O table, resulting in the model comprising 71 retails nodes and 71 household nodes. 
Oil Distribution Wholesale Retail Households
Oil 0 1 0 0 0
Distribution 1 0 5 71 0
Wholesale 0 0 0 71 0
Retail 0 0 0 0 71
Households 0 0 0 0 0
Oil Distribution Wholesale Retail Households
Oil 0 1 0 0
Distribution 1 5
Wholesale 71 0
Retail 71
Households 0 0 0 0 0
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Within the city there are also five major food wholesale markets. The largest of these 
is Hunts Point (Figure 6.3) which handles 60% of the food that passes into New York 
City (NYC, 2013). It was assumed the remaining 40% was shared equally between 
the other four sites as this information was not provided.  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Map of the five boroughs of New York City including community district boundaries 
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Figure 6.3: Hunts Point vulnerability to flooding (from NYC, 2013) 
Additional model elements for oil and distribution were created, allowing simulation of 
the supply of fuel for delivery vehicles throughout the study area. Table 6.2 shows 
the total supply produced by each sector. This relates to the total number of sites that 
required each input, derived from Table 6.1. 
Table 6.2: Total output per sector 
 
The difference in the implementation of the model compared to Chapter 5 was the 
structure and formatting of the input data. Separate output CSVs were generated by 
sector, to facilitate analysis of different model simulations. An examination of various 
newspaper articles revealed that there were two to three days’ worth of food 
available within New York City (Dietrich, 2012), therefore three days was set as an 
appropriate level of food reserve within wholesale, retail and households. In addition, 
JIT approach to food supply management was assumed due to its perishable nature.  
Oil Distribution Wholesale Retail Households
1 77 71 71 0
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Figure 6.4: New York Metropolitan Area fuel terminals operational status after Hurricane Sandy (NYC, 
2013) 
The initial simulations were set up to recreate the food shortages which were 
reported post Hurricane Sandy, these involved:  
1. Disruption of the supply of fuel to the city (Figure 6.4) as this was highlighted 
as the major factor that caused the disruption to food distribution post Sandy 
(NYC, 2013).  
2. As above, plus modelling a closure of all the bridges and tunnels in the city for 
one day, which was similar to real life events.  
3. A closure of the bridges and tunnels that connect Manhattan to the rest of the 
city only; for a prolonged period, all of the connections shown in Figure 6.5 
were removed from the model.  
4. A diversification of the supply of oil from one input to two; this was done to test 
highlight the effects of diversifying a supply base. 
Simulations 4-7 simulated a different extreme event which completely closed the 
Hunts Point Wholesale Market. The simulations were:  
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5. JIT with three days’ worth of reserves, three days was chosen as this was the 
number of days’ worth of food reserves that was available post Sandy 
(Dietrich, 2012). 
6. Rationing of supply with JIT and three days’ reserve, modifying JIT to increase 
the robustness.  
7. As 5-6, plus a more even share of food distribution between the five hubs in 
NYC.  
The location of Hunts Point in the coastal floodplain, and the proportion of food 
resource that passes through it, makes it particularly important from a flood risk 
management perspective.  
 
Figure 6.5: Crossing points to and from Manhattan (ParkIt, 2010) 
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The final three simulations focused on a hypothetical flood which completely closed 
the Hunts Point Wholesale Market. The simulations were: JIT with three days’ worth 
of reserves; rationing of supply with JIT and three days’ worth of reserves; and as the 
second scenario, but with an understanding of how long the disruption would last, 
meaning that reserve could be shared out over this time. Hunts Point was chosen as 
not only does 60% of New York City’s food pass through its markets, but also as its 
vulnerability to storm surges is set to increase (NYC, 2013) (Figure 6.3). 
Finally, Figure 6.6 shows the road network of New York City; in a similar way to the 
Shetland Island case study in Chapter Five it was simplified, meaning that the 
community districts were counted as nodes and the road network as the links 
between these nodes. It was assumed that the closure of bridges would be the only 
road infrastructure failure that could cause separate sub-networks to be created. 
This simplification took place as the road infrastructure network is very resilient, with 
many different routes available. This being said, the bridges between islands provide 
a weakness within the network, which is investigated in Section 6.3.1, although 
ferries and subway tunnels provide alternatives if bridges are closed for prolonged 
periods of time. 
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Figure 6.6: Road network in New York City.  
Similarly to the previous chapter, an identifier has been generated for different 
scenarios. For example, NY01FD refers to the basic food distribution scenarios, 02 
refers to scenarios which test diversified supply, HP is for the Hunt’s Point Scenarios 
and MH for those based in Manhattan.  
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6.2 Model parameters 
Information from ‘grey literature’ such as news articles and blogs was required to set 
up this analysis. There are $criticisms of grey literature, including lack of peer review 
and unclear information provenance (McAuley et al., 2000), and so such sources 
were only used when others could not be located. Background information from the 
aforementioned sources is outlined in Table 6.3, which shows the variable 
parameters of the model and the sources of information that dictated how each 
parameter was set. 
Table 6.3: Model parameters for NYC case study 
Parameter Value 
(days) 
Main source Comment 
Length of disruption 9 NYC, 2013 9 days of disruption to fuel distribution  
Level of disruption 100% NYC, 2013 Complete disruption  
Delivery Time 1 Assumption Reasonable due to NYC’s size 
Amount of reserve 3 Dietrich, 
2012 
Food to last 2-3 days (grey literature) 
Infrastructure to fail 1 FEMA, 2014 Bridges and tunnels 
Hunts Point example only 
District disrupted  NYC, 2013 Highlighted the vulnerability of area 
Level of disruption 100% Assumption All output would be affected by a flood  
 
Recovery was not included in this case study, as data relating to the restocking of 
food to Hunts Point and other distribution warehouses is not available. Any 
investigation into this would, therefore, be based entirely on assumptions.  
6.3 Disruption to New York City’s food distribution (FD) 
The initial simulations modelled in this case study were used to recreate the effects 
of Hurricane Sandy and test the effects of diversifying the oil supply. The model 
assumed that all fuel came into the city from one external node. As shown in the 
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Shetland Island case study (Chapter 5) resilience can be increased by widening the 
supply base of an input. Therefore, the model was run firstly using the same data as 
above for the 12 standard simulations (Figure 6.7) and secondly the same but with oil 
being supplied from two external nodes (Figure 6.8). In both cases the results show 
the percentage of usual output for the whole system. 
In figure 6.7, eight out of the 12 simulations lead to a full collapse in the system, as 
the movement of food around New York City is prevented by the unavailability of fuel. 
The bulk delivery simulation combined with rationing of supply was the most robust, 
as this resulted in the biggest lag between the disruption and the supply of oil running 
out (NY01FD_PS/B). Rationing of supply slightly slowed the collapse of the food 
supply network. The steps in the results show the lag in supply caused by the three 
days’ worth of reserve at each of the stages.  
 
Figure 6.7: Graph showing the results for 100% disruption to the fuel supplied to New York City as a 
percentage of normal, baseline, output (NY01FD) 
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The addition of a second external supply of fuel to the supply network (Figure 6.8) 
enabled 50% of usual demands to be met, increasing the overall resilience of the 
simulations. This aim of this scenario was provide a hypothetical example of what 
would happen if a more robust fuel supply network existed (Figure 6.4).  
NY02FD_JIT performed the worst, but still resulted in almost 50% of normal food 
supply being available within the city. Bulk deliveries added further resilience to the 
network by rationing supply. 
 
Figure 6.8: Graph showing the results for disruption to the fuel supplied to New York City as a percentage 
of normal, baseline, output from a diversified supply base (NY02FD). 
These results reinforce the reoccurring themes outlined throughout this thesis. Firstly, 
pure JIT reduces the level of robustness and resilience in a resource network. 
Secondly, bulk deliveries and rationing of supply provide increased levels of 
resilience. Finally, a more diverse supply base increases the level of robustness. A 
modification of JIT once again provides a robust outcome, which may overcome 
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some problems such as storage space. The percentage output for simulation 
PS/JIT/Re/Rv remained above 50% for two weeks, whereas the unmodified JIT 
dropped to 50% of output in two days.  
The next stage of this case study solely considers the availability of food during 
Hurricane Sandy (NY02FD). In order to do this, JIT is chosen for the bases, as it is 
assumed that food deliveries are mainly carried out in this manner due to the 
perishable nature of the product and the premium cost of onsite storage, resulting 
from the scarcity of space within New York City. 
The model was run again for the whole city of New York. Two further scenarios were 
tested: the first assumed that the ability to distribute produce was hampered by a lack 
of fuel, and the second added the closure of bridges and tunnels throughout New 
York for one day. These model simulations were chosen to recreate the events post 
Sandy. 
The results for both showed no difference: this was because the disruption to bridge 
infrastructure was for a shorter period of time than that of the distribution to fuel. This 
fits with what was found during Sandy: initially it was the closure of bridges and 
tunnels that caused disruption to the movement of food to and from Manhattan and 
other islands, but the main problem after the event was the inability to refuel delivery 
vehicles, meaning that produce could not get from the wholesalers to the retail 
outlets (DeAngelis, 2012; Wilkie et al., 2012; NYC, 2013).  
Figure 6.9 shows the results for the diversified fuel supply (NY02FD), which assumed 
two external inputs to the system instead of one. This presented a much greater 
robustness in terms of the distribution of fuel. 50% of fuel supply was making it into 
the city for these scenarios, as well as approximately 50% of the food getting to the 
retail stores and therefore to the households. This once again highlighting the 
increased robustness resulting from having a wider supply base. 
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There is a three-day lag within the model that shows food within households running 
out three days later than in retail outlets. This assumes that no rationing takes place 
to extend how long the food lasts for. If 50% of the oil is not disrupted, then 50% of 
deliveries will still be able to take place, lowering the affects of the disruption. This 
shows the importance of getting supply from more than one place to increase the 
robustness of such networks.  
 
Figure 6.9: Stocks of food in Wholesale, Retail & Households for both the standard simulations and 
simulations with a diversified (Di) supply of oil (NY01FD & NY02FD). 
During the disruption throughout the days following Sandy, the Red Cross, FEMA 
and other organisations handed out ready-to-eat meals and snacks to those who 
were short of food. This began three days after Sandy, during which 2,300 donations 
were handed out on the first day, 25,000 by the second day and over 350,000 on the 
third day. This continued until the 11th day after Sandy, by which time the trend of the 
cumulative number of meals handed out had reached over 3.7million (throughout the 
whole of the affected area, as figures solely for NYC were not available) (FEMA, 
2014). 
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Figure 6.10 shows a trend line based on these figures, the line shows that there is 
some negative correlation between the actual number of hot meals given out post 
Sandy and the proportion of food demand met within the modelled simulation. As the 
number of days goes up after disruption the number of meals handed increases, 
whereas the proportion of food demand met from usual sources decreases.  
This, therefore, implies that the people affected may have been able to either stock 
up before the disruption, or ration their food consumption during the period of 
disruption, meaning that their reserves of food where able to last longer than would 
usually be the case, or a mixture of both. Without a detailed understanding of how 
much food was held on average by each household it is, of course, impossible to 
accurately model the effect of the food shortages. The model results show a worst 
case scenario that would take place if no corrective action (in addition to the 
modelled level of reserve) and changing of consumption habits had taken place.  
Figure 6.10: Modelled results for households with number of meals distributed (NY01FD) (FEMA, 2014) 
6.3.1 Prolonged bridge closures to and from Manhattan (MH) 
The next set of simulations focused on the closure of bridges and tunnels connecting 
Manhattan to the rest of New York; although it is very unlikely that all of the 
connecting routes would be lost for such a long period of time. In the modelled 
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simulations it was nominally chosen as six days. Post Sandy itself, bridges were only 
closed for a relatively short period of time, reopening on the day following the storm 
(Figure 6.1).  
The majority of food distribution in New York City in this scenario (Figure 6.11) 
functioned as normal, meaning that produce was able to be moved from wholesale 
markets to retail outlets, and finally to households, without disruption. In Manhattan, a 
similar drop in food levels to that of the first two modelled simulations was noticed. As 
there is a food distribution centre on Manhattan the speed of the disruption slowed 
slightly, until the stocks here were exhausted. The stepped nature of the results was 
caused by the household’s reserve being used after supplies were exhausted from 
the local distribution hub.  
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of available food supply available in each community district after the modelled 
prolonged bridge and tunnel closures between Manhattan and the rest of New York City (NY01MH) 
The effect of the closure was to split distribution and transport networks into two sub-
networks, which would act independently from one another. The larger of the two 
networks was left with a surplus of produce, whereas in Manhattan there was a 
shortfall. It could be assumed, therefore, that if such a scenario played out in the real 
world, corrective actions to move produce to Manhattan would take place. This could 
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be done either by rerouting the available infrastructure or injecting supplies into the 
system via other means; an obvious example would be to ship produce in from the 
main areas of New York on the ferries.  
6.4 Flooding of the Hunts Point food distribution centre (HP) 
The final scenarios which make up this New York case study investigate the effects 
of a hypothetical storm surge flood of the Hunts Point food distribution hub, as the 
vulnerability of Hunts Point was highlighted by NYC (2013).  
 
Figure 6.12: Output as a percentage of base line within the food distribution network after a flood causing 
output to cease at Hunts Point (NY01HP).  
Figure 6.12 shows the results of the various modelled simulations, which were based 
on the premise that Hunts Point would not be able to input any food into the 
distribution network. Approximately 60% of this sector is situated at Hunts Point, it is 
unsurprising to see the majority of simulations dropping to an output level of food 
distribution of just over 40%. NY01HP_JIT and NY01HP_JIT/Re simulations are 
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shown falling to this level the quickest (within 2-6 days depending on whether reserve 
was modelled or not).  
A bulkier delivery slows the cascading of failure noticed after disruption. When no 
reserve is modelled the lowest point is reached on the 10th day after disruption; with 
reserve total output is still approximately 55% 14 days after disruption. Finally, 
rationing gives further stability, and also allows for recovery in the two simulations in 
which reserve is also available. Once again PS/JIT/Re/Rv is shown to offer a viable 
approach to resource management, as it shows a much greater lag between initial 
disruption and output being affected; for this simulation it was 4 days longer than the 
pure JIT approach. 
 
Figure 6.13: Output as a percentage of base line within the food distribution network after a flood causing 
output to cease at Hunts Point, but with the dominance of Hunts Point reduced (NY02HP).  
Figure 6.13 shows the same simulations but with food distribution spread evenly 
between the five hubs of New York City. Consequently, a disruption to Hunts Point 
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means that the overall output of food distribution is over 80% in all of the shown 
simulations. Again, these results follow the same basic pattern outlined above, but 
this time show a much higher level of resilience to such a flooding event. This is 
because of the wider supply base, which supports the ideas outlined in both Chapter 
2 and Chapter 5, i.e. getting inputs from more than one supplier increases the level of 
resilience within a network.  
Within the rest of the chapter Hunts Point and disruption of food distribution from this 
wholesale depot becomes the focus. These simulations sections highlight the 
potential policy relevance of this model. It took into account a known issue and 
provided an estimation of the effects such a disruption would have on food 
distribution throughout New York City.  
This model could assist policy makers in making informed decisions when developing 
ways to reduce risks, with a key recommendation being to reduce the importance of 
Hunts Point within New York’s food distribution network by increasing redundancy 
within the system.  
6.5 Summary  
This, second case study, highlights the versatility of the model, and also provides a 
means to verify the resource model. The case study was carried out by modelling a 
small number of sectors as a tool to recreate what could happen in a real world 
event, even with a limited amount of data available.  
After Sandy the distribution of food was hampered because the supply of diesel and 
petrol to New York City was disrupted. This meant that the food could not get from 
the wholesale markets to retail outlets, and finally to households (NYC, 2013). This 
same pattern was seen reproduced in these results. On top of this, a disruption to the 
bridges connecting to Manhattan highlighted further vulnerabilities. The final 
simulations showed a vulnerability to the food distribution network at Hunts Point. As 
this site controls more than half of the food coming into New York City, a flood in the 
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area would have major effects. It is, therefore, important to plan for such an issue by 
increasing the robustness of a network to this sort of event. This could either be done 
through the building of physical defences to protect the site or by the system sharing 
output between the different hubs within the city. 
The stripped down data used in this case study helps to show the importance of oil in 
seemingly unconnected sectors; in this case food retail. The inability to get fuel into 
New York City post Sandy led to the difficulties noted in moving food from wholesale 
markets to retail outlets. This was reflected in the results of this case study. This 
problem was exacerbated further when power cuts caused the perishable food to go 
bad, further limiting the availability of food. This was not included in the model as it 
treats all food as one commodity, therefore does not separate between perishable 
and non-perishable goods.  
Table 6.4: Summary of results from disruption to oil supply and Hunts Point, for standard and diversified 
(Di) simulations (calculated over 14 days) 
 Mean Overall Output Mean Equilibrium Point 
Oil Supply Disruption 
(NY01FD) 
35.26% 7 days 
Oil Supply Disruption 
(NY02FD) 
74.66% 10 days 
Hunts Point Disruption 
(NY01HP) 
70.07% 10 days 
Hunts Point Disruption 
(NY02HP) 
90.75% 10 days 
 
Table 6.4 provides summary statistics from the two comparable simulations modelled 
within this case study. The mean overall output is the average output for all of the 
different simulations of the model in each of the scenarios. In both cases, the 
diversification of the supply base (either by adding an extra supplier of fuel or by 
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sharing output equally between the five food distribution hubs) leads to much higher 
levers of resilience to disruption. The mean equilibrium time shows how long before 
the networks output stabilises after production across all of the modelled simulations. 
In the oil supply simulations, the addition of a second supplier is shown to slow the 
cascading of disruption. 
The simple case study shows the ability of the model to recreate real world events. 
Firstly, the modification of JIT to include rationing and reserve is a viable solution to 
increase the robustness of the food distribution network, as it may be a cheaper 
option than having bulkier deliveries, due to the cost of storage space (this point is 
discussed further in the next chapter). Secondly, the importance of having more than 
one supplier for an input is shown as an important factor when increasing 
robustness. Post Sandy, the distribution of fuel was the major cause of disruption to 
the food distribution in New York, so having secondary suppliers, or redundant 
suppliers, would have increased the robustness of this part of the network. This was 
highlighted by the results of simulating 50% of oil supply coming from an alternative, 
unaffected sources, which increased the robustness by 50%. 
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7 Discussion 
This Chapter draws together and discusses the knowledge gained throughout the 
preceding chapters. A number of cross-cutting issues have been identified, and are 
discussed in Section 7.1 onwards: 
1. Resource management strategies 
2. Economic implications 
3. Practical challenges of resource management 
4. Learning post extreme event 
5. Governance issues 
6. Scaleability and transferability  
7. Validation and uncertainties 
7.1 Resource management strategies 
The model developed, and applied, in previous chapters of this thesis has been 
tested against a number of resource management strategies and considered a 
number of post-disruption recovery options in order to both understand and enhance 
resilience.  The results from the two case studies show that just-in-time (JIT) 
approach to resource management reduces system resilience. This conclusion was 
also backed-up by the literature, which identified JIT as a contributing factor to 
cascading failure of resource movements in all of the major examples described in 
Section 2.4. 
7.1.1 Minimise Just-in-Time resource management 
In all of the systems modelled, a pure JIT approach inhibited the levels of robustness 
and resilience. This was seen by the small number of days after the initial disruptive 
event before the sites of production and the economy as a whole were affected 
(these metrics were outlined in Section 4.5). Across all of the JIT simulations within 
the Shetland case study, overall output was less than 10%. This showed very low 
robustness to disruption. When recovery was also modelled, overall output did not 
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change, and no recovery took place. This shows the resilience of these techniques to 
be very low, and therefore an ineffective way to respond to disruptive events.  
The results of the model were backed up by reviews of observed events which took 
place after the Great East Japan Earthquake, which occurred on the 11th March 
2011, From the 14th to the 26th March Toyota had to close all of its domestic plants, 
and on the 15th it also reduced all production in overseas plants. It was announced 
that it would take until June for Toyota’s production rates to return to pre-earthquake 
levels. This disruption was caused by both a lack of parts and also a lack of 
information on which parts would be available when production resumed. It took 
Toyota a week to put together a list of 500 parts from 200 locations which would be 
difficult to source. While Toyota understood the availability to its first and second tier 
suppliers, they did not understand the complexities further down the supply chain 
(Matsuo, 2015). 
The developed model is designed to test different scenarios, as shown throughout 
this study, to allow stakeholders to develop strategies which would increase the 
robustness and resilience of their supply chain through understanding it’s 
complexities as well as the linkages further upstream in the supply chain. This is 
likely to take the approach of a balancing act between the benefits of having a lean 
supply chain and the levels of risk apparent to that supply chain. One way of doing 
this is through the modification of the JIT approach to include some on site stock and 
rationing of resources. In both the Shetland and New York case studies this was 
shown to provide a viable alternative to JIT. 
Unexpected linkages became apparent within the results of the Shetland case study 
(Chapter 5) and disruption was amplified by problems within seemingly unconnected 
industries. The model therefore provides a means to investigate linkages further 
down the supply chain. The finer grain the data used to set up the model, the more 
useful it can become in investigating vulnerabilities. This is because it is important to 
150 
 
 
 
 
 
understand not only the downstream links but also where these sites of production 
are located, as large scale disruptions such as a flood or earthquake can affect 
multiple suppliers simultaneously leading to larger disruptions and making it more 
difficult to mitigate such events.  
7.1.2 Avoid spatial clustering of like industries 
A secondary type of vulnerability was highlighted after the Chao Phraya River 
flooded in Central Thailand. To save on costs, clustering occurred between sites of 
production from within the same sector, within the industrial areas of Thailand 
(Chongvilaivan, 2012; Komori et al., 2012).  
As shown in the model, results from the Shetland Islands case study (Chapter 5) and 
the Hunts Point scenario (Section 6.4), if one industry (even if represented by many 
companies) is predominantly located in one area, the amount of disruption felt 
upstream in the supply chain increases as the output of the whole sector is affected. 
This was reinforced within the Shetland Islands case study, which showed that 
disruption to areas which held a high proportion of one sector’s industrial output led 
to very rapid failure throughout the whole system. When oil production was disrupted 
it affected electricity production for the whole island, because of a total failure in 
electricity supply. This again highlighted very low levels of robustness to disruption. If 
more than one site provided fuel for the power station, a partial service could have 
been provided, avoiding complete disruption to the island’s resource movement and 
economic activity. 
It points of supply are geographically spread out, then other arrangements can be 
made to keep resources moving. For example, Nokia was able to source 
semiconductors from another location after the Albuquerque factory fire but Sony 
Ericsson was not, providing Nokia with a competitive edge (Latour, 2001) as a result 
of their more resilient supply chain.  
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It would be up to the individual companies to assess the level of risk is caused by 
getting all of an input from clustered industries. If the risk is deemed to high, then 
they must locate alternative supplies from outside of the same vulnerable area. It 
would be necessary to take into account all aspects of this to come to a sound 
decision. This is shown by the Lerwick Risk Analysis (Section 5.9), in which the 
vulnerabilities to flooding seem very high until the flood defences are taken into 
account and the actual levels of risk are found to be negligible. 
7.1.3 Stockpiling of resources     
To help build resilience and lessen the chances of supply disruption cascading 
through a system a “move back” towards the principles of Just-in-Case (JIC) 
production, may be beneficial. The results of this analysis show that the addition of 
redundancy to a system is advantageous when concerned with the effects of 
disruptive events. The addition of a day of reserve stock in the Shetland Island case 
study showed overall output for the whole study period increasing from 9% (JIT 
simulations) to 17%. Here, redundancy was added to the system through the addition 
of reserve stock to each of the sites of production. Matsuo (2015) highlights the need 
for this redundant inventory to mitigate risks, and also goes further by suggesting that 
redundant suppliers who could step into the breach if the usual flow of goods is 
disrupted should be introduced.  
JIC production can be considered an opposite of JIT, in that it is a push system which 
moves on products from one stage to another, whether they are required or not 
(L'Abbe Wu, 1989). It also provides a slack in the production system by increasing 
onsite inventory (reserve), which can then be utilised if a disruption to supply occurs, 
therefore leading to an effective management of supply and demand uncertainties 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004).  
This was shown within the results of both the Shetland Islands and New York City 
case studies. In both cases the addition of extra onsite inventory led to an increase in 
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resilience after a disruption occurred. It provides redundancy to the system, and also 
allows time for the sites of production to locate alternative supplies or for the 
blockage in the supply chain to be rectified, therefore lessening the effect of the 
event. The main disadvantage of this approach is the economic implications, 
discussed in Section 7.2, as these could prevent this option from being economically 
viable. 
7.1.4 Bulk deliveries 
One of the major disadvantages of JIT is the reliance on suppliers to deliver their 
product on time, and this was shown to be a recurring issue throughout the case 
studies outlined in Section 2.4. In all cases a JIT production system was disrupted by 
an extreme event that led to a cascading of failure throughout either the local, 
regional, or global economy. The results of the Shetland Island case study highlight 
the vulnerabilities caused by this approach (Section 5.3).  
The analysis trialled an approach for supplies to be delivered in bulk and at set 
intervals. This increased the level of resilience apparent within a local economy by 
lengthening the lag between the disruption occurring and the production at a given 
site being affected by on average four days when adding reserve to the pure JIT and 
bulk simulations (enough reserve to cover one day of no inputs). The ability to 
increase the lag in supply loss after an extreme event is central to creating resilience, 
as it will provide time to take corrective action, and therefore lower the impact of 
disruptive events  
The number of days between disruption and its effects being noticed by the site of 
production is one of the key resilience metrics used within this study. Section 5.3 
shows that in the Shetland case study, bulky delivery strategies outperformed JIT 
strategies, with overall output closer to 50% across the whole case study. With the 
addition of one day of reserve stock this went up to above 98%. This was reinforced 
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by the mean production metric showing the usefulness of building redundancy when 
developing resilience within supply chains (Carvalho and Cruz-Machado, 2011).  
Within these scenarios, adding the recovery element of the model showed a cleared 
improvement and a bounce back towards the original output levels across the 
modelled economy of the Shetland Islands. This showed that it was a very resilient 
approach, even before improving this further by adding a rationing of resources 
across the network.  
7.1.5 Modification of JIT 
A reoccurring theme throughout this thesis is the realisation that a modification to the 
JIT approach can at times produce both very robust, and very resilient results. The 
addition of some reserve stock, as well as the rationing of supplies after a disruptive 
event is a viable alternative to the points outlined in 7.1.3 and 7.1.4. Such an 
approach could circumnavigate some of the economic and practical challenges 
outlined in Sections 7.2 and 7.3.  
Although it must be noted that this approach did not perform well across the board, 
as shown within the very wide range of results in Figure 5.2 in chapter 4. It shows 
percentage of output ranged from 38% - 100% depending on the ward where 
disruption occurs. This compares very favourably with the results from the pure JIT 
which showed output all results under 20%.  The modification of JIT with reserve and 
rationing can be seen as an easy uptake option to increase the resilience, as with the 
recovery model included output was at around 99% for all simulations using this 
approach. Making it one of the more resilient methods for dealing with disruption and 
with some coordination between sites of production it could provide increased 
resilience and robustness throughout a supply chain network.  
7.1.6 Flood risk Analysis and management 
As part of this study a risk analysis technique was developed; as described in 
Section 4.5. This provides a consistent metric, which accounts for the magnitude, 
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frequency and impacts of the flood events. The technique can be applied to different 
locations and management strategies. Such an approach is very important as it 
allows stakeholders to understand the level of vulnerability within their system 
through taking into account all downstream and upstream activities that are related to 
their own activity. As highlighted in Chapter 3, such interdependencies are often 
ignored, which leads to an underestimation of the level of risk inherent within a 
system (Jonkman and Dawson, 2012). 
Risk analysis is about providing a rational, consistent approach that accounts for the 
impact and likelihood of disruption. Typically, such an approach is used to identify 
direct damages, but in this case it has been extended to take into account resources 
and indirect losses. The approach outlined within this study provides an ability to 
identify hazards, highlight vulnerabilities, assess how significant the level of risk is, 
and provide an opportunity to adapt the system to reduce these risks.  
The developed framework is entirely generic and would, therefore, work with any 
hazard, with differing magnitudes. It could also integrate risk to employment, as 
employment can be treated as an input to a site of production, and therefore part of 
the supply chain.  
The Lerwick Risk Analysis (Section 5.9) highlighted the effectiveness of building 
infrastructural resilience to a specific type of risk, so for example sea defences 
protect many parts of the coast in and around Lerwick. The results of the Lerwick risk 
analysis showed that the risk of resource disruption is reduced by two orders of 
magnitude by the presence of flood defences.  
The secondary case study focused on food distribution in New York post Hurricane 
Sandy (Chapter 6). In this study, an extreme surge that inundated Hunts Point food 
distribution hub was considered (Section 6.4). This was chosen as NYC (2013) 
reported that this site is vulnerable to flooding, and that the risk of flooding may 
increase in the future. The report also set out proposals for an integrated flood 
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protection system for the area of Hunts Point, which would incorporate aspects of 
both natural and engineered flood defences capable of withstanding a one-in-200-
year storm surge event. 
7.2 Economic Implications 
It is important to consider the financial implications of these suggestions, which have 
not formed part of this model. A move away from JIT would be likely to lead to 
additional costs, such as, an increased need for extra warehouse space for reserve 
stock. For example: in 2006 the average cost of land in New York was $366.08 per 
square foot (Haughwout et al., 2008), which suggests a significant rise in overheads 
if retails wish to increase their square footage to allow for further reserve and/or a 
move to bulkier deliveries. The actual cost would be dependent on the levels of 
reserve to be housed, the nature of the business and the size of the product to be 
stored. It would also be dependent on the shelf life of the required inputs. This may 
be prohibitive to many enterprises in terms of cost, but also availability of space. 
The second major cost would come from encouraging companies from the same 
sectors to no longer cluster together. Clustering enhances the economic 
competitiveness of the industries as they produce greater levels of economic growth, 
more jobs and better paid jobs, increased levels entrepreneurial activity, and higher 
levels of intellectual property (Chatterji et al., 2013). Although as noted during the 
modelling process, this can cause problems within supply chains. If companies were 
encouraged to base themselves in different locations, they would lose out on the 
advantages of clustering in the same area as like businesses and transport costs 
would also increase.  
Companies and organisations should analyse the costs associated with making their 
supply chains more resilient against the perceived risk of serious disruption taking 
place. If the results of their risk assessment show that the costs associated with 
disruption are low, no change may be needed. For large interconnected systems it 
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may be beneficial for down and upstream suppliers to work together to add the 
required redundancy to the system. This approach is made more difficult as, for 
example, in the United Kingdom the Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury, 2014) 
makes only limited consideration of resilience. This creates a systemic problem as it 
is difficult to provide a business case for resilience.  
These economic implications are external to the model and would be highlighted as 
part of a cost benefit analysis. Such an analysis would benefit from the results of a 
model like this, which shows the risk to production at individual production sites as 
well as providing a range of levels to which production could drop, based on the type 
of resource management strategy employed.  
7.3 Practical challenges of resource management  
Practical issues exist around increasing reserve and having bulkier deliveries, as for 
example, some products require large amounts of storage space and some have a 
short shelf life. Bulky deliveries of certain products, such as chemicals, can also lead 
to increased safety concerns, as if an accident were to occur, spillages, for example, 
may be larger and therefore more difficult to clean up / contain (Trowbridge, 2006). 
When focusing on the bulkier deliveries, practical issues may also reduce this 
approach to increase resilience, as the effectiveness of this approach depends on: 
the size of the delivery (how long the supplies should last for), the frequency of the 
delivery; and when the delivery takes place in terms of the disruption, i.e. if the 
delivery occurred the day before the disruption, as per the model, robustness would 
be higher as more stock would be on site, whereas if the delivery were due the day 
after the disruption robustness would be reduced, leading to a quicker cascading of 
failure through the network.  
Another issue is caused by the scale of extreme events. The Great East Japan 
Earthquake in 2011 and the resulting tsunami (Section 2.7.1) affected large parts of 
Japan, and disrupted links within and between industries both inside Japan and 
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internationally. Despite Japan’s awareness and preparedness for such events, 
supply chain managers were ultimately unable to mitigate everything. The adoption 
of a risk based approach, which takes into account the likelihood and consequences 
of hazards, as well as accepting that there are certain unknowns that cannot be 
predicted, would force a consideration of big events and what options may exist if 
issues cannot be “designed out” of the supply chain. 
Finally, returning to the two case studies undertaken in this research, another key 
practicality is where employees live, and how the ability for them to get to their place 
of work, or not, affects the level of resilience apparent in a supply chain.  For 
example, if employees in Shetland were unable to get to work in Lerwick due to a 
disruption to the ferries (Section 5.8.1), their absence from the production site would 
be likely to further amplify the proliferation of resource disruption throughout this 
scenario. 
7.4 Learning post extreme event 
After Hurricane Katrina the government of New York State carried out a thorough 
investigation into the effects of the disaster and what future improvements could be 
made to increase resilience. As is highlighted in Section 2.4, learning post extreme 
event is necessary to increase resilience. Such learning allows for the development 
of an adaptive capacity that provides opportunities for change, and for resilience to 
be increased.  
A trigger for change and learning is often the occurrence of a disaster or disruptive 
event, as it can be seen an opportunity to take advantage of a period of rapid 
reorganisation. This was certainly the case in New York, with “A Stronger, More 
Resilient New York” (NYC, 2013) being the foundation of this post Sandy. Holling, 
(2001) suggests that such events provide the correct conditions for experimentation 
and innovation to develop with the specific aim of increasing resilience. This should 
be used as a template by others to follow post an extreme event, to allow for 
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resilience to be increased as well as encourage everyday life to return to an 
acceptable state.  
7.5 Governance issues 
A further source of discussion is the need to identify who is responsible for resource 
resilience within interconnected systems. One of the major issues post Sandy was an 
inability to get fuel into New York City, as refineries away from the metropolitan area 
had been disrupted; these were beyond the influence of the city One way the 
government of New York City could stop this happening again would be to invest in 
methods such as sea defences around refineries or, as suggested by Matsuo (2015), 
having redundant suppliers which are not called upon until they are required after a 
disruptive event. 
In a supply chain such as that of Toyota, the responsibility for understanding the 
resilience of that supply chain is most likely shared between the manufacturer, i.e. 
Toyota, and the companies that supply it. For successful governance it would be 
important for Toyota, in this example, to understand both the down and upstream 
linkages, as well as to press suppliers into incorporating measures targeted at 
increasing robustness into their own processes.  
On the Shetland Islands, governance should be shared between manufacturer and 
local authority, but in this case, Shetland Island Council plays an important part. This 
is seen through the installation and maintenance of flood defences around the 
Islands. Along with an understanding of resource vulnerabilities (as highlighted in 
Chapter 5), this would help improve resource resilience on the Shetlands.  
7.6 Scaleability and transferability of the resource model 
Within the two case studies the transferability of the model is shown as a benefit. The 
basic model was largely unchanged, the only changes being those related to the 
format of the data received. The same basic approach was used to analyse a small 
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scale local economy (Shetland) and an individual sector in a much larger scale 
example (Hunt’s Point, NYC).  
Within both case studies it was found that the unmodified JIT approaches yielded low 
levels of resilience and, therefore, it would be interesting to apply this approach to a 
global supply chain for a large multinational corporation, such as Toyota. However, 
this would be hampered by both the availability of data (as it is commercially 
sensitive) and the processing speed of the model itself. This second issue could be 
mitigated slightly by simplifying the approach, if the aim of the project were solely to 
highlight vulnerabilities in the system.  
The approach would also be transferable to small scale studies, such as an analysis 
of resource movements between wards in a hospital, with the aim of producing a 
more effective system through the identifying and locating of vulnerabilities. 
7.7 Assumptions and uncertainties  
Limited availability of data for this analysis causes significant uncertainties, as well as 
challenges for validation. The Shetland case study used data relating to the local 
economy as a whole, so therefore needed to be disaggregated down to lower levels 
of geographical output. Conversely, the data used for the New York case study was 
derived from qualitative statements and figures reports, newspaper articles, blogs, 
and government publications.  
Ideally, data would be available at a site-of-production level, noting what supplies 
were required, where they were obtained from, and in what way limiting an input 
would affect the output from that site. On top of this, information regarding what 
product that site supplies, the availability of resources, and the delivery patterns, 
would also help develop a sound understanding of resource flows. This in turn could 
incorporate transport models to simulate this resource movement, whilst also 
allowing for targeted disruptions to be tested.  
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Another uncertainty within the modelled simulations occurred when the rationing of 
available resources took place. Within these simulations it was assumed that all of 
the components within an economy would follow the same management strategy, 
which would increase the network’s resilience and, therefore, keep output in the 
economy as high as possible. To make this a reality, stakeholders would have to 
work together and develop integrated business continuity plans, which would come 
into place after a disruption. With numerous competitors utilising the same suppliers 
this would be very difficult if not impossible to implement, as the market would drive 
who gets the available resource. For example, the cost of hard drive motors 
drastically increased after the flooding in Thailand, which meant that computer 
manufacturers who were able to pay the most got the available components 
(Chongvilaivan, 2012; Komori et al., 2012).  
In some cases, rationing of supply could take place on an ad-hoc basis, but real 
world examples of this happening have not been found in the literature and would 
require a more an extensive survey. Saying this in the simplified New York case 
study it would be appropriate to ration food to allow for all members of a population to 
receive a share, and a form of rationing was shown through the distribution of meals 
to those who needed it most post Hurricane Sandy (NYC, 2013). 
7.8 Summary   
Within this chapter, issues relating to resource management strategies were 
discussed.   This discussion led to the recommendation to reduce JIT resource 
management, by incorporating both larger bulkier deliveries and onsite stockpiling of 
resources. It was also recommended that spatial clustering of like-industries be 
avoided.  
From the initial discussions, economic and practical challenges of resource 
management were introduced, in addition to governance issues. These included the 
cost of such changes, as well as the suggestion that it would be impossible to design 
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out all vulnerabilities. The way in which affected parties learn from disruption is also 
discussed and linked back to information gathered during Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
The discussion then moves to the model itself in terms of the scalability and 
transferability of the model. The validation within this chapter shows that this aim has 
been successfully met. The developed model has provided an approach to test 
interdependencies, whilst also incorporating policy tests to increase the amount of 
lag between disruption and when the effects are noticed. The model was informed 
through a development of an understanding of the wider issues relating to the 
disruption of supply chains; background research and an investigation of different 
modelling procedures was carried out by completing an extensive literature review. 
The aim of this research was to develop a method for assessing the robustness of 
resource flows against disruption from spatial hazards. In addition, this research 
aimed to address recovery, leading to an understanding of the resilience of these 
resource flows following an extreme event. to the study centred on building 
robustness and resilience to disruptive events through taking advantage of a lag and 
between the disruption of supply, and the time when this becomes apparent. This lag 
should provide time for a corrective action to take place, they success of which 
depends on the length of the lag. 
One major case study was identified (Shetland, Chapter 5), which allowed for the 
application of a quantitative urban resource model incorporating aspects from I-O 
and network analysis.  This was supplemented by the simplified case study 
discussed in Chapter 6 (New York City). In both of the modelled examples, different 
policy tests were analysed and the implications of these discussed, including the 
economic implications of moving away from a JIT method of production. A number of 
case studies were also discussed within the literature review (Chapter 2), albeit in 
much less detail. 
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The move to a more JIC approach through an increase of reserves is an underlying 
recommendation to answer the research question set out at the start of this thesis: 
how can the resilience to disruption of resource flows be increased within an 
interdependent network? Another viable approach which increases robustness by 
reducing the impact of disruptive events, is to modify JIT strategies by including some 
onsite reserve stock, to ration resources after a disruption. This modified approach 
showed very high levels of resilience once recovery was modelled and, therefore, 
could be the preferable option when taking into account the other factors, such as the 
economic implications discussed in this chapter.   
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
In this final chapter, the aims and objectives of this research are revisited. 
Conclusions are drawn from the methodological approach and the two r case studies. 
Additionally, the theoretical and policy implications of the work are considered, before 
making recommendations for industry and policy-makers, and identifying future 
research priorities.  
8.2 Revisiting the aims and objectives 
The aim of this work, set out in Chapter 1, has been to identify strategies to improve 
the resilience of urban and regional units to resource flow disruption that is caused by 
extreme events. This has been achieved by developing and applying a systems 
approach, in order to model the resource and infrastructure interdependencies within 
regions.  The impact of events, such as flooding, on these resource flows is 
assessed and used to identify resource management strategies that are more robust 
to disruptions.  Finally, recovery strategies are considered to understand how the 
system can be made more resilient.  To meet this aim, a number of objectives were 
set out, how the thesis has met each of these objectives is considered in Sections 
8.2.1 to 8.2.6 below. 
8.2.1 Understand the issues relating to the disruption of supply chains and 
investigate different modelling procedures through extensive literature 
review. 
Resource movements have been disrupted by flood events, at a range of scales. 
These resources, which include water, food, materials and other goods, are 
necessities for the wellbeing of both individuals and communities.  Growing 
infrastructural and supply chain interdependencies pose significant challenges for 
those wishing to transport resources, and flood risk managers aiming to reduce 
disruption to resource movements. A huge number of resources are relied upon 
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every day by individuals and communities in the modern world. While basic 
resources comprise water and food, many other goods are also to be necessities. 
One of the main impacts of disasters, such as flooding, is the disruption of resource 
movement, and growing infrastructural and supply chain interdependencies are 
increasing the challenges faced by flood risk managers attempting to lessen these 
impacts.  
When reviewing the background literature (Chapter 2) it was found that work on 
resilience is affected by having no common definition and little understanding of 
where it fits with other approaches. It was also noted that the slimming down of 
supply chains removes both the robustness and redundancy from systems, making 
them more susceptible to disruption from catastrophic events. In addition, the 
discussed examples showed a need for an understanding of the supply chain 
linkages to be developed to allow for systems to become more resilient to disruptive 
events.  
Within the methodological literature review, appropriate techniques for the 
development of the resource model were identified. From this review, certain aspects 
from three different methodological approaches were identified as useful for a 
resource model. The first of these was the utilisation of input-output (I-O) tables and 
the calculation of direct and indirect costs, to inform the supply chain links between 
different sectors. Secondly, elements from network analysis were added to the model 
to assess the infrastructure networks. The final addition to the model was a risk 
assessment based upon the vulnerability to different magnitudes of flood events.  
8.2.2 Develop a methodology for spatial disaggregation of resource supply 
and quantities and locations of demand.  
A new approach to the disaggregation of I-O data is set out in Section 5.2.2. It utilises 
Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) data to estimate the industrial 
output of a single census ward based on the number of employees per sector in that 
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ward, and took inspiration from work carried out by Hallegatte, (2012), Li et al. (2009) 
and Stimson et al. (2012). 
This approach allowed for a disruptive event to be modelled spatially, and provided 
the basis for the two case studies (Chapters 5 and 6). If the data had been available 
at a finer grain (individual sites) it could have allowed for more detailed network 
analysis (Section 3.5.2), especially regarding the role of resilience measures. 
Major criticisms of I-O modelling were highlighted in Chapter 3. The first of these was 
their lack of flexibility. For example, there is no option within I-O models for a 
producer to source a supply from an alternative source if there is a disruption to their 
usual source. The model outlined in this research addresses this through spatially 
disaggregating the I-O, giving numerous sites of production for each sector and 
simulating the effects of spatial hazards. 
The incorporation of both backward ripple effects was also important within the model 
to address issues with other modelling approaches which linked demanding sites to 
just one supplier (Hallegatte, 2013). This provides a truer picture of an economy as it 
allows for alternative supplies to be sought wherever available. It occurs when a site 
cannot produce their product, and they subsequently lower their demands on their 
suppliers, freeing up supply for other sites.  
As I-O data and modelling track the interactions at an economy wide level (Leontief, 
1970; Leontief, 1986; Hallegatte, 2012) they do not necessarily take into account a 
spatial element. This is once again addressed by the disaggregation of I-O tables to 
a lower geographic level. In this case it was done to ward level, but if employment 
statistics had been available at a site of production level it would also have been 
possible to do this. 
Within the literature about resilience (Section 2.2) it was highlighted that it was 
important to understand who is resilient to what and for how long they are resilient 
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(Gibbs, 2009). The model allows for different sorts of hazard to be tested; for 
example, it tested resilience to both a lowering of output in individual wards during 
the Shetland Case study, and to disruption to the infrastructure that moved these 
resources around. It also provided an idea of how long sites of production could 
function after a disruptive event. 
8.2.3 Develop a quantitative, spatial, resource flow model that dynamically 
links spatially disaggregated information on supply and demand with the 
infrastructure networks that mediate their flows. 
The methodological literature review (Chapter 3) investigated how other studies had 
approached the problem set out in the Chapter 1. From this review a hybrid approach 
was put forward. This took the use of I-O tables and the calculation of direct and 
indirect costs, and used them to inform the supply chain links between different 
sectors. This was applied in conjunction with the technique for the disaggregation of 
economy wide data to ward level. 
Within all of the case studies set out in Chapter 2, the amount of cascading disruption 
and the financial costs caused by these highlighted the need for an approach which 
was able to:  
1) Investigate supply chain linkages;  
2) Understand the importance of various supplies (Craighead et al., 2007);  
3) Locate and investigate pinch-points (Christopher and Peck, 2004), 
4) Identify supply chain risks (Rao and Goldsby, 2009); and  
5) Reduce the likelihood of underestimating the risk (Jonkman and Dawson, 
2014).  
The approach described throughout this research provides a simple, repeatable 
method which can address previously highlighted crisitisms of the discourse. Within 
both the Shetland and Sandy case studies, the model  is able to investigate linkages, 
while also being able to pick out which supplies are important and therefore could 
167 
 
 
 
 
 
reduce the robustness of the system if disrupted In addition, , pinch points were 
investigated throughthe removal of edges from the transport network. Finally, the risk 
analysis metric allows for both the identification of risk and, as it also takes into 
account the indirect effects of disruption, the reduction in the liklihood of the risk 
being underestimated.   
The methods chapter (Chapter 4) outlined this new technique, which utilised aspects 
of network analysis and I-O analysis to assess and improve supply chain resilience to 
two types of disruption. The first of these was a reduction of output and the second 
was the removal of infrastructure which links the different sites of production. As part 
of this, different policy tests were also modelled in order to generate a lag between 
disruption and when it is noticed, allowing for stakeholders to implement some form 
of corrective action. 
Within the introduction to this research (Chapter 1) it was highlighted that the current 
standing in research into resource movements around an economy tends to use a 
black box approach, without reference to how resources are used within the system. 
It was also noted that there is a lack of a spatial element to most of the example 
approaches set out in Chapter 3. This, therefore, provided the niche in which this 
research focused: the development of a spatial resource model that addressed these 
two fundamental issues. 
The model successfully addresses this by moving away from one large black box 
representing a local economy (Sections 3.4.1 and 3.7) and splitting this box up into 
many smaller black boxes, CAS Wards in the Shetland Islands and Community 
districts in New York City. These smaller black boxes allow for some geographic 
analysis, such as the Lerwick Risk Assessment in Section 5.5. 
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8.2.4 Subject this model to a series of disruptive events and test alternative 
strategies to increase the resilience of urban and regional units and 
accordingly make recommendations for industry, policy makers and 
researchers. 
Policy options identified from the literature review (Chapter 2) were parameterised 
within the model to consider options to increase resilience.  
The resource model utilises spatially disaggregated information on consumption and 
demand for resources, within a network model. Results presented in Chapters 4 and 
5 provided an understanding how disruption to the output in one ward cascades 
through the system to affect other sites of production.  
This phenomenon of cascading failure, which was observed during real events 
reported in the literature review, demonstrates how the use of a JIT resource 
production and movement strategy leads to the fastest cascading failures through the 
system. The addition of onsite stock to each site of production provided a lag in time 
between the disruption and the output being affected (which was to be expected), 
therefore simulating more of a “just-in-case” (JIC) approach. The JIT approach led to 
a mean output for the whole economy of less than 20% for all simulations (Shetland 
Islands Case Study – Chapter 5).  
A move away from JIT production increases the resilience within the system. The 
addition of bulk deliveries provides further robustness; with higher levels of output 
noticed after the disruption. This increased average output by 15% after disruption, 
showing much greater levels of resilience. Resilience is further increased by the 
addition of reserve stock and the rationing of supplies, and further aided by the 
addition of rationing of the available stock per sector, making these the most resilient 
simulations tested during the study with mean outputs above 90%.  
An alternative approach to this that achieved high levels of resilience in all of the 
cases considered was the modified JIT strategies. Within these simulations, recovery 
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was modelled and the approach simulated included some onsite reserve and 
rationing of supply. Thus extending analysis from considering the robustness of 
resource strategies and the infrastructure networks that mediate them, to 
consideration of recovery and resilience.  This approach also showed increased 
levels of resilience, albeit with a wider range of results. Such an approach could 
provide a viable method to improve both resilience and robustness whilst maintaining 
a lean supply chain and therefore the benefits associated with JIT. 
The infrastructure failure scenarios showed that if reserve stock is not used 
immediately to try to maintain production and resource movements within JIT 
simulations, but instead used to stimulate recovery, the system recovers to 100% 
output. In the simulations in which reserve stock was used immediately, output 
remained higher, but in the majority of cases did not return to pre-disruption levels.  
The second major vulnerability was having a non-diverse supply base: this was 
addressed in the New York case study. The diversification of oil supply more than 
doubled the levels of resilience, and the diversification of food supply added 20% to 
the output after the simulated disruption to Hunts Point. 
The analysis highlighted the potential for a single flood event to disrupt the 
movement of resources in other industrial sectors, away from the initial disturbance; 
in certain conditions and if certain important sectors are affected, this can rapidly lead 
to collapse of the entire system.  
These case studies highlight the adaptability of the resource model as well as its 
ability to simulate the impact of hazards across a range of spatial scales and 
magnitudes. This provides a bridge between macro and micro level studies which, as 
noted in Chapter 2, has been considered a weakness of the previous work in this 
field. 
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8.2.5 Demonstrate the use of the model to support flood risk analysis by 
providing a quantitative assessment of the indirect impacts of extreme 
events on resource disruption. 
.A final development of the model was its use within a flood risk analysis technique. 
The first aspect of this was to assess the vulnerability of the Shetland Islands 
economy to flood hazards at differing magnitudes, with the risk value being the sum 
of vulnerabilities for each of the modelled flood magnitudes multiplied by the 
frequency of the event. 
The model was also adapted to quantify the risk to resource disruption, to allow for 
the development of a risk analysis technique. This provided a consistent metric, 
which permits for the risk at different locations, and relating to different hazards, to be 
compared. The technique can also take into account defences already in place to 
provide a true picture of the risk to industrial output caused by a disruption to 
resource flows at various different magnitudes. It therefore identifies supply chain 
risks, while reducing the likelihood of underestimating these risks.  
This extension of the model provides a rational basis for assessing the direct and 
indirect impacts of a disruption to interdependent supply chain networks, and allows 
them to be compared within the same framework, which has often been seen as 
lacking in other approaches. It also allowed for an investigation of the benefits of 
different measures in terms of reducing the direct and indirect impacts of such 
events. 
8.2.6 Validate this resource model against an observed event. 
The Shetlands Islands were chosen as the first case study.  The local council has up-
to-date I-O tables of the intra-region industrial interactions in the local economy, 
which made this study possible. The study site was convenient as the internal 
economy of the Islands has been well documented and many of the industries are 
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co-located geographically, which reduced the complexity of the spatial interactions 
that needed to be represented in the model.  
Initial validation took place through sensitivity tests to understand the model’s 
response and behaviour, but this could not include analysis of the event dynamics 
due to insufficient data.  The disruption of food and fuel distribution after Hurricane 
Sandy was successfully modelled to provide a secondary validation. The model’s 
results showed an indirect relationship between the number of hot meals distributed 
after Sandy and the modelled disruption to the food distribution network. This 
provided an increased level confidence in the results of both case studies.  The 
Sandy case study was then taken further by running other simulations to investigate 
how the resilience of the food distribution network could be increased. 
8.3 Challenges and opportunities for the future development of the resource 
model  
Challenges and opportunities for the development of the specific resource model 
introduced within this research. Within this method a data disaggregation method 
was successfully implemented by taking advantage of BRES data to estimate 
production levels within different sectors at a smaller level of geographic output. This 
allowed for an investigation into the importance of different wards and the links that 
exist between them.  
The model also successfully brought together aspects of study from different fields, 
to create a multi-disciplinary approach. It was inspired by work within the field of 
industrial ecology to develop a tool that could provide a big picture of supply chain 
resilience: this helped to explain the links between the modelled networks and their 
environments, which assisted in the development of a more resilient system.  
The risk analysis technique that was developed followed the accepted approach for 
such techniques, and so the following exercises were carried out: hazard 
identification; risk assessment; determination of the significance of risk, through the 
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vulnerability assessment; and reporting of risk, within the case study. The method 
was set up to firstly highlight  the risk to the supply network within the Shetlands from 
floods of different magnitudes. Due to the adaptable nature of this method, it could be 
reused on different case study locations, but more importantly to different types of 
hazard.  
Two limitations of the methodological approach were highlighted when carrying out 
the case study of the Shetland Islands. The first of these was that the model 
assumed that Shetland was a closed system. This took away the opportunity for the 
sites of production within the Shetlands to source products from other places outside 
of the local economy. Had this been considered, the level of resilience within the 
modelled network may have been different, although given the geography of the 
Shetlands this was a more acceptable assumption than with many other potential 
sites.  
The second limitation was based on assumptions relating to the delivery of goods. 
The model treated all products and services the same, meaning they were delivered 
uniformly, on the same day and the same size of delivery, this was done because 
data showing how often certain products and services are required by each individual 
site of production does not exist. 
A major limitation to the scope and effectiveness of the modelling is the availability of 
high resolution resource flow data. The Shetland Islands were chosen for the case 
study as the council regularly (every 10 years) carries out an input-output survey of 
the local economy. The data was as low level as readily available but it was still 
necessary to disaggregate it to smaller levels of geographic output. Ideally the model 
would have I-O data at individual site level, to allow for the model to take into account 
the individual requirements of each site. This could be combined with address data, 
meaning that the exact location of different sites would be known  and an accurate 
depiction of the flow of materials involved within the network could, therefore, be 
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made. This would¸ however, lead to a much larger number of nodes within the model, 
which could then cause issues with the processing speed of the model. 
The employment statistics used to disaggregate the data provided the number of 
employees from each sector in a ward. This was used to estimate the proportion of 
each sector’s output by ward. It therefore assumed that that there is only one site of 
production per industry in each ward, and that all of the different sites from a sector 
have similar productivity levels. In both case studies this was inaccurate, but without 
the required data those assumptions had to be made.  
8.4 Recommendations for industry 
The first of the recommendations for industry is to move away from JIT management 
strategies. This approach caused for a quick and rather drastic cascading of 
disruption in all of the modelled wards within the case study of the Shetland Islands. 
A move to a JIC approach would allow for such networks to increase their resilience, 
by adding robustness through the addition of reserve stock and bulkier deliveries to 
the system. In most situations, however, the business case for such an approach 
would need to be understood and the associated costs for such a change would also 
need to be taken into account. Issues relating to resource resilience should therefore 
become an essential part of the decision making process, meaning that a business 
should understand their vulnerabilities and how disruption to their output could affect 
the companies they supply, as well as how such disruption may cascade to other 
sections of the economy. 
A second recommendation is to encourage companies to work together, by providing 
information on the availability of products which may be sourced from more than one 
location. This would allow companies to proportionally share what resources are 
available, which would in turn lessen the effects of disruption. As part of this strategy, 
companies should attempt to source components or important products from more 
than one geographic location, and so, avoid problems such as those caused during 
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the floods in Thailand when many clustered factories producing similar components 
were affected by the same disruptive event. Other examples of this were also found 
in the literature; for example, the case of Ericsson and Nokia after the disruption to 
the supply of components for the production of mobile phones. 
If this attitude were adopted, the modification of JIT would be a viable approach to 
increase both resilience and robustness at individual sites of production, and 
therefore for the economy as a whole. As discussed in Chapter 7, such an approach 
would require some onsite stock, as well as the ability to ration supplies after 
disruption. When this was applied in the full model, recovery levels were very high 
and, therefore, resilience was also very high. This is because most of the modelled 
industries were able to bounce back to pre-disruption output within the modelled time 
period. 
These recommendations could become the basis of an industrial code of conduct or 
resource chain management guidance, with the advice being catered for different 
industries taking into account the current resilience of that industry’s supply chain. 
The approach could also be used by large corporations, such as Toyota, to test and 
accredit the resilience of the supply chains of the companies which provide the parts 
for their assembly lines. 
8.5 Recommendations for policy makers 
The New York City case study (Chapter 6) shows the need for policy makers to 
understand vulnerabilities within networks, such as food distribution. This was 
recognised by the government of New York City, who understood the need to build 
resilience into this network through the building flood of defences to protect the Hunts 
Point food distribution network. More generally, there is an urgent need for local 
authorities and national governments to undertake resource security assessments.  
Carrying out a risk analysis, such as the approach demonstrated in Chapter 5, should 
be standard practice when resource relevant development is being considered in 
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areas of flood risk. This, coupled with a requirement to report on such activities, 
would allow for policy makers to impose resilient building techniques onto 
organisations to increase resource security, as well as provide incentives for 
organisations to invest in activities to increase robustness.  A risk analysis, such as 
the Lerwick Risk Assessment (Section 5.5), can be used to analyse the effectiveness 
of flood defences at protecting the economic activity of an area, as well as to provide 
an input to a cost benefit analysis. A cost benefit analysis can provide an 
understanding of what magnitude of disruption that it is cost effective to defend 
against, which can be useful information when planning future defences.  
Policy makers should use such information to diversify the locations from which 
inputs are sourced. For example, aside from Hunt’s Point there are four other 
wholesale markets which serve New York. It would vastly increase the resilience of 
the food distribution network if some of Hunt’s Point’s capacity was shared with each 
of these, allowing the system as a whole to cope better with disruption. 
A review of the background literature (Chapter 2) identified real world evidence that 
the sourcing of a resource from a single geographic location reduces resilience to 
disruptive events. For example, this phenomenon was apparent during the 2011 
flooding in Thailand, and in the aftermath of Albuquerque factory fire, as well as   in 
the two main cases studies (Chapters 5 and 6). In these case studies it was found 
that having either: a single source for an input, such as oil for the power station on 
the Shetland Islands; or a dominant supplier, such as Hunts Point in New York City, 
can very quickly lead to disruption throughout the modelled networks. In the cases of 
the Thailand floods and the issues with food distribution in New York City, resilience 
would have been increased if like industries had not been clustered together on 
floodplains, supporting a recommendation that in future, such developments be 
avoided.  
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8.6 Recommendations for future research 
In this section various recommendations for future research that could utilise the 
methods developed in this thesis are set out.  
8.6.1 Integration with other systems 
One useful development would be to recode the model into a more modular 
approach. This would then allow it to be incorporated into larger, integrated systems, 
with modelling approaches such as that of Walsh et al. (2011), to facilitate testing a 
wider range of resilience issues. 
The developed model could also be combined with other modelling approaches, for 
example, with more detailed flooding models, which could provide a more in-depth 
and accurate representation of the flood risks. The approach could also be 
incorporated into existing models that look at interdependencies of critical 
infrastructure, allowing for an investigation into how supply chain disruption may 
affect these systems, or conversely, how disruption to critical infrastructure may 
affect the movement of resources. 
8.6.2 Scaling up analysis  
The model could also be applied at different scales and scopes; for example, the 
investigation of the material flows that are essential for the day-to-day functioning of 
a hospital, and the vulnerabilities and bottlenecks that hinder it from running 
smoothly.  
Along the same theme, it would be interesting to apply this method at a national 
scale. For example, the model could be used to recreate the events that occurred 
during the fuel protests of the year 2000 (Section 2.4.3). With such a method, 
national level vulnerabilities, comprising various different hazards and combinations 
of multiple hazards, could be highlighted. Policy adaptations could then be made to 
protect against these hazards, and the potential increase in resilience could be 
tested.  
177 
 
 
 
 
 
On a global scale the model could lead to a tracking of a single multinational 
corporation’s supply chain. Within this, a risk assessment could take place at each of 
the sites of production, to identify where resilience is low, and test ways of improving 
this; for example, by diversify supply geographically, by increasing reserve, or by 
encouraging suppliers to work together. An assessment such as this would also allow 
corporations to understand who supplies their suppliers in greater detail, which was a 
problem for Toyota after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2000. This information 
would help to increase the resilience further downstream in the supply chain, and 
subsequently increase the resilience of Toyota, or other global operation.  
8.6.3 Recovery modelling 
The development of a more detailed recovery model would also benefit the 
approach, as at the moment it does not take into account everything that a more 
specific model would, such as sites of production bringing in supplies from outside of 
the local economy. The current model also does not allow a situation in which the 
disruption affects different industries for varying amounts of time to be simulated.   
A recovery model fitting the above description could be used to aid disaster 
response. This could be done by applying the tool as a post-event assessment tool, 
and the tool could, therefore, help find relationships within a system that may have 
been unknown. 
Such a model should take into account: the amount of time needed to repair any 
damage caused by the disruption; the ability to bring in supplies from outside of the 
modelled economy, if and when they are needed; and the affects the events may 
have had on the local population, for example, has some of the workflow left the 
area?    
8.6.4 Use of real time observations  
Live data provides exciting opportunities for most avenues of research. Having 
access to live data in this field could allow for a move to finer spatial scales, where 
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the focus would be on the individual sites of production. This could assist in the 
development of a true representation of the interaction between sites of production, 
and the infrastructure that aids in the movement of resources around a system. It 
would also allow for the development of an agent based version of this model, which 
would depict the individual attributes of each of the sites within a modelled economy.  
Data which details the individual sites of production would remove the many small 
black boxes and provide an understanding of resource movement and usage at a 
micro level. This could mean that policy makers, and emergency planners could work 
with stakeholders in developing individual approaches to increase a site’s resilience, 
whilst contributing to the resilience of the system as a whole.  
Real time tracking of resources and the routes they follow would allow for real time 
decision making. Therefore, as soon as a disruption occurred, a decision could be 
made utilising transport models to plan new routes, predict traffic and, if needs be, 
provide options for the resourcing of goods from an unaffected location. This could 
lessen the effects on supply chains and the movement of resources, and increase 
the resilience to extreme and disruptive events.  
The final two recommendations would have to incorporate better understanding and 
modelling of IT systems, and how these are (or could be) utilised to manage resource 
flows. Such systems could be modelled in such a way to allow for real time re-routing 
of resource flows during a simulation, enabling demands to be met and therefore 
resilience to be further increased. 
8.7 Summary of research  
This research was carried out to develop an innovative methodological approach for 
the spatial analysis of disruption to movement of resources. This is required because 
of the increasing number of disasters which cause a cascading of failure throughout 
supply chain systems, at regional, national and global scales. Business practises of 
leaning the supply chain and geographically clustering like-industries was seen as a 
179 
 
 
 
 
 
contributing factor to the severity of cascading disruption across all of the discussed 
examples. 
Previous approaches do not take into account spatial elements of disruption. The 
developed quantitative resource model took influence from I-O analysis, network 
analysis, infrastructural interdependencies, industrial ecology, resilience, and supply 
chain risk management, as well as introducing a data disaggregation technique that 
allowed for the spatialisation of the analysis. The basic model outlined in this 
research measured the robustness to disruptive events, but with the addition of a 
recovery aspect of the model it starts to become a measure of “the ability of assets 
and networks to anticipate, absorb, adapt to and recover from disruption”,(Cabinet 
Office, 2014) and therefore a measure of resilience. 
In both of the two major case studies, it was noted that just-in-time approaches were 
the least resilient, but that the addition of bulkier deliveries, rationing of resources 
and applying on-site reserve stock increased resilience, through adding both 
robustness and redundancy to the systems modelled. Therefore, although the 
literature focuses on JIT not being a resilient approach to resource management, the 
findings of both case studies show that with subtle adaptations and organisation 
between different elements of the supply chain, a modified JIT approach becomes a 
viable approach to increase the levels of resilience to disruptive events. It was also 
noted that a diversification of supply across separate geographic locations, increased 
resilience.  
A further development of the approach was the introduction of a risk analysis 
technique, which looked at the cascading disruption caused by hazards at varying 
magnitudes.  This technique also allow for an investigation into the effectiveness of 
any protection against these hazards that may be already in place. 
It is vital to recognise and maintain the flow of vital food, materials, water and other 
resources, to ensure community resilience before, during and after any disruptive 
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event. This research has presented preliminary results and insights from a new 
resource model that couples information on consumption and demand for resources, 
within a network model. Both the New York and Shetland case studies show that a 
generic, scale free approach that can be applied to very diverse case studies. With 
the addition of the risk analysis technique, a generic metric can also be output, 
meaning that comparative studies can take place.     
The research carried out as part of this provided recommendations for industry, 
policy makers, and academics, with the goal of increasing resource resilience. 
The method successfully brought together aspects from many different discourses, to 
create a multi-disciplinary approach. It outlines a technique with the ability to asses, 
as well as predict, the damage caused by a disruptive event.  Within this thesis, the 
results from the described research have been presented for a new resource model. 
The resource model couples consumption and demand information within a network 
model. This has enabled an understanding of resource flows and disruption in time 
and space. It provides stakeholders with a tool to test strategies which lessen the 
risks, and therefore utilise these developed approaches to increase resilience to a 
variety of disruptive events. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 
Glossary 
Bulk deliveries B 
Deliveries of x amount of a required supply 
made every x days. 
Daily stock usage U 
How much of an input a site of production 
uses per day 
Demand De 
How much a site of production requires of a 
specific product. 
Demanding site k 
The site which is demanding some of a site of 
productions supply. 
Disruption / Impact D The impact of the disrupting event. 
Disruption level L 
Potential maximum level of output which can 
take place around the whole economy. 
Employees per zone e 
Number of employees from a specific sector 
in an individual zone. 
Equilibrium time te 
The number of days after the initial 
disruption that the level of disruption 
stabilises. 
Industrial sector j Specific industry from the I-O table. 
Infrastructure failure IF 
When a IL is removed from the modelled 
infrastructure 
Infrastructure links IL 
The infrastructure links between different 
sites of production 
Infrastructure network IN 
The infrastructure network rebuilt within 
networkx for use within the model. 
Injection of supply I 
Supply added to the modelled economy from 
outside of the system to allow output to 
reach normal levels. 
Input output I-O 
The accounting method utilised to show the 
interactions between different elements an 
economy. 
Just in time JIT 
Resource management strategy in which 
products are produced or delivered only as 
required. 
Length of disruption tl 
Number of days that the modelled disruption 
lasts. 
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Number of nodes N The number of sites of production 
Onsite stock O 
Amount of stock available on site in a site of 
production 
Original supply Os 
The amount of supply output from a site of 
production at normal output levels. 
Output Op 
The amount of products output per modelled 
zone 
Probability p The likelihood of something taking place. 
Proportion p̂ Equal share based on other values. 
Rationing Ps 
Proportionally sharing available supply 
between the different demanding sites of 
production. 
Recovery Rv 
Phase in the model that takes place after the 
disruption has ended 
Reserve Re 
Level of back-up stock available at a site of 
production 
Risk R 
The sum of the disruption level for each of 
the modelled flooding events, multiplied 
by the likelihood of that flood event taking 
place. 
Supply S 
The amount of supply output from a site of 
production 
Supplying site i 
The site of production providing a supply to 
meet a demand 
Time t Number of days within the model 
Time of delivery td The number of days between deliveries. 
Time reserve will last tr 
Number of days reserve will last for if all 
supply of that stock ceases. 
Time until next delivery tn Number of days until the next delivery. 
Total employees E 
Total number of employees in a specific 
sector. 
Vulnerability V 
Quantification of the impact of floods at 
differing magnitudes in the area of interest 
Water depth w The level of flood water modelled 
Zone z 
The geographic area of which the 
disaggregated I-O tables represent 
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Appendix 2: User documentation  
Requirements: 
 setupCVS.py – This is a python script that sets up the output files populated 
with the results from the model (Appendix 3) 
 full_auto.py – This is the model itself (Appendix 4) 
 para.csv – a csv with the completed parameters for each simulation ran 
 nodeType.csv – three columns showing; the node type, zone name, and 
amount of supply available at that site of production.  
 nodeDemand.csv – the input – output consumption matrix of the local 
economy 
NB The number of rows in nodeType should equal the number of columns in 
nodeDemand, with: row 1 in nodeType corresponding to column 1 in nodeDemand, 2 
to 2, 3 to 3, etc. 
Instructions 
1) Paste a copy of setupCVS.py, full_auto.py, para.csv, nodeType.csv and 
nodeDemand.csv into a folder 
2) Double click on setupCVS.py 
3) Fill in the parameters you want to test in para.csv (the headings should not be 
saved in the csv just the values) 
 
4) In the same CSV also fill in the file names where each matric will be saved. 
The examples below show the (again titles should not be saved in the csv). 
 resilience metric,  
 mean production per type of simulation,  
 percentage production at each site of production 
 demand proportion per type of simulation,  
A B C D E F
infraFail injection disruptedWard propShare recovery done
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No No
G H I J K L
merge useReserve deliveryTime reserve disruptionTime disruptionLevel
Yes Yes / No interger interger interger decimal 0-1
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 mean demands per type of simulation,  
 injection amount per site,  
 mean production per ward,  
 mean demand per ward  
 The name of the simulation 
 The sites of production that failed on each day of the simulation 
 
5) The infrastructure is rebuilt within the model and this is done simply using 
networkx.  
a. To change the number of nodes edit line 51 in full_auto.py 
b. To add or remove connections edit line 52 in full_auto.py 
c. To change the names of the nodes edit line 49 in full_auto.py 
d. To change the names of the sectors modelled edit line 48 in 
full_auto.py 
6) Double click on full_auto.py to run the model 
7) Results are saved in the CSVs created in the same folder as the script  
a. Resilience metric is saved in a text. These will only change if 
infrastructure connections are removed 
b. Mean production / demand per simulation type shows the results for 
separated out into similar simulations with just the disrupted ward 
changing  
c. Mean production / demand per ward shows the results for the different 
simulations carried out for one zone, therefore the zone stays the same 
but simulation parameters change 
d. Percentage production per site shows the output level between 0-1 for 
each site of production. A separate file is produced for every simulation.  
e. Inject amount per sector shows the amount of stock that would be 
required to be added to the system for all sectors to return to full 
production. A separate file is produced for every simulation. 
f. The disrupted by text file gives a list of the sectors affected per day of 
the simulation. 
M N O P Q
resilience meanproduction percentproduction demandproportion meandemand
resilienceB1.txt meanproductionB.csv percentproductionB1.csv demandproportionB1.csv meandemandB.csv
R S T U V
injectAmount mpWard mdWard runName disruptedBy
injectAmount.csv 27C01mp.csv md27C01.csv B1 disruptedByB1.txt
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Appendix 3: Setup CSVs 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Wed Oct 15 15:15:20 2014 
 
@author: a3041464 
""" 
 
from numpy import genfromtxt 
#runs = genfromtxt("runs.csv", dtype = str, delimiter=",") 
 
 
 
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SET UP SCENARIO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
###############################################################################      
#x=1 
#while x < len(runs): 
para = genfromtxt("para.csv", dtype = str, delimiter=",")     
r=0 
while r < len(para): 
    meanproduction = para[r][13] 
    meandemand = para[r][16]  
    injectAmount = para[r][17] 
    mpWard = para[r][18] 
    mdWard = para[r][19] 
     
    newHeader = ["DisruptedWard", "Run name", 
 "1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9","10","11","12","13","14", 
 "15","16","17","18","19","20","21","22","23","24","25","26","27","28","29"
 ,"30","31","32"] 
    newHeader2 = ["DisruptedWard", "Run name", 
 "1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9","10","11","12","13","14", 
 "15","16","17","18","19","20""21","22","23","24","25","26","27","28","29", "30"] 
    newHeader3 = ["Run name", 
"1","2","3","4","5","6","7","8","9","10","11","12","13","14","15","16","17", 
 "18","19","20","21","22","23","24","25","26","27","28","29","30"] 
    nh = ",".join(newHeader) 
    nh2 = ",".join(newHeader2) 
    nh3 = ",".join(newHeader3) 
    writer = open(meanproduction,'wb') 
    writer.write(nh2) 
    writer.close 
    writer2 = open(meandemand,'wb') 
    writer2.write(nh2) 
    writer2.close 
    writer3 = open(injectAmount,'wb') 
    writer3.write(nh) 
    writer3.close 
    writer4 = open(mpWard,'wb') 
    writer4.write(nh3) 
    writer4.close 
    writer5 = open(mdWard,'wb') 
    writer5.write(nh3) 
    writer5.close 
    print r+1, "of", len(para)  
    r+=1 
#    x+=1 
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Appendix 4: Full Auto 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Wed Jul 30 18:13:20 2014 
 
@author: Shaun Brown 
""" 
import numpy as np 
from numpy import genfromtxt, loadtxt  
import decimal 
import networkx as nx 
from decimal import * 
from scipy.stats import mode 
 
para = genfromtxt("para.csv", dtype = str, delimiter=",") 
r=0 
while r < len(para): 
    time = 0 
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SET UP SCENARIO~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
###############################################################################      
    infraFail = para[r][0]  
    injection = para[r][1]  
    disruptedWard = para[r][2] 
    propShare = para[r][3]  
    recovery = para[r][4]  
    done = "No" 
    merge = "Yes" 
    useReserve = para[r][7]  
    deliveryTime = int(para[r][8]) 
    timeUntilDelivery = int(para[r][8])  
    reserve = int(para[r][9]) 
    disruptionTime = int(para[r][10]) 
    disruptionLevel = decimal.Decimal(para[r][11]) 
    resilience = para[r][12] 
    meanproduction = para[r][13] 
    percentproduction = para[r][14] 
    demandproportion = para[r][15] 
    meandemand = para[r][16]  
    injectAmount = para[r][17] 
    mpWard = para[r][18] 
    mdWard = para[r][19] 
    runName = para[r][20] 
    disruptedBy = para[r][21] 
     
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SET UP INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
###############################################################################   
    datazones = ("27C01", "27C02", "27C03", "27C04", "27C05", "27C06", "27C07", "27C08", 
"27C09", "27C10", "27C11", "27C12", 
 "27C13", "27C14", "27C15", "27C16", "27C17", "27C18", "27C19", "27C20", "27C21", 
"27C22") 
    sectors = ("Agriculture", "Fish Catching", "Aquaculture", "Oil Terminal",  
 "Mining & Quarrying", "Fish processing", "Other food & drink processing", "Marine 
engineering",  
 "Textiles & crafts", "Other manufacturing", "Electricity", "gas & water supply", 
"Construction",  
 "Wholesale", "Retail", "Accommodation", "Catering", "Ports & Harbours", "Sea 
Transportation",  
 "Land Transportation", "Air Transportation", "Oil Supply Services", "Communication & 
supply services",  
 "Financial Services", "IT/computer related & real estate services", "Technical 
Professional other business services",  
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 "Public administration Local/Central", "School Education", "College Education", 
"Health", "Social work & other services",  
 "Other community social & personal services") 
    G = nx.MultiGraph() 
    G.add_nodes_from([0,21]) 
 G.add_edges_from([(0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 1), (0, 7), (0, 7),  (1, 1),(1, 2), (1, 
3), (1, 3), (1, 4),(1, 4),(1, 4), 
 (2, 2), (2, 4),(2, 4), (2, 5),(2, 5),(2, 5), (2, 5),(2, 5),(2, 5), (2, 6),(2, 6),(2, 
6), (3, 3), (3, 4),(3, 4),(3, 4),(3, 4), 
 (3, 4),(3, 4), (3, 5), (3, 5), (4, 4), (4, 5), (4, 5), (4, 5), (4, 5), (4, 7), (5, 
5),(5, 6),  (5, 5),(5, 16), (6, 6),(6, 7), 
 (6, 13),(6, 13), (7, 7), (7, 13), (7, 19),(7, 19), (8, 8), (8, 8), (8, 9), (8, 9),(8, 
9), (9, 9), (9, 11), (10, 10),(10, 11), 
 (11, 11), (11, 12),(11, 12),(11, 12),(11, 12), (11, 16),(11, 16), (12, 12),(12, 13),  
(12, 15), (12, 15),(12, 15), (13, 13),  
 (13, 14), (13, 14), (13, 16), (13, 16), (14, 14), (14, 18),(14, 18),(14, 18), (15, 
15), (15, 15), (16, 16), (16, 17), (16, 17), 
 (16, 17),(16, 17), (17, 17),(17, 17),(17, 18), (18, 18), (18, 18), (19, 19), (19, 20), 
(19, 20), (20, 20), (20, 21), (20, 21),  
 (20, 21), (21, 21), (21, 21)]) 
############################################################################## 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DISRUPTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
###############################################################################   
    writera = open(resilience,'wb') 
    writera.write("Before Disruption" + "\n") 
    writera.close 
    writerb = open(resilience,'a')     
    writerb.write("Sub Graphs" + "\n") 
    writerb.write(str(nx.connected_components(G)) + "\n") 
    writerb.write("k-connectivity" + "\n") 
    writerb.write(str(nx.average_neighbor_degree(G)) + "\n") 
    writerb.write("Degree Centrality" + "\n") 
    writerb.write(str(nx.degree_centrality(G)) + "\n") 
    writerb.close 
    x = 0 
    while x < len(datazones): 
        G.node[x] = datazones[x] 
        x += 1     
    ebunch=[(6, 7), (7, 6)] 
    if infraFail == "Yes": 
        G.remove_edges_from(ebunch) 
    else: 
        pass 
    subgraphs = {} 
    y = 0 
    while y < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
        subgraphs.setdefault((y), nx.connected_components(G)[y]) 
        y+=1 
    writerc = open(resilience,'a') 
    writerc.write("After Disruption" + "\n") 
    writerc.write("Sub Graphs" + "\n") 
    writerc.write(str(nx.connected_components(G)) + "\n") 
    writerc.write("k-connectivity" + "\n") 
    writerc.write(str(nx.average_neighbor_degree(G)) + "\n") 
    writerc.write("Degree Centrality" + "\n") 
    writerc.write(str(nx.degree_centrality(G)) + "\n") 
    writerc.close    
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~SET NODE ATTRIBUTES~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
############################################################################### 
    conMatrix = loadtxt("nodeDemand.csv", dtype=(Decimal), delimiter=",") 
    nodeT = genfromtxt("nodetype.csv", dtype = int, delimiter=",", usecols = (0))  
    location = genfromtxt("nodetype.csv", dtype = str, delimiter=",", usecols = (1)) 
    supply = genfromtxt("nodetype.csv", dtype=(Decimal), delimiter=",", usecols = (2))  
    inputs = len(conMatrix) 
    numberOfNodes = len(conMatrix[0]) 
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    subGraphSites = {}  
    z=0 
    while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
        subGraphSites.setdefault((z), []) 
        for x in subgraphs[z]: 
            y = 0 
            while y < numberOfNodes: 
                if location[y] == G.node[x]: 
                   subGraphSites[z].append(y)  
                y+=1 
        z+=1 
    originalDemand ={} 
    siteDemand = {} 
    conDict = {} 
    totalSupply = {} 
    originalSupply ={} 
    newSupply = {} 
    usage = {} 
    siteLocation = {} 
    demandType = {}   
    sectorSupply = {} 
    newDemand = {} 
    onsiteStock = {}  
    removedDemand = {} 
    disruptedDict = {} 
    distSect = {} 
    proportion = {} 
    sectorDist = {} 
    missing = {} 
    valueList = {} 
    stockPerStep = {} 
    injectionAmount = {} 
    totalSector = {} 
    minProportion = {} 
    nodeType = {} 
    totSup = {} 
    keyList2 = [] 
    typeOfSite = [] 
    mpList = [] 
    stopProduction = {} 
    reserveAmount = {} 
    spsRatio = {} 
    spsMinRatio = {} 
    sitesPerSector = {} 
    sitesPerSubGraph = {} 
    sectorSupply = {}  
    totSec = {} 
    originalStock = {} 
    demandProportion = {} 
    distReserve = {} 
    initialDisTFail = {} 
    initialDisruption = {} 
    nodeFailure = {} 
    idDone = {} 
    nfDone = {} 
    minDP = {} 
    mpList = [] 
    mdList = [] 
    list1 = ["Disrupted", "Failed"] 
     
    x=0 
    while x < numberOfNodes:#len(conMatrix): 
        totSup[x] = deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(supply[x])) 
        x+=1 
    for TYPE in nodeT: 
        sectorSupply.setdefault((TYPE), []) #set type of sector as key 
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    x = 0 
    while x < len(nodeT): #less than number of sites of production 
        y = 0 
        while y < len(sectorSupply.keys()): #less than the number of sectors 
            if nodeT[x] == sectorSupply.keys()[y]: # if the type of node matches type of 
sector 
                sectorSupply[y].append(decimal.Decimal(totSup[x])) #value = the totalSupply 
for that site of production 
            y += 1 
        x += 1 
    for sector in sectorSupply.keys(): # for each sector 
        totSec.setdefault((sector), []).append(np.sum(sectorSupply[sector])) #the supplies for 
each sector are added together to give the supply   
     
    y=0 
    while y < inputs: #len(conMatrix[x]):  
        typeOfSite.append(y) 
        y+=1 
    
    z=0 
    while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
        totalSupply.setdefault((z), {}) 
        newSupply.setdefault((z), {}) 
        originalSupply.setdefault((z), {}) 
        disruptedDict.setdefault((z), {}) 
        siteLocation.setdefault((z), {}) 
        conDict.setdefault((z), {}) 
        originalDemand.setdefault((z), {}) 
        onsiteStock.setdefault((z), {}) 
        demandType.setdefault((z), {}) 
        valueList.setdefault((z), {}) 
        usage.setdefault((z), {}) 
        proportion.setdefault((z), {}) 
        distSect.setdefault((z), {}) 
        missing.setdefault((z), {}) 
        siteDemand.setdefault((z), {}) 
        newDemand.setdefault((z), {}) 
        removedDemand.setdefault((z), {}) 
        stockPerStep.setdefault((z), {}) 
        spsRatio.setdefault((z), {}) 
        spsMinRatio.setdefault((z), {}) 
        injectionAmount.setdefault((z), {}) 
        sectorDist.setdefault((z), {}) 
        totalSector.setdefault((z), {}) 
        nodeType.setdefault((z), {}) 
        minProportion.setdefault((z), {})  
        stopProduction.setdefault((z), {}) 
        reserveAmount.setdefault((z), {}) 
        sitesPerSubGraph.setdefault((z), {}) 
        distReserve.setdefault((z), {}) 
        originalStock.setdefault((z), {}) 
        demandProportion.setdefault((z), {}) 
        minDP.setdefault((z), {}) 
        initialDisruption.setdefault((z), {}) 
        initialDisTFail.setdefault((z), {}) 
        nodeFailure.setdefault((z), {}) 
        idDone.setdefault((z), {}) 
        nfDone.setdefault((z), {}) 
        for key in totSec.keys(): 
            totalSector[z].setdefault((key), []).append(totSec[key][0])   
        for x in subGraphSites[z]: 
            totalSupply[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(supply[x]))) 
            newSupply[z].setdefault((x), []).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(supply[x]))) 
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            originalSupply[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(supply[x]))) 
            valueList[z].setdefault((x), []).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(supply[x]))) 
            disruptedDict[z].setdefault((x), "No") 
            stopProduction[z].setdefault((x), "No") 
            distReserve[z].setdefault((x), "Yes") 
            idDone[z].setdefault((x), "No") 
            nfDone[z].setdefault((x), "No") 
            siteLocation[z].setdefault((x), []).append(location[x]) 
            injectionAmount[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("0.00")) 
            nodeType[z].setdefault((x), nodeT[x])#.append(nodeT[x]) 
            minProportion[z].setdefault((x), []) 
            spsMinRatio[z].setdefault((x), []) 
            initialDisruption[z].setdefault((x), []) 
            initialDisTFail[z].setdefault((x), {}) 
            nodeFailure[z].setdefault((x), []) 
            minDP[z].setdefault((x), decimal.Decimal("0.00")) 
            q = 0 
            while q < 2: 
                initialDisTFail[z][x].setdefault((list1[q]), []) 
                q+=1 
            y=0 
            while y < inputs: #len(conMatrix[x]):  
               conDict[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x])) 
               usage[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x])) 
               proportion[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("0.00")) 
               distSect[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("1.00")) 
               missing[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("0.00"))         
               originalDemand[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               siteDemand[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               newDemand[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               removedDemand[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("0.00"))  
               spsRatio[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(deliveryTime*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               demandType[z].setdefault((x), []).append(y) 
               sectorDist[z].setdefault((y), "No")  
               sitesPerSubGraph[z].setdefault((y), 0) 
               sitesPerSector.setdefault((y), 0) 
               demandProportion[z].setdefault((x), []).append(decimal.Decimal("1.00")) 
               reserveAmount[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(reserve*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               if deliveryTime == 1: 
                   onsiteStock[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(reserve*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
                   stockPerStep[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(reserve*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
                   originalStock[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x])) 
               else: 
                   onsiteStock[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(reserve*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x])) + (deliveryTime-
1)*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
                   stockPerStep[z].setdefault((x), 
[]).append(reserve*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x])) + (deliveryTime-
1)*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
                   originalStock[z].setdefault((x), []).append((deliveryTime-
1)*(decimal.Decimal(conMatrix[y][x]))) 
               y+=1 
            x+=1  
        for site in nodeType[z].keys(): 
            for sector in sitesPerSector.keys():                 
                if nodeType[z][site] == sector: 
                    sitesPerSector[sector] += 1 
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                    sitesPerSubGraph[z][sector] +=1 
                else: 
                    pass 
################################################ DISRUPTION 
################################################    
        for ward in siteLocation[z]: # for every ward 
            if disruptionLevel < decimal.Decimal("1.00"): # if disruption in network 
                if siteLocation[z][ward][0] == disruptedWard: #if the site location is in the 
disrupted ward 
                    totalSupply[z][ward][0] *= disruptionLevel #level or production is 
multiplied by disruption level for each site in the ward 
                    newSupply[z][ward][0] *= disruptionLevel 
                    disruptedDict[z][ward] = "Yes" # disruption dict becomes yes 
                    demand = 0  
                    while demand < inputs: # while less than the number of sectors 
                        siteDemand[z][ward][demand] *= disruptionLevel 
                        newDemand[z][ward][demand] *= disruptionLevel 
                        distReserve[z][ward] = "No" 
                        stockPerStep[z][ward][demand] = (stockPerStep[z][ward][demand]-
reserveAmount[z][ward][demand])*disruptionLevel 
                        if demand == nodeType[z][ward]: # if equals node tyoe of disrupted 
site 
                            sectorDist[z][demand] = "Yes" # sector disrupted becomes yes 
                        demand += 1 
                else: 
                    pass 
            else: 
                pass 
        z+=1 
     
    z=0 
    while z < nx.number_connected_components(G):             
        if infraFail == "Yes": 
            for key in sitesPerSector.keys(): 
                if sitesPerSector[key] > 1: 
                    if sitesPerSector[key] > sitesPerSubGraph[z][key]:                        
#print key 
                        sectorDist[z][key] = "Yes" 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                else: 
                    pass 
        else: 
            pass 
        #timeuntil delivery needed for batch deliveries 
        for key in stockPerStep[z].keys(): # for each site of production 
            stock = 0 
            while stock < inputs: #les then the number of sectors 
                if deliveryTime > 1: 
                    stockPerStep[z][key][stock] /= (timeUntilDelivery-1) # amount to be used 
up each timestep 
                else:  
                    pass 
                 
                if usage[z][key][stock] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"):  
                    spsRatio[z][key][stock] = stockPerStep[z][key][stock]/usage[z][key][stock] 
                else: 
                    spsRatio[z][key][stock] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                stock += 1 
        for key in stockPerStep[z].keys():  
            spsMinRatio[z][key] = min(spsRatio[z][key])  
     #   print spsMinRatio 
################################################ SETUP CSVS 
###################################################     
        writerz = open(percentproduction,'wb') 
        writerx = open(demandproportion,'wb') 
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        keyList = conDict[z].keys() 
        for key in keyList:         
            keyList2.append(str(key)) 
        z+=1 
    newHeader = ",".join(keyList2) 
    writerz.write(newHeader + "\n") 
    writerz.close     
    writerx.write(newHeader + "\n") 
    writerx.close 
    writery = open(disruptedBy,'wb') 
    writery.close 
    numberOfSubgraphs = nx.number_connected_components(G) 
 
    while time < 30: 
        print time 
        ratioList = [] 
        injectList = [] 
        meanDemandList = [] 
        vl = [] 
        dp1 = {} 
        demandProp = [] 
        subSectorSupply = {} 
        disTotalSector = {} 
        subTypeDict = {} 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
            subTypeDict.setdefault((z), []) 
            dp1.setdefault((z), {}) 
            for site in typeOfSite: 
                if site in nodeType[z].values(): 
                    subTypeDict[z].append("Yes") 
                else: 
                    subTypeDict[z].append("No") 
                for node in onsiteStock[z].keys():  
                    if subTypeDict[z][site] == "No": 
                        if originalDemand[z][node][site] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"):  
                            if onsiteStock[z][node][site] == decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                stopProduction[z][node] = "Yes" 
                            elif useReserve == "No": 
                                stopProduction[z][node] = "Yes" 
                            else: 
                                pass 
                        else: 
                            pass                             
                    else: 
                        pass 
            z+=1 
        if infraFail == "Yes": 
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:    
                if time >= disruptionTime: 
                    if recovery == "Yes": #if being moddled 
                        if done == "No": #has stock been utilised previously, if yes then loop 
finishes 
                            G.add_edges_from(ebunch) 
                        else: 
                            pass 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                else: 
                    pass 
            else: 
                pass 
        else: 
            pass 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
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    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RECOVERY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################# Delivery Step ###################################     
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:  
                if time >= disruptionTime: 
                    if recovery == "Yes": #if being moddled 
                        if done == "No": #has stock been utilised previously, if yes then loop 
finishes 
                            if merge == "Yes": 
                                n = 1 
                                while n < numberOfSubgraphs: 
                                    totalSupply[0].update(totalSupply[n]) 
                                    originalSupply[0].update(originalSupply[n]) 
                                    disruptedDict[0].update(disruptedDict[n]) 
                                    conDict[0].update(conDict[n]) 
                                    originalDemand[0].update(originalDemand[n]) 
                                    onsiteStock[0].update(onsiteStock[n]) 
                                    demandType[0].update(demandType[n]) 
                                    valueList[0].update(valueList[n]) 
                                    spsRatio[0].update(spsRatio[n]) 
                                    spsMinRatio[0].update(spsMinRatio[n]) 
                                    usage[0].update(usage[n]) 
                                    proportion[0].update(proportion[n]) 
                                    distSect[0].update(distSect[n]) 
                                    missing[0].update(missing[n]) 
                                    siteDemand[0].update(siteDemand[n]) 
                                    newDemand[0].update(newDemand[n]) 
                                    removedDemand[0].update(removedDemand[n]) 
                                    stockPerStep[0].update(stockPerStep[n]) 
                                    injectionAmount[0].update(injectionAmount[n]) 
                                    sectorDist[0].update(sectorDist[n]) 
                                    newSupply[0].update(newSupply[n]) 
                                    nodeType[0].update(nodeType[n]) 
                                    minProportion[0].update(minProportion[n]) 
                                    stopProduction[0].update(stopProduction[n]) 
                                    reserveAmount[0].update(reserveAmount[n]) 
                                    demandProportion[0].update(demandProportion[n]) 
                                    idDone[0].update(idDone[n]) 
                                    initialDisruption[0].update(initialDisruption[n]) 
                                    nfDone[0].update(nfDone[n]) 
                                    nodeFailure[0].update(nodeFailure[n]) 
                                    originalStock[0].update(originalStock[n]) 
                                    n+=1 
                                for key in minProportion.keys(): 
                                    if key >= nx.number_connected_components(G): 
                                        del(minProportion[key]) 
                                        del(totalSupply[key]) 
                                        del(originalSupply[key]) 
                                        del(disruptedDict[key]) 
                                        del(conDict[key]) 
                                        del(originalDemand[key]) 
                                        del(onsiteStock[key]) 
                                        del(demandType[key]) 
                                        del(valueList[key]) 
                                        del(spsMinRatio[key]) 
                                        del(usage[key]) 
                                        del(proportion[key]) 
                                        del(distSect[key]) 
                                        del(missing[key]) 
                                        del(siteDemand[key]) 
                                        del(newDemand[key]) 
                                        del(removedDemand[key]) 
                                        del(stockPerStep[key]) 
                                        del(injectionAmount[key]) 
                                        del(sectorDist[key]) 
                                        del(totalSector[key]) 
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                                        del(newSupply[key]) 
                                        del(nodeType[key]) 
                                        del(stopProduction[key]) 
                                        del(spsRatio[key]) 
                                        del(reserveAmount[key]) 
                                        del(demandProportion[key]) 
                                        del(idDone[key]) 
                                        del(initialDisruption[key]) 
                                        del(nfDone[key]) 
                                        del(nodeFailure[key]) 
                                        del(originalStock[key]) 
                                merge = "No" 
                            else: 
                                pass 
                            for site in originalDemand[z].keys(): #every site of producion 
                                disruptedDict[z][site] = "No" # disruption dict now finished  
                                stopProduction[z][site] = "No" 
                                for key in sectorDist[z].keys(): # for every sector 
                                    sectorDist[z][key] = "No" # disruption dict now finished   
                                    distSect[z][site][key] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") # 
disruption dict now finished  
                                    if useReserve == "Yes": 
                                        if nodeType[z][site] == demandType[z][site][key]: #if 
type of node matches the type of resource 
                                            if onsiteStock[z][site][key] > 0: #if the 
onsitestock is greater than zero 
                                                if originalStock[z][site][key] < 
onsiteStock[z][site][key]: 
                                                    newSupply[z][site][0] += 
(onsiteStock[z][site][key]-originalStock[z][site][key]) #onsitestock which  matches nodeType 
is added to supply 
                                                    totalSupply[z][site][0] += 
(onsiteStock[z][site][key]-originalStock[z][site][key])  
                                                    onsiteStock[z][site][key] = 0 #onsitestock 
then becomes zero 
                                                     
                            done = "Yes" 
                            useReserve = "Yes" 
                        else: # recovery not moddled   
                            pass 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                else: 
                    pass 
            z+=1 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:  
                subSectorSupply.setdefault((z), {}) 
                for x in nodeType[z]: # while x is less than the number of sites of production 
                    for y in sectorDist[z].keys(): #while y is less than the number of sectors 
                        subSectorSupply[z].setdefault((y), []) 
                        if nodeType[z][x] == subSectorSupply[z].keys()[y]: #if the node type 
is the same as the sector type 
                            
subSectorSupply[z][y].append(decimal.Decimal(totalSupply[z][x][0])) #add new supply created 
per timestep to the dict 
                for sector in subSectorSupply[z].keys(): # for each sector  
                    w = 0 
                    while w < mode(nodeT)[1]: 
                        if len(subSectorSupply[z][sector]) < mode(nodeT)[1]: 
                            subSectorSupply[z][sector].append(decimal.Decimal("0.00")) 
                        w += 1 
                for sector in subSectorSupply[z].keys(): # for each sector              
                    disTotalSector.setdefault((z), {}) 
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                    disTotalSector[z].setdefault((sector), 
[]).append(np.sum(subSectorSupply[z][sector])) #the supplies for each sector are added 
together to give the supply 
                for node in originalDemand[z].keys(): #for every site of production 
                    for TYPE in disTotalSector[z].keys(): #while type is less than number of 
different sectors          
                        if totalSector[z][TYPE][0] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                            if disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0] >= totalSector[z][TYPE][0]: 
                                missing[z][node][TYPE] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                            elif decimal.Decimal("1.00") - 
(disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0]/totalSector[z][TYPE][0]) > decimal.Decimal("0.00"):  
                                missing[z][node][TYPE] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") - 
(disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0]/totalSector[z][TYPE][0]) #missing is the proportion of stock below 
usualy levels of poduction 
                            else: 
                                missing[z][node][TYPE] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                        else: 
                            pass 
            z+=1 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
            if time%deliveryTime == 0: 
                if time >= disruptionTime: 
                    if injection == "Yes": 
                        for site in originalDemand[z].keys(): 
                            stopProduction[z][site] = "No"   
                            for demand in sectorDist[z].keys(): 
                                distSect[z][site][demand] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                if nodeType[z][site] == demandType[z][site][demand]: 
                                    if totalSector[z][demand][0]-disTotalSector[z][demand][0] 
> decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                        injectionAmount[z][site][0] = 
(totalSector[z][demand][0]-disTotalSector[z][demand][0])/sitesPerSector[demand] 
                                    else: 
                                        injectionAmount[z][site][0] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
 
                                 
                        for site in originalDemand[z].keys(): 
                            for demand in sectorDist[z].keys(): 
                                totalSupply[z][site][0] = originalSupply[z][site][0] 
                                if nodeType[z][site] == demandType[z][site][demand]: 
                                    disTotalSector[z][demand][0] = totalSector[z][demand][0] 
                                    sectorDist[z][demand] = "No" 
                                    disruptedDict[z][site] = "No" 
                    else: 
                        pass 
 
                else: 
                    pass 
 
            z+=1 
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Working out Proportion~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################# Delivery Step ################################### 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:                        
                for site in originalDemand[z].keys(): #for every site of production 
                    demand = 0  
                    while demand < inputs: #while less than number of sectors 
                        if disruptedDict[z][site] == "Yes": #if the site is from disrupted 
ward 
                            proportion[z][site][demand] = decimal.Decimal(disruptionLevel) 
#proportion is equal to set disruption level 
                        elif propShare == "Yes": #if proportional sharing taking place 
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                           if sectorDist[z][demand] == "Yes": #if the sector is disrupted but 
site not in disrupted ward 
                                
                                if nodeType[z][site] == demand: #if node type is the same as 
disrupted sector 
                                    TYPE = 0 
                                    while TYPE < inputs: #while less than number of sectors 
                                        if usage[z][site][TYPE] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                            if sitesPerSubGraph[z][TYPE] == 0: 
                                                if onsiteStock[z][site][TYPE] / 
usage[z][site][TYPE] < decimal.Decimal("0.01"): 
                                                    proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                                                else: 
                                                    proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                            elif sectorDist[z][TYPE] == "Yes": 
                                                if nodeType[z][site] == TYPE:  
                                                    proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                                else: 
                                                    proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal(disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0])/decimal.Decimal(totalSector[z][TYPE][0]) 
#proportion becomes that value 
                                            else: 
                                                proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") #for other sites in disrupted sector proportion = 100% 
                                        else: 
                                            proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                        distSect[z][site][TYPE] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
#once set changes to zero so isnt changed in next step 
                                        TYPE += 1  
                           else: 
                                TYPE = 0 
                                while TYPE < inputs: # while less than number of sectors 
                                    if distSect[z][site][TYPE] == decimal.Decimal("1.00"): #if 
not disrupted 
                                        if totalSector[z][TYPE][0] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                            if 
disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0]/totalSector[z][TYPE][0] < decimal.Decimal("1.00"): #if percentage 
is less than 1                            
                                                proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal(disTotalSector[z][TYPE][0])/decimal.Decimal(totalSector[z][TYPE][0]) 
#proportion becomes that value 
                                            else: 
                                                proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") # else it is 1 (cant be greater than 1) 
                                        else: 
                                            proportion[z][site][TYPE] = 
decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                    else: 
                                        pass 
                                    TYPE += 1 
                        else: 
                            TYPE = 0 
                            while TYPE < inputs: # if not proportional sharing value is always 
1.00 apart from sites in disrupted ward 
                                proportion[z][site][TYPE] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                                TYPE += 1 
                        demand += 1 
                for key in proportion[z].keys(): 
                    minProportion[z][key] = min(proportion[z][key]) 
                    if minProportion[z][key] < decimal.Decimal("0.05"): 
                        stopProduction[z][key] = "Yes" 
                if propShare == "Yes": #if proportional sharing taking place  
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                    for node in demandType[z].keys(): #for every site of production 
                        testa =  np.greater_equal(onsiteStock[z][node], missing[z][node]) #if 
available (left over stock since previous delivery) stock is greater than missing   
                        for demand in demandType[z][node]: #for each type of supply (sector) 
                            if testa.all() == True: #if all results from testa are true 
                                newDemand[z][node][demand] = 
proportion[z][node][demand]*originalDemand[z][node][demand] #new demand is proportion of 
original demand (as reserve stock to make up value to 100%) 
                            elif minProportion[z][node] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                newDemand[z][node][demand] = 
minProportion[z][node]*originalDemand[z][node][demand] #if no reserve proportion is smallest 
value as that limits what can be produced  
                            else: 
                                newDemand[z][node][demand] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                for node in demandType[z].keys(): #for each site of production         
                    for demand in demandType[z][node]: #for each type of input    
                        removedDemand[z][node][demand] = originalDemand[z][node][demand] - 
newDemand[z][node][demand] #removed demand is the difference between normal demand levels and 
new ones after disruption 
                 
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~NEW DELIVERY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
############################# Delivery Step ################################### 
                for node in demandType[z].keys(): #for each site of production         
                    for demand in demandType[z][node]: #for each type of input 
                        for TYPE in nodeType[z].keys(): 
                            if demandType[z][node][demand] == nodeType[z][TYPE]: #if demand at 
node = the supply from another node 
                                if stopProduction[z][node] == "No": 
                                    if proportion[z][node][demand] == 1: 
                                        if siteDemand[z][node][demand] <= 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0]: #if there is enough supply to meet demand     
                                            totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] -= 
siteDemand[z][node][demand] #total supply reduces by amount of demand 
                                            onsiteStock[z][node][demand] += 
siteDemand[z][node][demand] #onsitestock recives 100% supply 
                                            siteDemand[z][node][demand] = 0 #demand is met so 
becomes zero 
                                        else: #if supply is less than demand 
                                            siteDemand[z][node][demand] -= 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] #site demand is reduced by whatever the available stock value is 
                                            onsiteStock[z][node][demand] += 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] #onsitestock still gets all supply available 
                                            totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] = 0 #at this site of 
production becomes zero 
                                    else: #if prooprtion is less than 1 
                                        if newDemand[z][node][demand] <= 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0]: #if if there is enough supply to meet the newdemand   
                                            totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] -= 
newDemand[z][node][demand] #total supply reduces by amount of newdemand 
                                            onsiteStock[z][node][demand] += 
newDemand[z][node][demand] #onsitestock recives 100% supply 
                                            newDemand[z][node][demand] = 0 #new demand reduced 
to zero 
                                        else: #if supply is less than demand 
                                            newDemand[z][node][demand] -= 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] #new demand is reduced by whatever the available stock value is 
                                            onsiteStock[z][node][demand] += 
totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] #onsitestock still gets all supply available 
                                            totalSupply[z][TYPE][0] = 0 #at this site of 
production becomes zero 
                                            #print "there", node, demand, "newDemand", 
newDemand[z][node][demand] 
                                        siteDemand[z][node][demand] = 
newDemand[z][node][demand] + removedDemand[z][node][demand] #site demand becomes whats left of 
new demand plus the removed demand 
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                                else: 
                                    pass 
                            else: 
                                pass 
            z+=1 
############################################################################### 
#####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RATIO OF SUPPLY RECIEVED~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
############################# Delivery Step ################################### 
        z = 0                     
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G):     
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:  
                for node in stockPerStep[z].keys(): 
                    timeUntilDelivery = deliveryTime #set time until delivery to equal 
delivery time 
                    for demand in demandType[z][node]: 
                        if useReserve == "Yes": 
                            #print "here", node, demand 
                            if disruptedDict[z][node] == "Yes": 
                                if usage[z][node][demand] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                    if ((onsiteStock[z][node][demand]-
reserveAmount[z][node][demand])/timeUntilDelivery)/usage[z][node][demand] > disruptionLevel: 
                                        stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = 
usage[z][node][demand]*disruptionLevel 
                                    else: 
                                        stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = 
(onsiteStock[z][node][demand]-reserveAmount[z][node][demand])/timeUntilDelivery 
                                else: 
                                    stockPerStep[z][node][demand] =decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                                #print "there", node, demand, "stockPerStep", 
stockPerStep[z][node][demand], "usage", usage[z][node][demand] 
                            elif onsiteStock[z][node][demand] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = 
onsiteStock[z][node][demand]/timeUntilDelivery #amount of stock per time step is  
                            else: 
                                stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                        else: 
                            if onsiteStock[z][node][demand] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                                stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = (onsiteStock[z][node][demand]-
reserveAmount[z][node][demand])/timeUntilDelivery #amount of stock per time step is  
                            else: 
                                stockPerStep[z][node][demand] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                        if usage[z][node][demand] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"):  
                            spsRatio[z][node][demand] = 
stockPerStep[z][node][demand]/usage[z][node][demand] 
                        else: 
                            spsRatio[z][node][demand] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                 
                for key in stockPerStep[z].keys():  
                    spsMinRatio[z][key] = min(spsRatio[z][key]) 
                for node in stockPerStep[z].keys():             
                    if disruptedDict[z][node] == "Yes": 
                        if disruptionLevel < spsMinRatio[z][node]: 
                            spsMinRatio[z][node] = disruptionLevel 
                        elif spsMinRatio[z][node] < decimal.Decimal("0.01"): 
                            spsMinRatio[z][node] = decimal.Decimal("0.00") 
                            #stopProduction[z][node] = "Yes"                        
                        else: 
                             pass 
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~CREATE SUPPLY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################# Delivery step ###################################  
                for i in conDict[z].keys(): 
                    if spsMinRatio[z][i] >= decimal.Decimal("1.00"): 
                        totalSupply[z][i][0] += originalSupply[z][i][0] 
                        newSupply[z][i][0] = originalSupply[z][i][0] 
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                    else: 
                        totalSupply[z][i][0] += (originalSupply[z][i][0] * spsMinRatio[z][i]) 
                        newSupply[z][i][0] = (originalSupply[z][i][0] * spsMinRatio[z][i])  
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DELIVERY DONE~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################# Every Timestep ###################################  
            else: # not a delivery time 
                if z == 0: 
                    timeUntilDelivery -= 1 
                else: 
                    pass 
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~USE STOCK~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################# Every Timestep ##################################  
            for i in conDict[z].keys(): 
                for j in demandType[z][i]: 
                    if spsMinRatio[z][i] >= decimal.Decimal("1.00"): 
                        onsiteStock[z][i][j] -= decimal.Decimal(usage[z][i][j]) 
                         
                    elif spsMinRatio[z][i] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                        onsiteStock[z][i][j] -= decimal.Decimal(stockPerStep[z][i][j]) 
                    else: 
                        stopProduction[z][i] = "Yes"   
            z+=1 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G):             
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:  
                for node in demandType[z].keys(): #for each site of production 
                    demand = 0 
                    while demand < inputs:  
                        if originalDemand[z][node][demand] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                            demandProportion[z][node][demand] = 1-
(siteDemand[z][node][demand]/originalDemand[z][node][demand]) 
                        else: 
                            demandProportion[z][node][demand] = "na" 
                        demand+=1 
                    demand = 0 
                    while demand < inputs: 
                        if demandProportion[z][node][demand] == "na": 
                            pass 
                        else: 
                            dp1[z].setdefault((node), 
[]).append(demandProportion[z][node][demand]) 
                        demand+=1 
                for key in demandProportion[z].keys(): 
                    minDP[z][key] = sum(dp1[z][key])/len(dp1[z][key]) 
            z+=1 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
            for key in stockPerStep[z].keys(): 
                for demand in demandType[z][key]: 
                    if spsRatio[z][key][demand] < decimal.Decimal("1.00"): 
                        if idDone[z][key] == "No":                             
                            TYPE = 0 
                            while TYPE < len(sectors):# nodeType[z].keys(): 
                                if demandType[z][key][demand] == TYPE: 
                                   initialDisTFail[z][key]["Disrupted"].append(sectors[TYPE]) 
                                TYPE+=1 
                    if spsRatio[z][key][demand] == decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                        if nfDone[z][key] == "No":     
                            TYPE = 0 
                            while TYPE < len(sectors):# nodeType[z].keys(): 
                                if demandType[z][key][demand] == TYPE: 
                                    initialDisTFail[z][key]["Failed"].append(sectors[TYPE]) 
                                TYPE+=1 
            z+=1 
231 
 
 
 
 
 
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G):  
            for node in demandProportion[z].keys(): #for each site of production                        
                demand = 0 
                while demand < inputs:                            
                    if len(initialDisTFail[z][node]["Disrupted"]) == 0: 
                        pass 
                    else: 
                        idDone[z][node] = "Yes" 
                    if len(initialDisTFail[z][node]["Failed"]) == 0: 
                        pass 
                    else: 
                        nfDone[z][node] = "Yes" 
                    demand+=1 
            z+=1  
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~RESET DEMAND~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################## Every Timestep #################################         
        z=0 
        while z < nx.number_connected_components(G):  
            for i in conDict[z].keys(): 
                for j in demandType[z][i]: 
                    siteDemand[z][i][j] = decimal.Decimal(originalDemand[z][i][j]) 
    ############################################################################### 
    #####~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~GENERATE METRICS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#### 
    ############################## Every Timestep ################################# 
 
            for key in valueList[z].keys(): 
                if originalSupply[z][key][0] > decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                    valueList[z][key][0] = 
decimal.Decimal(newSupply[z][key][0])/decimal.Decimal(originalSupply[z][key][0]) 
                else: 
                    valueList[z][key][0] = decimal.Decimal("1.00") 
                demandProp.append(str(minDP[z][key])) 
            for key in valueList[z].keys(): 
                for value in valueList[z][key]: 
                    vl.append(value) 
                    ratioList.append(str(value)) 
            if time%deliveryTime == 0:  
                if time == disruptionTime: 
                    if injection == "Yes": 
                        for key in injectionAmount[z].keys(): 
                            injectList.append(str(injectionAmount[z][key][0])) 
                            injection = "no" 
                        iJ = ",".join(injectList) 
                       # print "injectionAmount", injectionAmount 
                        iJL = disruptedWard + "," + runName + "," + iJ 
                        writer4 = open(injectAmount,'a') 
                        writer4.write("\n"+iJL) 
                        writer4.close 
                    else: 
                        pass 
                else: 
                    pass 
            else: 
                pass 
                 
            meanProduction = decimal.Decimal((sum(vl))/(len(vl))*100) 
            for key in minDP[z].keys(): 
                meanDemandList.append(minDP[z][key]) 
            meanDemand = sum(meanDemandList)/(len(meanDemandList))*100 
            z+=1 
        mpList.append(str(meanProduction)) 
        mdList.append(str(meanDemand)) 
    ########################################## SAVE RESULTS 
###################################### 
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        writerz = open(percentproduction,"a") 
        rL = ",".join(ratioList) 
        dP = ",".join(demandProp) 
        writerz.write(rL + "\n") 
        writerz.close 
        writerx = open(demandproportion,'a') 
        writerx.write(dP + "\n") 
        writerx.close 
        if recovery == "no": 
            if meanProduction == decimal.Decimal("0.00"): 
                time = 30 
            else:                
                time += 1 
        else: 
            time += 1 
    z=0 
    writery = open(disruptedBy,'a') 
    writery.write("Initial Disruption" + "\n") 
    while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
        for i in initialDisTFail[z].keys(): 
            listID = [] 
            j=0 
            while j < len(initialDisTFail[z][i]["Disrupted"]): 
                listID.append(initialDisTFail[z][i]["Disrupted"][j]) 
                j+=1 
            if len(listID) > 0: 
                lID = ",".join(listID) 
                k=0 
                while k < len(datazones): 
                    if nodeType[z][i] == k:                       
                        lID2 = "Node "+ str(i) + " in " + datazones[k] + ":" + lID 
                        writery.write(lID2 + "\n") 
                    k+=1 
              #  print lID2 
        z+=1 
    z=0 
    writery.write("" + "\n") 
    writery.write("Node Failure" + "\n") 
    while z < nx.number_connected_components(G): 
        for i in initialDisTFail[z].keys(): 
            listNF = [] 
            j=0 
            while j < len(initialDisTFail[z][i]["Failed"]): 
                listNF.append(initialDisTFail[z][i]["Failed"][j]) 
                j+=1 
            if len(listNF) > 0: 
                lNF = ",".join(listNF) 
                k=0 
                while k < len(datazones): 
                    if nodeType[z][i] == k:                       
                        lNF2 = "Node "+ str(i) + " in " + datazones[k] + ":" + lNF 
                        writery.write(lNF2 + "\n") 
                    k+=1  
        z+=1 
    writery.close 
    mP = ",".join(mpList)     
    mD = ",".join(mdList) 
    mPL = disruptedWard + "," + runName + "," + mP 
    mPL2 = runName + "," + mP 
    mDL = disruptedWard + "," + runName + "," + mD 
    mDL2 = runName + "," + mD 
    writer2 = open(meanproduction, "a") 
    writer2.write("\n" + str(mPL)) 
    writer2.close 
    writer5 = open(meandemand, "a") 
    writer5.write("\n" + str(mDL)) 
233 
 
 
 
 
 
    writer5.close 
    writer6 = open(mpWard, "a") 
    writer6.write("\n"+str(mPL2)) 
    writer6.close 
    writer7 = open(mdWard, "a") 
    writer7.write("\n"+str(mDL2)) 
    writer7.close 
    print r+1, "of", len(para) 
    r+=1     
print "KAPOW", "THWACK", "ZOWIE", "BAM" 
 
 
 
